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This work provides a statistical analysis and interpretation of homicide rates and
patterns in South Africa for the years 1948 to 2003. Complied from data
accessed from the South African Police Services, Mortuary Reports, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and Non Government Organisations the patterns of
homicide according to race, gender and age are analysed.
This thesis proposes that the anomic condition of South African society is a key
contributor to the creation and maintenance of the high levels of homicide found
in this society. The normalisation of inter-personal violence through the collective
conscious of communities and individuals has resulted in the growth of homicide
and its continued high levels ten years after the end of Apartheid. This
hypothesis is further supported through a survey conducted upon teenage
subjects in Kwa-Zulu Natal province of their attitudes towards the use of
violence. This work demonstrated strong positive support for interpersonal
violence by members of the police and state. The survey also showed significant
racial and gender differences in attitudes.
The anomic conditions that continue to be present in South Africa will contribute
to the weakness of the criminal justice system, and the willingness of individuals
and communities to use their own resources to combat crime rather than rely
upon the state and its agents for protection. The result being a continued high
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[1\1an is wolf to man] (Simmel 1964, p. 28)
Homicide continues to affect the social stability of South Africa. In 2002 there
were an average of sixty murders a day a rate of 47.8 per 100 000 (C.I.A.C.
2004), far exceeding the world average of 4 per 100000 and the African average
of 11.8 per 100 000 (W.H.O. 2002). The homicide rate in South Africa has
remained over 10 per 100 000 since 1968, rising to over 60 in the early 1990s
and only since 1994 has declined to its present level of 47 per 100 000. The
social, economic, political and psychological costs are high (Emmett and
Butchart, 2002; Human Rights Committee, 2000; Shaw, 2002). Understandably,
South Africans have high levels of fear of violence and crime (Burton P., du
Plessis A., Leggett T., Louw A., Mistry D. and van Vuuren H., 2004). The
continued weakness of the criminal justice system and the police to deal with the
continued crime and violence (Scott, 2002; Shaw, 2002) has resulted in a
considerable growth in the private security industry (Schonteich, 2000b), and in
vigilante activities (Sekhonyane and Louw, 2002), as individuals and communities
rely upon their own resources to provide protection and safety.
This thesis proposes that the anomic condition of South African society is a key
contributor to the creation and maintenance of the high levels of homicide found
in this society. Commencing with a literature review of homicide research in
South Africa, and the application of Durkheim's theory of anomie in international
homicide research, the theories of anomie and the collective conscience are then
explored within the context of understanding homicide in South Africa. This in-
depth review of the theory illustrates how through the application of these
theories that an understanding can be achieved of how violence and homicide
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have become normalised within the society, and why the levels of violence have
remained high ten years after the end of Apartheid.
Recognising that the factors that influence the level of lethality in an assault,
determine if a homicide occurs, and are therefore also indicators of the anomic
condition of the society, the theoretical review will be followed by an examination
of societal factors associated with homicide in South Africa. Two societal factors:
medical care of the victim and policing, and two "personal" factors: weapon use
in assaults and alcohol use are examined in how they affect lethality levels. It is
shown how a change in one of these factors can influence the lethality of an
assault, and thus influences the homicide rate. Directly influenced by state
policies, these societal factors are thus critical in the understanding of how
homicide rates can be reduced.
An analysis of historical patterns also offers a means of understanding the
present state of homicide in South Africa. Through a statistical analysis of South
African homicide rates and patterns from 1968 to 2002, the distinct differences in
homicide rates between the different race groups can be linked to the anomic
structure of the society. This analysis of homicide victims is further developed
with a study of the patterns of prosecutions and convictions of the aggressors -
those who committed murder and culpable homicide from 1949 to 1996. This
data shows how homicide levels increased dramatically in the mid 1970s, and
have not declined as rapidly post-1994, even though race, age and gender
patterns have remained generally similar throughout the study period. The data
demonstrates the endemic nature of violence in the society, and illustrates how
the violence pre-1994 was not of a purely political nature, but deeply structural,
and thus has continued.
Statistical data of homicide victims and aggressors does not however allow for an
understanding of individual attitudes and motives for using violence. To
comprehend how violence is internalised and normalised within the collective
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consciousness, a qualitative study is required. A survey of the attitudes of 580
teenagers in the province of KwaZulu-l'Jatal regarding the use of violence by
themselves and others is presented. The results of which illustrate how Pro-
violent attitudes are internalised and offer insight into the racial and gender
differences regarding the willingness to support violence. How the internalisation
of violence contributes to the anomic condition of South African society is further
explored through two existing community oriented forms of social control: the
private security industry and vigilante acts.
Legally homicide is the "killing of a human being. It may consist in the killing of
one's self (suicide) or of another (murder or culpable homicide)." (Burchell J. and
Milton J. 1991, p. 410). Sociologically, homicide is a far more complex act that
provides a key with which to analyse society. Homicides are "social facts"
(Messner S.F. and Rosenfeld R., 1999); they are social indicators of the structure
of the society. Who is killed and how they are killed reflects the deeper racial,
gender, economic, political and social structures of the society. Homicides reflect
the social stability and divisions of a society, as well as giving an indication of the
level of social control, ability of the state to effectively control, protect and
punish its citizens.
The state and public's reaction to homicides allows for enquiry into their morality
and beliefs of violence and community. The increase in vigilante killings in the
1990s in South Africa, and the continued growth in private security and gated
communities has some of the reactions by the poor and wealthy to protect
themselves from violence. The use of privatised and other non-state systems of
control and protection from crime and violence by all economic communities
demonstrates the internalised morality of relying upon their own resources rather
than the state to provide policing and security. This continued community
focused moral order serves to reinforce the anomic condition of the communities,
as they rely upon their own abilities, rather than on the centralised state.
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Homicide in South Africa has to be understood as part of the historical nature of
the society. The state and liberation movements used violence and homicide as
a tool to achieve their political aims in the struggle against Apartheid prior to
1994. The same behaviour is used in the post-Apartheid society to achieve
economic goals which can be seen in the following examples:
in the cases of violence to gain control of lucrative transport routes by taxi
organisations (Dugard, 2001; Schoeder, 2001);
in its use as a way of dealing with criminals, witches and others seen as a
threat to the safety and security of the community (Schonteich M. 2000c;
Minnaar, 2001; Harris, 2001; Valji, 2003);
- as part of the continuing violence against women and children (Vogleman
and Lewis, 1993; Motshekga, M. and Delport, E., 1993); and
- as a form of social control (von Schnitzler A., Ditlhage G., Kgalema L.,
Maepa T., Mofokeng T. and Pigou P, 2001; Schonteich M., 2000b).
Homicide has become part of the social framework, but it is only a part of the
wider use of violence within the society, a behaviour that has been moulded and
normalised by the structure of the society and the social and psychological forces
that operate within it.
Homicide is the most accurate of crime data due to the high level of reporting to
the authorities, and the general acceptance of what constitutes a homicide. Of
all violent crimes, it is most likely to be reported to the police, and can be used
to study the levels of violence within a society. There is general international
agreement on what constitutes a homicide, i.e. the killing of one person by
another, and thus cross-national and longitudinal studies can be accurately and
reliably conducted, so that a clear understanding of the levels of violence in a
society can be understood. For a study of South African crime, it is Vitally
important to use a measure that has retained the same definition through the
changing legal codes that have occurred in the past sixty years. The key
problem in South Africa was the lack of data from the Homelands, and the lack
of accurate data on Black mortality prior to 1968 (Botha and Bradshaw, 1985;
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Moon 2000). The political violence from the 1970s to the 1990s and the general
lack of trust in the police meant that many non-lethal assaults would not have
been reported, thus it is only through the use of homicide data that a reasonable
picture can emerge of the violence in South Africa. In order to more fully
understand the levels of social disorder in the society and the threat that it faces,
it is also important to study a behaviour that can be compared to other nations.
Homicide is only one possible result of a violent act. There are a multitude of
factors beyond the control of the aggressor and victim about the result of the
violent act. The ability to get the victim to adequate medical care, the skill of
medical staff, the distance to a hospital, and of course the simple very non-
scientific aspect of luck and chance: luck in not being killed, the knife missing the
vital organ, or just hitting it. This web of factors all combine to create the
homicide condition. Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1958) showed that the actual cause
of many homicidal acts is trivial, but there is a complex social structure that
surrounds the act and gives it meaning. The motives for violence, for wanting to
cause another person's death are integrated into the cultural structure of the
aggressor. In order to understand the process of violent behaviour one must
understand the social framework, and analyse the societal norms that create the
behaviour.
Violence in South Africa has a long history, one that still influences the present
society. The use of violence as a means of social control, as a form of
punishment by the state, or as an act of revenge, passion or anger predates
colonial rule (Davenport, 2000). The institutionalisation of violence and
inequality by the state first under colonial rule, later elevated by the Apartheid
system created a society wherein violence became normality. The state was
willing to use violence to crush dissent and enforce order in the country. The
Bambatha rebellion of 1906 and the Bulhoek massacre in 1921 were two such
examples, where the state demonstrated its willingness to kill those who
threatened social order. Violence, and the threat of violence was used by the
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Apartheid state to crush political opposition, most infamously in the massacres in
Sharpeville in 1966 and Soweto in 1976, as well as numerous individual
assassinations of political leaders. The routine use of the death penalty, police
torture, the establishment of death squads, and the use of the army to control
civil unrest and the funding and arming of groups opposed to the liberation
movements demonstrated the ease and normality of violence as a tool of the
state. These actions were part of the Apartheid system that involved violence
against specific individuals, as well as institutionalised violence within the social,
legal and economic structures. The level of violence that was directed at
individuals, the economic, social and political oppression that was created by the
state was, as Coleman clearly argues, a "crime against humanity" (Coleman,
1998).
The use of violence by the Apartheid State resulted in the White population
being isolated from the majority of the violence that occurred in the country.
The Group Areas Act and the Pass laws of 1950, and other Apartheid measures
ensured that the country was racially divided, and divided into high and low risk
areas for crime and violence. The townships and Homelands allowed for the
concentration of poverty and social disorder within these boundaries, and
effectively isolated the White areas from the realities of life of the majority of
South Africans.
The liberation forces also used violence to achieve their aims of ending
Apartheid. The establishment by the African National Congress (ANC) and the
Pan African Congress (PAC) of armed wings of uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) and the
Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) respectively, along with the call to
make the country ungovernable legitimated the use of violence against the state.
The establishment of self Defence Units and People's Courts in townships created
an alternative justice system, and legitimated community action against internal
and external threats. Violence became a politically legitimated method of the
liberation movement. The political rallying cry of "Kill the Boer, kill the farmer"
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by the PAC and AI'JC is symbolic of the legitimated violence within the liberation
movement. The slogan was only categorised as hate speech in July 2003 after
initially being upheld as an act of freedom of speech by the Human Rights
Commission (www.news24.com17/07/2003).
As the struggle against the state increased after 1976, so too did the homicide
rate (Coleman, 1998). The homicide rate increased from 10 per 100 000 in 1974
to over 50 per 100 000 by 1982, and continued to climb to 69 per 100 000 by
1994. However, with the gaining of democracy in 1994, the use of homicide and
violence did not drop as quickly as many had hoped. Since 1994 the homicide
rate has only declined to 47 per 100 000 by 2002, and in the same eight year
period after the end of Apartheid, the rate of attempted murder has increased
from 71 to 77 per 100 000.
Although South Africa has an extremely high homicide rate - nine times that of
the USA, and twenty nine times the rate in the UK - the demographic patterns of
homicide are similar to those in Western nations. The majority of homicides
occur, and have occurred, within a select gender and age group. Victims will
generally be males aged between 16 and 35, and killed with a weapon of some
sort, either a knife or gun. The aggressors are also in the majority male,
unmarried, and will have a low education. Males are killed at five to six times the
rate of females, and those between 16 and 30 have four to five times the chance
of being killed than any other age group. Female homicide victims and
aggressors have a similar profile to their male counterparts. The victims and
aggressors are young adults, and the aggressors are in the majority single and
poorly educated. They do however suffer a greater rate of homicide by beating
and strangulation, which is expected when the aggressor is a physically stronger
male.
Alcohol is found in a high percentage of both male and female victims of knife
and beating homicides, less so for firearms. Race remains a key social indicator
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of risk, with Coloured and Black rates exceeding White and Asian rates.
Coloured homicide in particular is extreme, maintaining a rate of over 60 per 100
000 since 1980, compared to the national average of 48 per 100 000 for the
period. These patterns of young male aggressors match closely those found
internationally, where similar patterns of aggressor and victim occur (Campbell A.
and Muncer S., 1994; Smith and Zahn, 1999). What is different is the rate of
homicides in the South Africa.
Examinations of factors that affect homicide levels provide only a partial
explanation of homicide in South Africa. The combination of weapon use, high
rates of alcohol consumption, poor policing and medical care all exist in Western
nations, so why are South African rates so high? Emile Durkheim's work on
anomie provides a framework for the analysis of violence and homicide in South
Africa. Anomie is a state of "normlessness" created by a lack of regulation in the
society. The individual is "cut off" from the social whole, their normative beliefs
unable to integrate them into the society.
South Africa is an anomic society. The Apartheid system, the racial, economic
and ethnic divisions have created a nation of multiple and competing
communities. The violent struggle for and against Apartheid, accelerating after
1976 ensured that the state was separated from being able to impose its own
order upon the majority of South Africans. These communities are, or believe
that they are isolated from the power of the state. They are more likely to use
violence to protect themselves, as they cannot rely upon the state or any other
agent to do it for them. This can be seen with the large-scale establishment of
alternative systems of order within communities such as People's Courts, Self-
defence Units, vigilante groups and private security.
In South Africa the existence of anomic communities, estranged from the greater
society has increased the use of violence and homicide as a means of social
control. Violence is used as a form of collective act of the community, a visible
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expression of their anomic condition, as they believe that they cannot rely upon
the state to provide an adequate system of social control and protection for
them. Their exclusion forces them into actions that reflect their needs and
desires. As Durkheim argues, the function of punishment acts to bond
communities together, and the forms of social control on both sides of the
struggle against Apartheid achieved just that. Communities relied upon their
own resources, their own forms of social control in order to create stability. Many
communities were alienated from the state criminal justice system prior to 1994,
others after. This alienation and anomie were reflected, and continue to be seen
in the use of violence to attack external threats, as well as to impose internal
control within the communities.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
In order to place this work within a theoretical and research context, this
literature review will examine the study of homicide in South Africa, exploring the
various sociological themes and research methodologies that have emerged.
The analysis of violence in South Africa can be divided into two broad time
periods: the pre-1994 overtly political analysis and the post-1994 criminological.
The pre-1994 research focused upon how the Apartheid system was instrumental
in the creation of violence by the creation of racist and oppressive systems of
criminal justice and policing. While the post-1994 research incorporated more
criminological methodology, focusing upon the economic and social causes. Both
periods must be reviewed to gain longitudinal perspective of homicide in South
Africa.
The trends and patterns of homicide in South Africa can be understood through a
review of the historical data. It is through the analysis of long-term trends and
patterns that a clear picture of how and why present rates are occurring. The
accuracy of data is a vital component of homicide research, as it is through the
analysis of raw homicide data that long-term patterns and trends can be
identified and valid social policy created. Homicide data was a much argued area
under Apartheid, with the state and political I\JGOs in conflict over the
classification of political homicides, in the post-1994 South Africa the debates
remain, but over the accuracy and timely release of homicide data.
Research work conducted into attitudes towards the use of violence both within
South Africa and internationally are investigated and assessed in their usefulness
to an understanding of internalisation of violence within the South African
context. This research is necessary in order to understand how pro-violent
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beliefs are internalised and enter the collective consciousness of the individual
and community, and thus sustain violence within the society.
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Homicide Research in South Africa
Homicide research in South Africa and Africa is still a relatively new field. Freed's
work (1962) marks the beginning of criminological research in South Africa. In
comparison, research in the USA can be traced back over eighty years (Hoffman,
1925; Brearly, 1932; Wolfgang, 1958), and in Europe into the eighteenth century
with the works of Lombroso (1912), Ferri (1884) and Durkheim (1897).
The sociological analysis of South African homicide can be traced to Freed
(1962), who researched the nature of crime in major urban centres in South
Africa in the 1950s. Using a research methodology that was limited to anecdotal
evidence presented in police reports and interviews with street people, Freed
suggested a link between crime and community instability. In his study, Freed
found that the majority of criminals were young Black males, who were under-
nourished, poorly educated, urbanised and had low economic stability. The role
of Apartheid laws and policies were not analysed by Freed as part of his
research, although Freed indirectly blamed Apartheid for the crime rates
amongst Black males.
Freed's work provides a necessary starting point for the analysis of homicide in
South Africa. His work, although limited in nature, offers some statistical analysis
of urban crime and violence giving an insight into the nature of reported violent
crime. In particular, comparing the work to present data, it can be seen that the
race and gender patterns of aggressors and victims have not changed in over
fifty years, although the rates and weapons used to commit homicides have.
Freed's lack of large-scale quantitative data however and reliance upon
qualitative research limits its usefulness for the analysis of homicide in modern
South Africa. The qualitative work lacks depth in its analysis of high risk groups.
The reliance upon random interviews with street beggars to gain insight into
urban crime is neither reliable nor does it offer great insight into the criminal
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gangs that operated in the townships at this time (see Glaser, 1998 and 2000 for
detailed analysis of gangs and crime in Soweto for this period).
The academic analysis and critique of Apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s
produced a critical understanding of the creation of social instability, crime and
violence within the society. These works can be seen as part of the wider
political analysis of the Apartheid system, as they concentrated upon the impact
of Apartheid polices upon the social fabric of the society. Bennett and Quin
(1988), and Davis and Slabbert (1985) argued that the state was directly and
indirectly involved in the growth of violence through the implementation of the
Apartheid laws, and the militarised and racist society that was created. The use
of violence by the police, and how policing in South Africa served as an agent of
oppression rather than of protection was further analysed by the Catholic
Institute for International Relations (1988), who argued that the SAP were a
force of social oppression, and their actions encouraged violent opposition within
the townships. The impact of the political struggle upon the society and the
resultant violence and legitimatising of violence is set out in the works of
Manganyi and du Toit (1990), and McKendrick and Hoffmann (1990). While the
militarisation and internalisation of violence within the society is shown by the
work of Cock and Nathan (1989), who argue that the state polices made the
country an armed nation, operating as a society at war. The society was
moulded into a violent, fearful and divided set of communities, by legitimising
violence against members of other communities; prO-Violent attitudes and beliefs
were encouraged and internalised, to be used against those who threatened not
just the security of the state, but also the security of the community and the
individual.
Studies of violence by the state to uphold Apartheid include the works by
Coleman (1998) and Cock (1989) who both expose the extent of the systematic
and organised planning that went into the maintenance of the Apartheid system,
as well as providing a litany of detailed reports on the scale of political violence.
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Coleman provides a chronological study of reported acts by the state against
South African citizens documented by the Human Rights Committee of South
Africa, while Cock examines how the state supported violence against citizens
through the use of the police, army and political groups. Both studies illustrate
how the state justified the use of homicide to achieve its goals, this justification
of violence went beyond state policy, and has to be seen as a significant factor in
the legitimatised use of violence in the society. The research depicts a society
racked with random and targeted violence, a nation divided where a minority
was able to live beyond the daily risks of violence that were the norm for the rest
of the society. The use of violence to achieve political goals contributed to the
legitimisation of the behaviour, and normalised it within communities of all races,
as well as the policy makers of the state and political movements.
The politically motivated violence was most acute in the KwaZulu-Natal province.
The struggle for political control of the province was fought between the ANC
and its supporters and Inkatha, supported by the state. The violence reached a
climax in the four years before the 1994 democratic elections, with targeted
assassinations and indiscriminate attacks of mainly ANC supporters. Aitchison
(1993; 1998) and Jeffrey (1997) provide analysis of this violence. They expose
its brutality, as well showing how the police had direct involvement in providing
material and intelligence support for Inkatha. The violence divided the province
into warring communities, increasing the number of firearms available and the
justifications for using homicide.
The creation of a society of oppression is seen in the works of Mathabane (1986)
and Lelyveld (1985), while the use of the police, the courts and the state to
intimidate and kill is seen in the works of Woods (1978) and Lewin (1976).
These personal accounts of the nature of political, economic and social, and
psychological oppression and violence allow for a human perspective beyond the
raw statistics of deaths. They are part of the comprehension of the complexities
of violence, its justification and methods of dehumanising its victims. It is
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however, the works of Pauw (1991; 1997) that exposes the level of brutality of
violence that occurred in the country. His description of police death squads that
operated with state support and political impunity expose not only the lengths
that the state was willing to go to maintain power, but also the willingness of
individuals to kill and torture when ordered. Pauw's works testify to the brutality
of Apartheid oppression.
These works addressed and analysed how the political and economic nature of
South Africa operated to create a society that was abnormal, violent and
oppressive. The fundamental weakness of these works is their lack of analysis of
crime and violence outside the political arena. The premise that the majority of
violence in South Africa was a result of the political struggle and oppression
failed when violence continued, and increased after the achievement of
democracy in 1994. However, their political analysis places the cause of violence
in South Africa upon the political structures of the society, thus assuming that
the change in the political structures would result in a sharp decline in violence.
If South Africa was to be seen as being in a civil war, then the end of the war
would mean an end in casualties. This however did not happen, and after 1994,
it was clear that the violence in South Africa was not solely a political creation,
but one that was caused by factors that had not been considered.
Criminological analysis of South Africa was overshadowed by the more numerous
and overt political analysis. However, Midgley, Steyn and Graser (1975) and
Midgley (1977) do provide a critical analysis of crime and the role of the state.
They detail the racial and gender differences in the rates of violence, and
contend that the racial nature of the criminal justice system ensures the
disproportionate punishment of offenders according to their race, thus further
enhancing the racial system of social control in the society. They argue that
there is a link between low socio-economic status and crime rates, as shown not
only in South Africa, but also internationally. These works build upon Freed,
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developing criminological analysis in South Africa, and developing a sociological,
rather than political understanding of crime in the society.
Ndabandaba's work (1987) brings a necessary Black South African criminological
perspective through his research into crime in the area of Umlazi, a peri-urban
township in KwaZulu-Natal. Examining the community crime patterns including
homicide, Ndabandaba found that the majority of crimes were related to socio-
economic instability caused by poor housing, high unemployment, and low levels
of relevant policing not violence directly related to political action. Ndabandaba
paints a very bleak picture of the daily life in the community, where crime and
violence were normality. He shows how violence is normality within these
communities; violence is not a result of direct political action in the struggle for
or against the Apartheid State, but as a result of the structural forces acting
upon and within the Umlazi community. Ndabandaba shows that crime and
violence in Umlazi is not a direct result of the political struggle, nor an aspect of
the struggle against Apartheid, but instead a part of normal life. This normality
of violence is an important aspect that is largely ignored by the more political
studies, which by arguing that the cause of violence in the society was
Apartheid, assumed that by ending Apartheid, violence would rapidly decline.
Ndabandaba's work refutes this by shoWing how crime and violence were
entrenched as part of the community, and to reduce this violence needed more
than a political change, but economic and social change within these
communities.
The rationalisation of violence by the individual and community is seen in the
works of Glaser (1998) and Marks (1995). They show how violence was used
and justified by township youth ostensibly in the fight against Apartheid, often in
order to create social dominance and control in the community. The
rationalisation of violence in order to create stability, control or order occurred
within the wider political struggle. This change in morality has been a vital part
of the maintenance of violence in the post-Apartheid era. The behaviours learnt
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and justified are repeated in the use of homicide to gain control of transport
routes by private companies (Schroeder, 2001; Dugard, 2001).
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Reports (TRC) (1998) provide the
greatest wealth of information of violence and homicide during the Apartheid
period. It was established in part to uncover what happened in South Africa
prior to 1994, and to serve as a means of reconciliation and allowing the country
to move forward from its violent past. The reports provide more than 20 000
personal statements from victims and aggressors, and detail the number of
political homicides that occurred. The reports detail the effects of violence upon
the individual, as well as exposing the support for the use of violence from the
leaders of the Apartheid State, the ANC, PAC and Inkatha. They are a liturgy to
the rationalisation and legitimatising of violence by groups and individuals, as
well as the willingness of many to forgive those who killed and injured in the
name of politics.
In the post-1994 period there has been an expansion of criminological analysis,
with the growth of research from several NGOs and academics. The research
groups of the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and the Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) both have been crucial in this growth. They
continue to produce critical analysis of crime, violence and policing both
qualitatively and quantitatively. The ISS in particular provides a consistent
critique of policing and other social policies in their impact upon crime and
violence, as well as conducting research into the causes and impact of fear of
crime and drug use. The work of Schonteich in particular is useful in his critical
appraisal of crime and violence in South Africa. His work details the level of
urban crime (2001), the failings of the criminal justice system to cope with crime
reduction (1999), and the public's attitudes towards criminals and how they
should be punished (2000a). He provides a comprehensive picture of the
Criminal Justice System in crisis, a public angry with this failure and willing and
able to use violence themselves to curb crime, or employ others to so. The work
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by the ISS and CSVR is a vital analytical source of data for the understanding of
crime and social disorder in the country as they continue to provide detailed
statistical and analytical analysis of crime in South Africa.
The ISS and CSVR work is further enhanced by the research of individual
criminologists and sociologists; the works by Minnaar A. and Hough M. (ed.)
(1997) and Shaw (2002) have produced key works in the understanding of crime
and violence in South Africa. Minnaar and Hough's collection provide an analysis
of different types of crime in South Africa, including "South African" acts of
violence of necklacing and witch killing. This work is an important step in the
development of a South African criminology. Shaw's work adds to Minnaar and
Hough greatly. He presents a concise quantitative analysis of homicide, rape,
aggravated assault and robbery rates and patterns since 1994. Shaw explores
the challenges facing the changing South Africa concerning violence and the
growth of the drug trade and organised crime, as well as the need and problems
facing the creation of a democratic police and safe society.
Emmett and Butchart (2002) in their analysis of violence in South Africa argue
that violence is best understood through a Foucaudian perspective. Contending
that the understanding of the nature of violence has altered with the political
changes in the country, it now rests within a public health perspective. They
argue that social policies remain reactive to the violence, and will continue to do
so. However, this does not answer the problem of why homicide occurs or
continues, only how it is interpreted and how it should be addressed. They do
not provide an understanding of the nature of the cause of homicide, and thus
without this knowledge any solution will fail.
The growth of criminological analysis in South Africa will develop the




Research of attitudes towards violence in South Africa are mainly victimisation
studies that provide insight into the general population attitudes towards the
effect of crime and the ability of the police and courts to protect them and
punish criminals. Louw, Shaw, Camerer and Robertshaw's (1998) study of
attitudes towards crime and policing in the city of Johannesburg shows that the
public have a great fear of crime, and a continued lack of faith in the police and
courts in solving the problems. This work has been updated by the Burton, du
Plessis, Leggett, Louw, Mistry and van Vuuren (2004) National Victims of Crime
study conducted in 2003. This paints a depressing picture of the realities of
crime in South Africa. The majority of respondents believe that crime has
increased, in spite of the police evidence to the contrary, and that the state is
not coping with the crime problem in the country. Segal, Pelo and Rampa's
(1999) research into youth attitudes towards crime and justice expresses the
strong desire for crime to be reduced, but a continued lack of faith in the state's
ability to achieve it.
Research of attitudes towards violence amongst South African school age
children are mainly of youth gangs and other high-risk groups. This field is
crossing into psychology, but the investigation remains grounded in the
criminological. There are numerous works on youth gangs: Segal, Pelo and
Rampa (1998), and l"1arks (1995) providing the most comprehensive studies of
gang attitudes towards violence. Both works show how violence was internalised
and justified while bound within the political struggle framework. The gang
activities were both political and criminal in nature, allowing for the justification
of violence in the political arena to be used in the criminal one. Wood K. and
Jewkes (1998; 2000) explore the use of violence within teenage sexual
relationships, again showing the internalised normality of the use of violence.
Burnett's (1998) research into violence within a single South African school in the
1992-95 period argues that there is an interweaving of the violence within the
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school and the greater community. The children learn to view violence as a form
of empowerment, internalising and justifying its use.
International research on attitudes towards violence of teenagers has sought to
understand why there is such a significant racial difference in homicide rates.
The work in the USA is the most useful, as although the high risk communities
are the racial minorities, Le. African American, they experience degrees of social
and political marginalisation, high crime, poor economic conditions and weak
family and social stability that occurs in South Africa. The link between a
positive attitude towards using violence and engaging in violence is shown in the
work of Funk, Elliott and Urman (1999), Flores, and Mock (1999), Velicer, Huckel
and Hansen (1989) and Kraus SJ. (1995). Their research shows a strong
positive link between individual attitudes and the risk of violent behaviour. The
research shows how living in a violent environment causes pro-violent attitudes
to be internalised and normalised. These attitudes are not only a predictor of
behaviour, but also an indicator of the nature of the communities in which the
subjects live. If the individual's attitudes towards using violence can be
determined, then predictions can be made as to the likelihood of the subject
engaging in violence, and policies implemented to try to alter these attitudes.
This field of violence prediction has to be expanded in South Africa. It can
provide vital insights into the future trends of violence in the country, and allow
for risk prevention programmes to be initiated where they are needed.
Understanding attitudes alone is not enough, the full scale of the levels of
homicide and violence need to be accurately documented and critically analysed
in order for violence prevention measures to be undertaken. For these measures
to work an understanding of why homicide occurs in South Africa is needed, and
for that a theoretical understanding is needed of the concepts and applications of
Durkheim's theory of anomie and the collective conscious is needed.
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Statistical Data Analysis
If homicide is to be understood and reduced, accurate statistical data is vital in
developing a clear picture of the scale and character of the issue (Maguire, 1995;
Riedel in Smith and Zahn, 1999). In South Africa the accuracy of the data and
access to it has always been problematic. There has yet to be data collection and
publication along the lines or level of sophistication of the Uniform Crime Reports
collected by the FBI in the USA. Data has been collected by two key sources:
the South African Police Services, who recorded the number of murders, culpable
homicides and attempted murders, along with all other crimes reported to or
investigated by them; and the hospitals who record the manner of death
recorded in death certificates. This data was available on an annual basis
through the Police Commissioner Annual Report, and Statistics South Africa
annual reports of causes of death for South Africa. Prior to 1968, Black South
African deaths were not required to be recorded, and deaths in the Homelands
were not recorded by Statistics South Africa, creating a gap in the data for the
period. As Botha and Bradshaw (1985), and McGlashan (1985) argue, this lack of
data creates significant gaps in knowledge needed for health planning.
Inaccurate mortality and morbidity data will not allow the state to allocate
resources to those areas in need.
In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, various NGOs and political groups collected their
own data on the number of deaths from political violence in the country (Human
Rights Commission 1994, 1999, 2000; Coleman 1998), which provided an
alternative to the official reports of political violence. Their data however is only
restricted to those deaths that were seen as being political in nature, and thus
can be open to interpretation of what was a political homicide. The
determination of what was "political" was always difficult, at no time did any of
the NGOs or police or government agree as to the exact number of "political
deaths". Although useful in creating a database that can be used to understand
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the levels of political violence, the data from these sources do not cover all
homicides in the country.
After 1994 there have been significant changes in data gathering. Firstly the
S.A.P.S. centralised their data collection into one division: the Crime Information
Analysis Centre (C.I.A.C.), who did publish crime data for the country on a
monthly basis until 2001, and has published annual data from 1994 to 2002.
The release of crime data has however been stopped by the government on
several occasions, firstly from July 2000 to May 2001 when the methodology of
crime data collation was altered and improved, and then on several occasions in
subsequent years. The Safety and Security Minister Charles Nqakula stated that
the regular release of crime data would be "demoralising" (news24.com
10/05/2002). This lack of transparency of data has been countered in some way
by the National Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS) within the Medical
Research Council (MRC) who have added greatly to the understanding of the
levels of violence in South Africa by conducting annual research since 1999 into
mortality rates, gathering data from mortuaries in the country (Butchart, 2000).
This provides data on homicide rates that can be compared accurately to the
police and government data - a vital resource in the analysis of homicide in
South Africa. Unfortunately the MRC research has yet to cover the entire country,
and prOVides as yet only a sample of the homicide patterns for South Africa. The
NIMSS data has come under criticism from the S.A.P.s., as the NIMSS data
shows higher levels of homicide than the police record. The problem of accurate





i. Durkheim and Homicide
An understanding of the causes of homicide in South Africa can be gained
through the application of Durkheim's theories of anomie, the collective
consciousness and morality. It is through these theories that an understanding
of why South Africa is anomic and thus why homicide rates have remained high.
Durkheim is rightly seen as the founder of a Functionalist conception of morality
and society (Lukic, 1974). His theories argue that societies strive towards
stability and order, and it is through an analysis of social facts that an
understanding of the deep structure of the society can be gained. His work on
suicide (1897) is one of the first systematic statistical analyses of deviance,
arguing that it is through the observation of behaviours that the strains upon the
society can be understood.
The first application of Durkheim's theory of anomie in the analysis of homicide
in Africa is that of Bohannan (1960). Bohannan's qualitative research on ten
African tribal groups in 6 countries used Durkheim's theory of anomie to explain
how homicide was constructed as a normal event within these community
groups. He showed how homicide was an integral part of the social framework
of communities, and was regulated within these structures as a normative
behaviour. He observed that violence was closely tied into the structural frame
of the community, with the belief in the spirit or ancestor world playing a
significant role in the acts of suicide and homicide. Bohannan showed how any
understanding of the causes of homicide and suicide in Africa had to be
conducted with an understanding of the micro and macro social and world views
of the communities. Imposing Western ideas and theories of deviance, without
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an understanding of local beliefs and norms in order to study homicide will not
work. He argues:
"To study African homicides...we must study not merely African ideas of
what is wrong (Le. social pathology) but African ideas of British law and
African evaluation of that law in terms of their own ideas of right and
wrong."
(Bohannan P. 1960, p. 21)
Bohannan suggests that the imposition of colonial law does not change the
community system of beliefs and normative structures, the communities will
continue to use their own belief structures to guide their behaviour. This is a
crucial aspect of any study of homicide; it is only through the understanding of
the function of homicide within the community in which it occurs will it be
understood. He argued that homicide served the function of social control within
communities, and was directly tied into the cultural morality of the society.
However, Bohannan's work relied upon qualitative research, and lacked any
broader statistical analysis of homicide in these tribal groups or their wider
societies. This wider range of research is necessary if the work is to be useful
beyond the specific geographic area and time period. There is a concentration of
research of homicides within traditional tribal groups and a lack of research of
homicide within the more organic, urban African societies. The work is set within
a specific social and timeframe, and it is thus difficult to use outside these
parameters, particularly to understand homicide in urban, industrial Africa
The application of the theory of anomie to violence and homicide has been most
prominent in the USA. Merton (1968) successfully adapted and applied the
theory to analysing crime in the United States in explaining why deviance
increased as individuals were unable to achieve the "American Dream" of
economic wealth through legitimate means. His interpretation of anomie is
however firmly fixed within the structure of the economically goal driven USA
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society, and thus not sufficient to explain homicide in South Africa in all its
various forms. The use of homicide in order to secure taxi routes (Dugard,
2001) is one area where Merton can be applied, but in the case of witch killing,
vigilantism and political killings it fails to explain the motives and reasons for
continuation.
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) further adapted the theory of anomie into the
concept of institutional anomie theory (IAT). This theory argues that non-
economic familial, educational, and political institutions to produce a more
complete explanation for serious crime. Their work has been widely applied to
the study of homicide both in the USA and internationally (Maume and Lee,
2003; Bernburg, 2002; Savolainen, 2000), arguing that rapid economic and
social change have increased homicide rates in counties and communities in
transition. These studies support Durkheim's original concepts of the impact of
social instability upon the levels of deviance, and bring a greater level of analysis
to the understanding of why homicide rates increase as social change occurs
within societies and communities. The cross-national research has significant
flaws in the wholesale acceptance of the data from the WHO and UN on rates of
employment, economic development and homicide. This uncritical approach
ignores the problematic nature of much of data on crime, violence and homicide,
particularly in low-socio economic countries, and the emergent democracies.
Botha and Bradshaw (1985) and Louw and Schonteich (2001) detail the
problematic nature of mortality and crime data in South Africa, and argue that
there has been and continues to be a significant gap in official data. The IAT
theorists assume that the societies analysed share similar paths of economic,
political and social change. To ignore the individual historical patterns within the
society, and accepting state data for homicides creates an erroneous picture of
the realities within the society.
The role of changing forms of social solidarity was studied by Clinard and Abbott
(1973), who argue that Durkheim explains crime in terms of urbanisation and
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industrialisation in terms of the change from mechanical to organic solidarity.
This shift involves a change in the methodologies and perceptions of deviance
control, from a system based upon a strong collective conscience and repressive
laws to that of restitutive laws and less strict collective conscience. When the
social system changes too rapidly for the normative and regulative systems to
deal it, crime will occur. Urbanisation will also weaken familial and community
links, freeing the individual from the traditional forms of social control, which
although less legislated are more pervasive.
This analysis of the changing forms of solidarity is further expanded by Kim,
Burke and Milner (1993) who studied 116 US metropolitan areas and showed
that deviance (rates of crime, suicide, alcoholism and illegitimacy) and
conformity to social norms (charity work and voter turnout) comprise a single
latent dimension. They argue that economic diversity increases deviance
through indirect means via mechanical, organic and domestic solidarity.
Mechanical solidarity is decreased further by racial diversity, and increases crime
indirectly, but decreases other deviance by increasing domestic solidarity.
However, Austin R.L. and Kim (1999) argue that studies of societal development
have shown weak negative relations or no relationship to homicide rates. The
role of development as classified as mechanical or organic is a contentious
criteria to accurately determine. The mechanical forms of social structure found
in rural South Africa are far removed from those studied by Kim, Burke and
Milner in the USA, and thus reduce their value outside the context of the USA.
All these studies, although useful in the understanding of the application of
Durkheim to homicide, fail in their wider application to homicide in South Africa.
Both mechanical and organic forms of solidarity exist together, interacting within
the same community structures within South African society. The change
between the two forms is not definitive, but a continuum.
Einstadter and Henry (1995) argue that the causes of crime are an aggregation
of the breakdown of the traditional moral structures, the forced division of
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labour, heightened individualism and the unsynchronised adaptation of social
structure to accommodate rapid social change. The melding of these factors
causes an imbalance in the levels of regulation and integration within the society,
increasing the chances of deviance and crime. This moral view can be seen
within the South African context, with a forced racial division of labour and the
systematic shattering of traditional mechanical communities. However, this
argument if applied to South Africa means that homicide should continue to
increase as the division of labour in the country will continue to be forced for the
majority, and the traditional forms of community wither.
There is a strong and expansive collection of Marxist and critical analysis of the
state and the institutional violence that it created. Violence interpreted through
the Marxist lens exposes the use of the state apparatus in the protection of
industry and the capitalist class (Kraak, 1993; Dison, 1989). This economic
analysis is important in the understanding of the structural nature of the social
conflict and the importance of economic conflict within the society. However,
the limited economic analysis fails to interpret the complex social dynamics
present in South African society, as violence and conflict arose based upon
ethnic, cultural and most importantly racial lines. The class conflict that Marxists
interpret was only a part of the wider social structure, and the racial divisions in
the society overwhelmed any economic divisions.
Lukic (1974) criticises Durkheim for developing theory that was imprecise in
terms of defining precisely if a social fact contributes to the self-preservation of a
specific society or of society in general. He also criticises Durkheim for the lack
of explanation of how a moral society is created in the first place. Is morality
only functional during certain times? This moral flexibility, that Durkheim fails to
account for can be observed with the support or opposition to homicides,
depending upon who the victim is. The racial bias in the punishment of
convicted murderers in Apartheid South Africa reflects this shift in morality.
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Those who killed White victims were always punished to a greater degree than
those who killed non-White victims. 1
Finally, Roshier (1977) opposes Durkheim's view that crime is functional and
inevitable, arguing that he confused inevitability with necessity. The penal
policies and crime preventative measures undertaken by criminal justice systems,
Roshier argues, is far more humane than Durkheim's theory of crime being
created and then punished to maintain social stability.
The application of Durkheim to homicide has remained as a reinterpreted theory
within the USA criminological field. It should however not remain there, as
Durkheim can be used to explain the nature and structure of homicide in South
Africa and other emergent democracies. The work by Merton and Messner and
Rosenfeld has provided a wider application of Durkheim, but does limit the work
within the industrialised USA and the "American Dream". The application of
Durkheim's concepts to understanding homicide and social structure in South
Africa is a further development of this process.
1 See Chapter 5 for more detail on the racial bias of sentencing of murder and culpable homicide
cases.
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ii. The Creation of Violence
It is in conditions of social instability that social disorder will occur, and from
social instability will come violence. The role of regulation within a society is
crucial in the creation of stability or pathology. Durkheim argued that problems
arise when there is not just a lack of regulation, but the wrong regulation.
Imposed regulation, not one that has been allowed to evolve within the social
structure, creates a forced division of labour, and thus an unstable society. The
solution to which is a change in the established order.
Anomie is an indicator of deeper structural problems. Muller argues:
" ...whereas anomie may indicate a transitional state of absence of
relevant rules, forced regulation indicates an illegitimate order,
whose unjust rules systematically create an asymmetrical division of
power which favours a small elite at the expense of the mass of
society."
(Muller 1993, p. 99)
This is reflective of the system developed under Apartheid. Regulation was a
constant factor in Apartheid policy, and this was not only for non-Whites,
controlled by the myriad of laws and regulations, but also for Whites. They were
controlled to a lesser extent, but still their daily lives were regulated, in particular
through the direct methods of the law, conscription, and apartheid measures -
also more subtly through the education system, church and media. Severe
regulation inhibits solidarity, instead of reinforcing them. The use of force to
apply the rules goes against the natural order of the division of labour and the
internalisation of the normative structures of the society. It is this point that is
vital in the application of Durkheim's ideas to the South African context. The
society had a forced division of labour placed upon it, regulated by laws that did
not reflect the majority's collective consciousness. The racial division of labour
was an extreme beyond the class divisions seen by Durkheim in France. South
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African society was constructed to be divisive, to ensure that the White minority
were able to maintain political, economic and social power over the Black
majority. The labour laws were part of this wider Apartheid system (Davenport,
1987)
The division of labour served the racially elite at the expense of the majority.
The laws that were implemented were based upon this un-natural consciousness
of the minority, and imposed with high levels of coercion.
In South Africa there has been a massive collapse in the systems of regulation
and integration. For most of the country's history the system of regulation has
been oppressive, racist and destructive. The state's forms of control were
organised in order to control the population, both Black and White, but in varying
degrees of severity. However, all were controlled.
For Durkheim it is the absence of society that causes deviance, Le. control. The
absence of society does not free them to pursue their needs and desires; rather
it lifts the goals out of their reach - driving the individuals into deviance. It is
not a "freeing" from moral restraint, but the shackling of the individual into a role
not of their control, where they can never achieve the goal that is expected of
them.
"The intense anger/frustration described by Durkheim is not realised by the
absence of society, it is created by the absence of society." (Agnew in Passas
and Agnew 1997, p. 31). The individual is forced into a position of deviance by
the lack of controlling agents. They are not "free to be deviant" as the control
theorists postulate, but instead forced into deviance due to the lack of control
and social order. For Durkheim it is the absence of regulation and integration in
the society that creates the strain. The lack of regulation results in the
production of unobtainable goals, as the individual is unable to limit their wants.
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However, the question must be asked if individuals can limit their needs and
desires? If this is so, then do those individuals not engage in deviant acts?
The political violence in South Africa is more complex than just the result of a
lack of norms. The activities of criminal gangs can be seen as part of this lack of
regulation and integration. Gang activities are an old problem, first emerging in
the aftermath of the gold rush on the Rand in the late 1800s, and continued to
flourish in the townships in the 1920s and 1950s as the migrant labour system,
urbanisation and poverty increased (Mokwena, 1991; Vogleman and Lewis,
1993). The violence associated with these gangs was not of a direct political
nature; that is they were not active in attempting to gain political power, even
though the political system of Apartheid had created the conditions that assisted
to create their existence.
There was a systematic campaign on the part of the liberation movements to
politicise people, and after the banning of the ANC and PAC in the 1960s, a shift
to the use of violence as a means of achieving political goals.
Durkheim argues that in order for the individual to avoid strain they have to have
set goals that are obtainable and they must come from an authority that they
respect; that is society or part of it. This however ignores authorities that are
feared. Society however, often does not regulate properly. Rapid social change
or the dominance of non-economic institutions do not provide limits to the goals
that are meant to be achieved - the absence of adequate social structures that
serve to regulate and integrate the individual, and regulate their desires. If the
society encourages the pursuit of goals that are unobtainable, this will also
create conditions fertile for frustration, and deviance. Rapid social change is a
catalyst for this. The absence of regulated society, a lack of an evolved division
of labour and the failure of social institutions to adapt to the change in the
society all contribute to create a situation wherein the individual will be more
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likely to engage in acts that are illegal, not based within the society's legal
structures.
A lack of recognition of the legitimacy of the state or its institutions will create
further problems. Individuals may reject the goals set by the society - because
they do not respect the society, or are not attached to it. It is the legitimacy of
the societal structures that greatly influences whether or not the individual or
community will abide by the laws.
The traditional systems that brought the populous integration, regulation and
meaning altered, changed and sometimes vanished altogether. This sudden shift
in the formal and informal structures was not recognised as a problem. The
ruling ANC believed that it would be able to continue as before, while the non-
state agencies that had previously given some form of regulation had now
altered. In the past the structures were relatively easy to identify and classify as
belonging to the Apartheid State, or those that opposed it. Thus, it was a
relatively easy process in choosing which agency one would ascribe to, and
whose norms one would follow.
The move to violence has been a path of legitimated morality and rational
actions. The actions of the individual in engaging in acts of violence are created
in their social environment. It is this social environment that has to be
understood as the key influencer and agent of behaviour creation.
Durkheim argues that the observable qualities of the individual are not the
explanation for or origin of social organisation, but that social life is both the
cause and end of these "individual" attributes. The individual does not generate
their own morality, but takes on the morality of the community in which they
exist. The actions and expressions of the individual are the expressions of the
collective (Campbell, 1981). Their morality and behaviour is that of the
community, there is no pure individual action, only that which has been
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generated from the collective consciousness of the broader community in which
the individual exists. The behaviour of the individual reflects the morality of the
community. Thus, the act of homicide reflects the greater collective
consciousness and morality of the community.
It is problematic to suggest that South Africa has a single moral order, or that
the morality of the individual is a perfect reflection of the morality of the
community in which they live. Durkheim's idea of the collective consciousness
leaves gaps as to the interrelationship of the consciousness of the individual, the
community in which they live and the greater society. South Africa is a clear
example of a society with widely differing types and forms of consciousness,
which clashed consistently during the nation's history. The dominant political
consciousness was not that of the majority of the population.
The idea of the willingly accepted collective consciousness being reflected in the
individual's behaviour ignores the role of coercion and fear. In the violence in
the 1970 to 1990s there is great evidence of this form of pressure placed upon
all sections of the society, and the creation of a consciousness that better suited
the more politically powerful than as a reflection of a legitimated authority.
South Africa has a long history of low-level continuous violence and resistance
against the state from the 1920s. Violence increased with the introduction of the
Apartheid laws after 1948, with resistance to the new regime being met with
violence by the state. In Pondoland in the Transkei open revolt occurred in 1960
against the imposition of a Bantu Authority. "'early 5000 people were arrested.
The Sharpeville massacre of 21 March 1960, where 69 people were killed by the
police in a protest against the Pass laws resulted in the imposition of a State of
Emergency, and the subsequent detention of over 18,000 people. This was
followed by the banning of the ANC and PAC, and their move towards armed
conflict against the state.
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Sharpeville marked a turning point for violence in South Africa. The state
showed what it was willing to do to maintain control, and the resistance
movements had run out of non-violent options, and began armed conflict against
the state (Davenport, 1987).
The state imposed increasingly draconian measures in order to contain political
and social unrest, while the liberation movements increased their resistance to
the state. The 1976 student uprising against the imposition of Afrikaans in Black
schools accelerated the use of violence in the country. As will be seen in the
folloWing chapters, recorded levels of homicide increased dramatically after the
mid-1970s as the political violence increased as the state increased its
repression, and the liberation movement and student movements increased their
fight against Apartheid and the fight to take control of the townships.
The violence in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s was not a new
phenomenon, but developed out of the combination of the struggle against
Apartheid, and the struggle to protect it. The creation of poor, ill-policed
townships added further to these pro-violence factors.
The economic, social and political pressures imposed upon the majority of the
population undermined the moral basis of the society. The migrant labour
system was integral in the breakdown of family and community structures in
rural areas, and for the creation of imposed divisions within the hostel system
(Johnstone, 1976). These pressures and breaking of family and community
structures weakened the social order, destroying the traditional structures of
rural society and created almost perfect grounds for the creation of violence in
the mine hostels and urban townships (Segal, 1991).
The Apartheid economic and social system destroyed the traditional bonds of
communities. The combination of urbanisation and migrant labour weakened the
collective consciousness of the traditional social structures, creating anomic
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communities, estranged from control over their labour, their families and their
lives.
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ii. Morality and Society
Morality is at the heart of Durkheim's work (Watts-Miller, 1996; Hall, 1987). The
quest for an understanding of the moral nature of society is a key underlying
thrust in his main works on the Division of labour, religion, education and his
research on suicide.
When any form of deviance is studied one must ask questions regarding the
morality of the offender who engaged in the act, and the morality of the wider
society in making this act deviant. With an act that is apparently as severely
deviant as homicide the morality of the society has to be studied closely. South
Africa has had a consistently high homicide rate, as well as extreme levels of
assault and other forms of violence against the body. The failure of the violence
to end with the coming of democracy in 1994 belayed the hope that the violence
was purely political in nature, and left the problem of how to explain and account
for the continued violence that South Africans act out upon each other. The
question that has to be asked and hopefully answered is: "What is the nature of
the morality of the South African society that creates this situation?"
At the core of any action is the motivation for engaging in the act and the
boundaries set by the society for that action. The "morality" of an act is
tempered by the "morality" of the society. The moral basis of a social system
will determine how certain acts are perceived by the individual and the
community. This in turn will affect the rate that these acts occur.
The deviance that occurs is tied closely to the attitudes within communities
regarding the acceptance of using violence. In South Africa violence was used
as a means of attaining control and power. The high levels of violence that
became a constant part of life for many in the townships resulted in many being
not only traumatised, but also inured to the violence (Ball, 1994; Olivier, Roos
and Bergh in Bornman et al., 1998; Marks, 1995). There was a lack of respect
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for life, a cheapening of the value of a person, as long as that person's death
was morally acceptable. This could mean the membership or lack of
membership of a political party, or being related to someone who belonged to
the wrong political group.
For Durkheim morality lies within the society; this in itself is more than the
physical construct:
"It is the source of morality, personality and life itself at the human
level. It is something on which we all depend whether we know it or
not." (Bellah 1973, ix)
The morality that exists within the society is a reflection of that structure. The
actions of individuals and the reaction of members of the society to their actions
will uncover the moral structures of the society. Individuals are intricately tied to
one another whether it is in a mechanical or organic social structure. Their
morality is internal to society as well as internal to themselves. The "moral act"
is however an external action, behaviour that is fundamentally altruistic (Hall,
1987).
"Morality begins with disinterest, with attachment to something other than
ourselves."
(Bellah 1973, p. 151)
This altruism does not have to be a positive act, but can be one of Violence, but
justified in the morality of altruism and thus benefiting the group.
The behaviour of the individual is limited by this "morality"; they will engage in
behaviour that they believe is moral, justified; even if this is homicide. Morality
and moral action are functional for the community. For Durkheim, society has to
seek moral ends and goals, and thus the individual has to do so too. This
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individual action is bound within the moral framework, influencing every action,
justifying and making it acceptable to the actor. Every action, even those
classified as "duties" have to be seen as "good" in order for them to be
undertaken. The creation of the moral end assists in justifying the act (Lukes,
1973; Isambert in Turner, 1993).
For deadly violence, the moral justification for such an act has to be significant.
The process of the formation of a moral code that allows for the tacit justification
of homicide is crucial in the understanding of the crisis that faces South Africa.
The acts themselves are significant in terms of the deeper social issues, the
normative structure of the society, the norms held by the members of the society
that create the process in which deadly violence is common place. The moral
order of South Africa was one based upon violence, where homicide was used as
a moral act to further political, social and economic ends. The matrix of
structural forces that interacted to create a violent morality has to be understood
within this "Durkheimian" analysis. When the moral order of a group supports
homicide, then it will be a moral act. The action of killing will be justified as
protecting and supporting the group, and the act will be one of reducing a threat
to the safety of the group, but also one that increases the internal cohesion of
the group by this act.
The actions of the "People's Courts" and vigilante groups demonstrates this
moral function. Homicide and violence were justified within a moral framework,
firstly as acts of political control wherein political opponents, government agents
or sell-outs were targeted and killed, then of crime control where the focus
shifted to criminals (Minnaar, 2001; Harris, 2001). The use of the "necklace",
i.e. placing a fuel soaked tyre round the victim and setting it alight, as a weapon
of political homicide in the townships demonstrated how violence was used
within a moral frame. The use of the necklace started in the early 1980s (Ball,
1994) and was continued into 2003. It was used as the ultimate form of
punishment for those suspected of assisting the state, and later used on
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criminals. The initial morality of this method was a form of social punishment
and social control: it would stop others from betraying the liberation movements.
It was also a means of social change, a weapon of terror to fight Apartheid. As
Winnie Mandela said at a funeral in April 1986: "With our boxes of matches and
necklaces we will liberate this country" (The Guardian, London 15 April 1986).
Necklacing acted as a means of "cleansing" the community of political and
criminal threats (Nomoyi and Schurink in Bornamann et al., 1998). The act itself
required that several people had to be involved in the killing process, thus
creating a strengthened bond between them in the act of punishment,
reinforcing their normative values and de-individualising their actions. The act of
homicide was one of creating a moral order, and thus was moral in itself. As
Durkheim argued there are no straightforward "moral facts", instead the morality
of the individual is created within the context of the society's norms, values,
customs and beliefs (Lukes, 1973).
Moral choices are for Durkheim the result of societal forces; their function is to
maintain the social world in which they live. For an act to occur those actions
have to be justified in some way; some goal must be set and the actions for
achievement of that goal learnt and practiced. These acts are based upon a
system of normative codes. Actions do not occur in a vacuum, but in accordance
with the morality of the community. "Something of the nature of duty is found
in the desirability of morality." (Ibid. p. 413) The acts that are justified
externally in the morality of the society, and internally by the internalisation of
that morality will be practiced.
"Doubtless the morality of the time is to be found in social
practices, but in a degraded form, reduced to the level of human
mediocrity. What they express is the way in which the average
man applies moral rules, and he never applies them without
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compromising and making reservations. The motives on which
he acts are mixed: some are noble and pure, but others are vulgar
and base."
(Durkheim, 1920 in Lukes 1973, p. 421)
The morality of a society must be viewed within the context of the specific time
and place of the act. The needs of the society will determine the justification of
the acts performed. But, what are the needs of the society, and what occurs
when the society is divided in what is perceived as a moral act?
Durkheim does not address the inner complexities that face many societies. His
theories support the idea of a single society that operates, and not a set of
competing communities each with divergent and convergent normative and
moral traits. For these communities in South Africa, they all fall under the same
national legal code; however, it is obvious that the moral basis of behaviour for
these communities differs widely from the codified norm.
"Moral codes are grounded in the social conditions of existence,
such that the forms of morality appropriate to one society would be
quite inappropriate in the context of another."
(Giddens 1978, p. 21)
Durkheim sets up an ideal type from which to work. One can see in the South
African context the establishment of differing moral codes that are based on the
norms and values, not of the entire society, but of the differing communities. An
"ideal type" is difficult to imagine let alone achieve in such a system. The
varying communities enhance and entrench their own systems of moral codes
and normative systems. These are both internally created and externally
introduced.
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It could be argued that the basic morality in regard to the use of violence as a
means to achieving a goal was used throughout the society, it just differed in
who the victims could be.
The moral actions of the individual are directed towards the community, rather
than the society at large. The schism of apartheid has divided the society into
fiercely competing groups, and this divide has yet to be fused. The result is that
the communities compete with each other, and turn the moral order inwards -
altruism occurs inwards, rather than outwards to the whole society.
Within a social system, the individuals are intricately tied to one another through
the systems of norms, values and mores of that social system, as well as the
society at large. We are not debating here the intricacies of how this comes
about, that is best left to those more skilled in that area, but instead we are
trying to investigate how these norms structures enable the individual and the
society itself to engage in seemingly deviant acts with little apparent regard for
the deviance of their actions or beliefs.
For Durkheim the morality of a society is closely tied into the nature of the social
system, the increasing freedom of the individual within societies that have
organic solidarity is not complete, as with the change in economic and political
structure comes the constraining of the individual in other ways. There is still a
need to belong to the society in some way. These freedoms are tempered by
the norms, values and mores of the society, no matter what the social structure.
The morality of a society will determine to some extent the rate at which acts are
engaged in. The moral nature will change over time and in particular as the
society moves from a traditional to an organic system of solidarity. The shift to a
legal-rational system of morality based within an organic framework will mean
that there will be a shift in the morality of the society.
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In South Africa, it is apparent that the moral basis is not a fixed or a single entity
shared by all. The legal system is based upon a rational-legal process.
However, this is a far cry from the actions of individuals and communities outside
the courts. There is much evidence of a long and continued belief in traditional
forms of social justice. The action of "witch-hunting" is relatively common in
some areas, as is the belief held by many in the justification of vigilante activities
against criminals (Minnaar et al. in Bornman, van Eeden and Wentzel, 1998).
The moral codes set down by the political parties in the conflict in South Africa
were subverted in their practice. The high moral ground that the AI'JC was able
to hold both internally and externally to the South African society was not always
replicated on the ground. The moral justification for killing was available, but
more than this the practice of killing was present and resolute before the political
struggle turned to violence.
In South Africa there is a situation of competing social forces. The urbanisation
of the population, and the shift and the competition between the mechanistic
and organic is ever present and visible. There is a strong power struggle that
continues with the old holders of power, and definers of morality in the
mechanistic community structures and the new political organic urbanised power
base.
The actions of the communities in supporting their members when they break
the law are another element in this argument. When people are caught in
actions that violate the law, i.e. breaking the codified moral rules, at times
members of their community view their acts as moral, as good for the
community. A case in point here is the actions of PAGAD (People Against
Gangsterism and Drugs) in the Western Cape. They have engaged in actions
that have broken the law in order to defend the morality of the community as
they see it. Can their actions be viewed as justified? If this is so, and within
their community their actions of killing those who they perceive as threats to
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their community are viewed as moral, then is this not further exacerbating the
situation within which the society becomes further divided, and internally
antagonistic. Each community seeks to define what should be conceived of as
morality, and these moralities at times not only contrasting with each other, but
also violating the national laws.
To engage in a moral act, one has to have internalised the values of the society,
or of the community. The "moral act" allows for the absolution of responsibility
for the act. Killing to protect the community is a moral act - as can be seen in
the actions of those who kill suspected witches. They are willing to admit their
acts, as they do not view them as violations of law, but an act of moral
behaviour, altruism in protecting the community from harm. This traditional
practice of using extreme violence in order to protect the community from a
perceived serious threat is viewed as a moral act, in spite of it violating the law
of the nation.
The morality of an action depends upon who is committing the act and against
whom. The morality of an act is far more than Durkheim suggests it is. It is
more than just an act of altruism, born from the need to benefit the community.
What happens when an act is committed that the community perceives as a
moral act, but the wider society, and the recipient of this "moral act" does not
perceive it as so? What should happen to the actor whose moral act violates the
nation's laws, but benefits their direct community? They are acting for the good
of the community, is this a moral act, even though it is an illegal one? If one can
view it as moral, then the act is justified by the community and the individual,
and will be repeated, either by the individual, or by other members of the
community. A later ripple effect will occur in that members of other communities
could justify their acts as moral, as the initial community had done.
Once the law has been broken once, the act of breaking the law will happen
again, and not this time restricted to the same act. If one act can be justified as
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a moral act, so can others. If an act that is illegal can be justified as an altruistic
act for the community, then so can others. Then a shift could occur in the
perception by other communities about what is justified and "moral". It is here
that the key to the problem remains. Under Apartheid, the state was able to use
the law, and other aspects of the state, including religion to make the racial
inequality, and it is upholding a moral act. Defending the state against enemies
of the state was couched in moral terms - fighting the "rooi gevaar" was a
justifiable act, an altruistic one, not only for the South African State, but also for
"Western Civilisation".
The confessions of those involved in the various acts of terror show clearly that
they saw their actions as just and moral - as they were engaged in a fight
against evil, a moral battle in which their altruism was justified, even though this
altruism involved the killing of others (T.R.e. 2000). For those opposing the
state a similar process occurred - their struggle against the state was also a
moral one. The actions of the youth in the townships were not only dangerous,
but also necessary in order to end oppression. They too were able to lay claim
to a moral shield with which to use in the justification of their actions.
"Violence is needed in our country so that we can remove all the bad things that
are there. This present regime is like a sickness that must be destroyed violently
so that better things can exist and the society can be healthier. So violence is
necessary." (Marks M. 1995, p. 13) This statement from a youth involved in the
political conflict in the Soweto township in the early 1990s reflects well with the
justification of violence used by those who supported the Apartheid state.
The morality of killing was couched in terms of either liberation or protection - as
a means to a justifiable and moral end.
Violence was perceived to be a vital part in the "cleansing" of the society.
Bloodshed and liberation were linked. The morality of the violence was
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encouraged by its framing in a political scheme. The "community" norms of the
townships, driven by calls from the ANC and PAC to make the country
ungovernable, as well as the norms of violence from the state and its agents
worked well together in the normalisation of the use of violence as a legitimate
means of achieving a political goal. From this came an internalisation of the
violence, and a spill over of the use of violence for purely political ends to those
of more social goals of control and punishment.
It is clear that a process of normalisation occurred in regard to the use of
violence, and the community was not in a position to readily control this.
"It is a fact that during apartheid, anti-human attitudes developed, and there is
an old culture of violence in this country because of the brutalised conditions
under which people lived. Elements of the police still participate in crime.
Everywhere there is a culture of impunity." (Omar D 1990, p. 57)
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iii. Cultures and Sub-Cultures of Violence
Wolfgang and Ferrecuti's seminal work on homicide argued that homicide
occurred mainly in sub-cultural groups that had norms and structural values and
perceptions that differed from the wider society (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967,
and further developed by Sampson, 1985).
This argument was well supported by the statistical evidence that they were able
to gather of homicides that showed clear economic and geographic markers for
higher rates of violence. The arguments have been further supported by other
theorists and eVidence, but also attacked as ignoring the wider role of a culture
of violence existing within a society, that can have sub-cultures of higher
violence within them. Wolfgang and Ferrecuti's work is important in any analysis
of violence in South Africa. The continued rates of homicide in the country point
to the normalisation and rationalisation of violence within a sub-cultural or
cultural aspect. They argue that it is the acceptance of norms and values that
accept violence as a non-deviant act that increases the risk of violence occurring.
This can be clearly seen in the South African context. The violence in the 1970s
and 1980s was heavily influenced by a change in norms and values about the
use of violence. A low-level war occurred, and although it was hoped that with
the end of Apartheid the violence would end, this did not occur. If a sub-cultural
argument is made here, it is clear why the violence continued due to the
internalised acceptance of violence as non-deviant and rational. However,
Wolfgang and Ferrecuti's arguments fail to provide an answer to the wide scale
of violence in South Africa, and a greater structural argument is needed. The
sub-cultural arguments are insightful, but only to a certain degree. They are
able to demonstrate how violence became normalised within the society.
The increase in homicide in the country after 1976 can be understood within
Wolfgang's framework. The creation of normative values that encouraged the
use of violence in situations that previously alternative behaviours would have
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been used can be seen. The legitimisation of violence through the political
process was crucial in this process. However, if the violence in South Africa was
along a sub-cultural level, and bounded within a political frame, then after 1994
the violence should have dramatically reduced. If the violence was politically
motivated, and was used only to achieve political goals, then with the
achievement of such goals it should have ended. As with any war, the
achievement of political and military victory signals the end of the military
conflict. The violence in South Africa prior to 1994 was viewed as part of a
military struggle, non-conventional, low level conflict, but a war nonetheless.
Violence in such a conflict is sub-cultural with a few of the population being
trained as soldiers to perceive the killing of certain others as not only legitimate,
but necessary, and that their actions in engaging in this homicide is not only
legitimate, but will be well rewarded for doing it efficiently and effectively. The
rest of the society is also taught to view the soldier's actions as legitimate,
honourable and non-deviant, helping to reinforce their behaviour. However, this
violence has limited legitimacy, only operating within the war environment. In
low-level wars however, the boundaries of the conflicts are very vague, with
civilians moving in and out of a military role. The war in South Africa was made
more complex by the struggle within the townships between the state and the
political supporters of the ANC, PAC, Inkatha, UDF, and state supported vigilante
groups.
The differential between civilian and soldier were minimal, with membership of
an ethnic group often being sufficient evidence for attack. The numbers of
trained soldiers involved were a small number, with civilians Withstanding the
worst of the casualties. It can be argued that within the townships and across
the wider community pockets of sub-cultural groupings used violence and
homicide as a rationalised means - legitimating it within a political and military
struggle, but internalising its use. What is more important however is the
altering of the wider society's attitude towards the use of violence by those given
legitimacy in its use. The presence of sub-cultures of violence within a society
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that are allowed to continue show to some degree that the rest of the society
has accepted their presence and rationalised their actions. A group that engages
in certain acts of deviance is accepted to some extent, but it does depend upon
the nature of the deviance, and the social status of the group.
In South Africa, it is apparent that violence within non-White groups was
tolerated, as long as Whites did not become involved as victims. This sub-
cultural aspect was tolerated, as it did not threaten the social order of Apartheid.
The structural nature of the migrant labour system/ the Dop system3, and the
oppression of the Apartheid system all contributed to the creation of an almost
perfect situation for high levels of interpersonal violence to occur. These policies
have been long recognised as problematic. The 1937 Report of the Commission
of Enquiry regarding Cape Coloured Population of the Union stated that the
children:
\\ ...grow up in an atmosphere of drunkenness and crime, may
be taught to beg and steal by their elders, and come to
consider such modes of life as normal, all the more because
they find them repeated in the lives of many families around
them, while the pressure of social disapproval in these matters
on the apt of those with whom they come into contact, is
often so weak as to have no deterrent effect."
(Report of the Commission of Enquiry regarding Cape Coloured Population of the
Union 1937, (UG 54-1937) pp. 19-20)
2 The mass migration of male workers from rural areas and 'homelands" to the mines and
industries of the Rand (now Gauteng). They would remain there for up to 11 months in single
sex hostels and return to their rural homes for Christmas. It is no surprise that in certain areas
the rates of violence increase during these periods.
3 The paying of workers on vineyards partly in wine. These areas have very high rates of
alcoholism, and of arrests for gross bodily harm, assault and drunkenness, but surprisingly
relatively low rates of homicide. It has been suggested that the workers get too drunk to actually
kill, but enough to fight and injure each other. (From interview with L. Jewitt, Social Worker)
This system has been in operation for as long as the vineyards have operated, and only recently
have attempts been made to stop the practice.
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The report identifies the key problems as the social disorganisation of the
communities, the extreme poverty and no way of alleviating it. It also calls for
the abolishment of the tot system, the improvement of the housing, economic,
educational and social situation of the communities. It is certainly clear that this
report was never heeded.
The problem of how exactly this sub-culture arises in the first place has not been
clearly answered by Wolfgang and Ferracuti (Hawkins, 1985; Prothrow-Smith,
1991; Turner, 1994). The creation of sub-cultures of violence are connected to
the greater social structure, and the influence of family structure, economic
deprivation, social dislocation are crucial in the maintenance of these social
groupings. Much of the work in this area has been done on homicide in the
African American communities in the USA. Their high rates of homicide, social
dislocation, economic deprivation, and social exclusion fit well into the sub-
cultural thesis (Pouissant, 1972; Oliver, 1989). However, in spite of the large
volume of work, there are still problems, especially in the translocation of the
theories from the First World into South Africa. The economic situation of
African Americans is mirrored in South Africa, the urbanised ghettos, high rates
of unemployment, and political disempowerment. However, the situation of
Black South Africans is in many areas very far removed from the social
environments of African Americans. The strong traditional mechanical social
structures of rural and in some cases urban life, extreme poverty in squatter
camps and the migratory lives of many males create a very different social
structure in South Africa. It can be argued that the "Coloured" population in
South Africa share more similarities to African-American social systems. Both are
in the minority, urbanised, suffer from high rates of arrest, crime, social
dislocation and political disempowerment. The social and economic structures
created under Apartheid assisted greatly in the creation of geographic enclaves
that assisted in the creation of a sub-cultural mentality within the "Coloured"
communities. The social dislocation and its results are clearly visible in their long
history of high rates of arrest, violence, and crime. It is however difficult to
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assess the true accuracy of the crime data prior to 1994, or even after that, due
to the extreme bias in the criminal justice system. The creation of PAGAD as a
force opposing the state after the establishment of a democratic nation it can be
argued shows that for some in this community they are still operating within a
political and social sub-culture. The economic and social system has not
changed to any great extent for this group, and thus the sub-cultural forces
remain to influence.
Turner is able to put forward a more succinct argument stating that "many
residents of the ghetto neither support nor reject violence; they simply view it as
part of the everyday phenomenon of life" (Turner 1994, p. 6). This overarching
theory of a culture of violence is more suited to the South African situation. A
society that has a normality of violence cannot be seen to have sub-cultures of
violence, but instead a culture of violence is created and maintained through the
actions of the few in committing the acts, and by the majority in their tacit
support of the violence as justified acts, or in their violent responses to the
threat of violence. Turner suggests that it is a weakening of the social norms,
not their rejection that creates a fertile field for the acceptance of violence, a
very Durkheimian perspective. The norms that usually reject the use of violence
are not used, as they are seen as irrelevant to the individual's situation. The
norms of non-violence and humane treatment of others is soon deemed
irrelevant when the environment changes to one of high risk.
The macro-level Violence, state organised and sponsored under the Apartheid
government has helped to create an acceptance of the use of Violence, and at
the same time create a culture of denial and excuse for the use of violence. As
Arendt stated, "Rule by sheer violence comes into play where power is being
lost" (Arendt 1969, p. 53). Moreover, in South Africa as the state increasing lost
control over the population so the levels of violence meted out increased with
both highly organised focus, and random terror. When the structures of power
were substituted by violence, the vanquished and vanquisher were both affected.
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The danger of violence is that "the end is in danger of being overwhelmed by the
means which it justifies" (Ibid. p. 4).
The failure of the institutions to proVide for the needs of the individual and the
community results in a separation from the state. An anomic system prevails
wherein the individual lacks integration in the wider society, and the community
lacks integration in the greater nation state. For each the social dislocation is
critical. For the individual there is an alienation from the society, a lack of
belonging and cohesion. For the community the separation from the greater
nation results in a far greater predicament. It will seek to adapt and form its
own system of moral codes and social ethics based upon the internal values held
within that group, a moral system based upon the in-group values is often more
conservative and constrictive than those imposed by the wider society. It can be
argued that this occurs in any case in all communities to some degree; however,
for the communities in South Africa the level of marginalisation is great. The
opportunities and experience to establish alternative forms of social order are
well established. The separation from the central state had been encouraged
under the National Party, and this continuance of the pre-eminence of the
community is a logical continuation of that social flow. The political acts of
setting up systems that differed from those of the state have seemingly been
continued in various forms. For some communities it has seen the subtle change
of former political groups, for others it is a more formal arrangement with the
hiring of private organisations to engage in private security.
The key problem with this community division is that it fosters a large-scale
sense of anomie, not only with the individual, who would feel cut off from the
institutions that are meant to serve them, but also by the communities in which
they live. This is a far greater problem. An anomic individual may well engage
in deviant acts against themselves, or others. However, the state Criminal
Justice System or the closer community will control these acts in a stabilised
society. When a community becomes anomic, however, the deviant acts by the
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individual which can be viewed as productive for the community will be tolerated
and even encouraged.
This can be seen in many societies, even highly stable ones, wherein a
community engages or encourages deviant or criminal acts in order to further
the aims of that community. Generally, these acts are short lived, short-term
vigilantism, before the state reinstates control. For a society that is unstable the
situation is more problematic. The members of a community who are in an
anomic state will seek to create and impose a moral order that is best suited to
their own interests, even if this is in conflict with the laws of the state. The
community will seek to maximise its benefits for itself, and perceive actions
taken by members of other communities as either supportive or oppositional to
its aims and goals. This can and does include the actions taken by the state.
The cases wherein community action has occurred in order to "protect"
community assets, whether these are housing, schools or economic
opportunities. The actions to protect "community interests" range from mild
protest to deadly action. What is deemed to be a "community interest" varies.
For many of the previously designated White communities it is the integration of
their schools and residential areas. A legacy of the years of apartheid "swart
gevaar" still bears fruit.
The "needs and interests" of the community are seemingly easily manipulated to
protect vested race and class interests. However, it goes further than this in that
the actions can and do become violent and deadly relatively easily. The actions
taken by various White communities in "protecting" their schools from racial
integration are based upon a similar belief structure in the actions of members of
a community protesting and threatening members of the judiciary when
members of their community are on trial. Both are attempting to impose their
power upon external agencies in order to further their aims. It is clear that for
both groups they do not believe that the state or its agencies have their interests
at heart, and thus perceive the need to take direct action in order to ensure a
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result that they would consider favourable. For both their actions demonstrate
that they are willing and able to resort to actions that are considered deviant and
illegal, however, for them this action is justified as being necessary for the "good
of the community".
These very public and well-recorded actions are only part of a greater structure
of anomic communities. The actions taken by the individuals within the
communities can be seen to be disassociated from a sense of greater moral
obligation to the "greater good" of the society. Violence against those who are
not members of the community is more readily accepted than violence within the
community. The acceptance of the normality and possible necessity for violence
as a means of private control and protection is supported by the separation of
the individuals in the community and the greater state institutions. The role that
the state should play in protecting citizens from harm, and providing them with
adequate support has been taken back to within the community.
Under Apartheid rule, the White communities received preferential treatment
concerning all services and policies from the state. It appeared that the state
was designed to serve just them, and provided basic services and institutions for
other racial groups as a very secondary measure. For the White communities
this ended with the 1994 election and the dramatic shift in the power and racial
structure of the new state. The actions taken by various communities, in
particular White Afrikaner communities showed that they felt that they were able
to and could succeed in creating a community separate from the greater society.
The establishment of the town of Oranje is a case in point. The calls for a
"Afrikaner Homeland" made by the various right wing groups was an effort to try
to maintain their cultural identity, but also to create separate community clearly
split from the society in which they dwelt. The government allowed the
establishment of the town based upon purely racial lines, but would not allow for
the establishment of a greater "homeland". The historical evidence of the
impoverishment caused by the Homeland system is evidence enough of the
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dangers of creating a more federal system of nation, the disunity of the past had
to be eliminated through the unity of the political and social future. The
economic communities can also be seen in the various cities in the country, with
an increasing number of "gated communities", walled and secured suburbs in the
wealthier areas. These "communities" are not distinct in their racial enclave, but
economic. The social control maintained by private security, not the S.A.P.S.
These communities are not viewed as a threat to the stability of social order in
the society; however, they are a visible creation of the division of the society into
separate communities. The oddity is that in a country with such a history of
racial divide, these enclaves are based upon economic power. The gated
communities rely upon the work of private security to impose control, the state
police playing a secondary role. Although these communities are not the sole
preserve of South Africa, as they are well founded and growing in many First
World countries, in particular the USA, they emphasise a different phenomenon
here.
These communities have to be viewed within the greater social structure of a
divided society, based upon the primacy of the community, and the under
reliance upon the state. For the previously advantaged communities a sense of
marginalisation has occurred. A belief in the loss of access to the centre of
power, and this lack of influence has spilt over into the creation of separate
institutions to provide for their needs, and thus relying less upon the state for
their needs, and less upon the traditional institutions for the sense of community
and integration and regulation. The shift away from the core institutions is
understandable as they have changed rapidly and for many they perceive those
institutions as no longer serving their needs or reflecting their interests.
Combined with this is the lack of belief in being able to bring about any change
for their interests by the state, so instead they seek to establish and protect their
own institutions that will serve them and further reduce any links with the state
or wider community.
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The social changes that occurred in the 1990s created several expectations for
the South African society. For many it was the hope that their needs and
aspirations would be addressed, that as "their" political party was now in power,
that the state institutions would now serve them as a priority. The failure of the
criminal justice system to deal with crime, and the continued levels of daily
violence.
For the individual there exists a dual set of consciousness, as Gramsci postulated
in his prison writings. A "popular morality" of tradition, and another of "official
morality" (Gramsci, 1971). This duality allows for the individual to operate both
in a mechanical and organic universe. The calling for varying forms of justice will
depend upon the nature of the offence, the victim, the offender and the actions
by the state. The willingness to move outside the boundaries of the state
criminal justice system and to rely upon the actions of "tradition" fit into this
matrix.
As in the situation of small groups that are based upon mechanical forms of
solidarity, the systems of moral order are created and reinforced within that





Research shows that there are a complex set of social factors that affect
homicide rates and patterns in society (Sampson, 1987; Smith and Zahn, 1999;
Wolfgang, 1958; Brown, 1999). Economic discrimination and inequality
(Neapolitan, 1994; 1996; Messner, 1989), family structure (Gartner, 1990), age
of population (Heide, 1999) and race (Wolfgang, 1958; Hawkins, 1999) all affect
the homicide rates in societies. The effects of state social control through the
use of the death penalty upon homicide rates are widely argued (Baily and
Peterson, 1999; Bowers, 1988), as are other forms of social control. The factors
that directly influence homicide are linked into the wider social nexus, the mere
presence of these factors on their own is not enough for homicides to occur,
what is needed are further social pressures to act upon the individual.
Within South African society specific pressures have ensured that certain factors
play a greater role in the creation of the homicide environment than others. The
affects of firearm use, alcohol consumption, policing and medical care all interact
in South African society to influence the nature of violence and homicide. These
factors are crucial in understanding the complex nature of homicide in South
Africa, as well as predicting in what manner it will occur in the future. These
factors demonstrate the unique contribution and impact that the Apartheid
system has had upon the society, and how the present nature of homicide in
South Africa continues to struggle with this legacy. The anomic nature of the
society is shown and enhanced through these factors.
Homicide occurs in a social environnent. That environment is directly and
indirectly influenced by a series of forces that will positively or negatively affect
the homicide rate. Cross-national and national research has shown that
economic inequality is the most consistent of factors in positively affecting
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homicide rates (Messner, 1989, 2001; Neapoliton, 1996), while unemployment
was not found to have an effect (Kapuscinski et al., 1998; Smith et al., 1992).
The level of urbanisation was found not to be a factor (Messner, 1980, 1982;
Neapoliton, 1996) while research on the impact of the age structure of the
population on homicide rates varied from a positive relationship (Ortega et al.,
1992), a negative relationship (Bennett, 1991) and no relationship (Messner,
1989; Neapoliton, 1994).
In the case of firearms, there is overwhelming evidence of the positive impact
they have upon the homicide rate (Kellerman, 2001; Miller et al., 2002). Alcohol
consumption has a similar effect (Shaw and Louw, 1997), while the impact of
policing (Smith and Zahn, 1998; Garland, 1985) and medical care (Harris et al.,
2002) can have both a positive or negative impact upon homicide rates. In
South Africa the four factors of firearms, alcohol use, policing and medical care
are all crucial in the understanding of the past rates and patterns of violence, as
well as allowing for a greater understanding of the nature of present and future
trends.
These factors are not unique to South Africa, but they are critical in achieving a
clearer understanding of homicide in that country. South Africa's present
homicide rates and patterns are the result in part of the country's past. The
racial divisions, the legal, social, economic and political constructs of the
Apartheid system continue to influence the present. The intentional and
unintentional constructs that were created prior to 1994 assisted in the building
of an extremely violent society where a culture of violence was maintained and
encouraged.
Four key factors in the creation of homicides will be studied in this chapter:
weapon use, alcohol consumption, medical care and policing. All these factors
have been found to affect the rates of homicide in international research,
however for South Africa they are particularly important due to their historical
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construction and continued impact upon the levels and patterns of homicide in
the present society.
The police in Apartheid South Africa operated along the lines of a para-military
force, tasked to crush political dissent and social unrest rather than solve and
reduce crime (Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1988; Coleman,
1988; Cock and Nathan, 1989). Their expected policing functions were usurped
by the political demands of the state. The police were not able to reduce levels
of violence in the country, partly because they were the cause of some of the
violence. The majority of the South African population did not trust or support
the SAP, adding to their failure to solve crime. The creation of alternate policing
structures by the ANC, PAC and Inkatha within townships and Homelands were a
response to the politicisation and militarisation of the SAP. These alternate
structures also did not function adequately as defacto police, but instead as
instruments of political control and influence. The creation of a credible,
effective and representative police force has been a priority for the government
since 1994. The ability to achieve this will greatly affect future levels of violence
and homicide in the society.
Medical care will often determine if an assault results in a death or not (Doener,
1985, 1988; Gaicopasi et al., 1992). The ability to get an injured person to
adequate medical care within the first hour is recognised as crucial in the
determination of their survival. This post-facto element in South Africa is again
influenced by the historical divisions of Apartheid. The creation of a medical
service that was designed primarily for the benefit of the minority White
population to the detriment of the other race groups affected morbidity rates.
The difference in available care would affect the survivability of assaults and thus
affect the homicide rates. The level that this occurred is however unknown. The
transformation of medical care in South Africa, like the police, has been a priority
for the state. The health service however faces new pressures from the AIDS
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epidemic that once more will affect the ability of hospitals to provide adequate
care for assault victims.
An estimated half of South African adults drink alcohol, those that do drink
consume the equivalent of 20 litres of pure alcohol per year. Many consistently
consume the equivalent of over 30 grams per day, or over 100 litres per year.
The world average is 6 litres per year (WHO Global Alcohol Database, 2004;
Parry, 2000). This consumption is further exacerbated by the historical practice
of the Dop system in the Western and Northern Cape, which involved the part
payment of farm workers in alcohol. This practice, now illegal, helped create an
environment of poverty, abuse and violence amongst the farm workers. The
drinking trends of South Africans continue to play an important role in the
creation of abusive and dangerous familial and social situations. The entrenched
nature of alcohol abuse and binge drinking helps to maintain a violent structure
in the society. Alcohol acts as an enhancer of high-risk environments. The
results of the excessive consumption of alcohol in South Africa can be seen in the
extreme rates of assault and violence in the areas where this pattern of
consumption is the norm.
The nature of homicides has changed dramatically in the last twenty years. Prior
to 1990 the majority of homicides were with a stabbing or cutting weapon, less
than 10% of all homicides were by firearm. Only Whites were killed in significant
numbers with firearms, these mainly by other Whites. Legal firearm ownership
meant that the majority of firearms were owned by the White population, and
the result of this can be seen in their homicide patterns. Although many political
killings were carried out with firearms, their use was limited. Since 1990
homicide by firearm has rapidly increased to just less than 50%. The increase in
firearm ownership in the 1990s combined with an influx of illegal weapons and a
high number of lost and stolen firearms entering the society have all contributed
to this shift. This dramatic change has to be understood as a significant and
dangerous long-term trend that will help to keep homicide rates at a high level.
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These four factors are crucial in the understanding of the present nature of
homicide in South Africa and how it will change in the future. They are not only
important influencers that can be influenced to affect the levels of homicide, but
also indicators for the state of violence in the society. Each of these factors will
be analysed individually in terms of how they directly and indirectly affect the
rate of violence and homicide in South Africa.
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i. Weapon Use
A weapon is not necessary to kill someone, but using a weapon will increase the
chance that the victim will die. A weapon of some form causes the vast majority
of homicides, be it a knife, firearm or blunt instrument. Weapons increase the
lethality of the violent act, and research has clearly demonstrated the direct
correlation between the carrying of a weapon and the increased risk of violence
and homicide (Wolfgang, 1958; Kellerman, 1993; Cummings et al., 1997;
Perkins, 2003). The act of killing is made, in relative terms, an easier task.
When firearms become the most used weapons in homicides, the society faces a
serious long-term problem.
Killing another person is a difficult psychological task. The ground-breaking work
by Marshall (1978) showed that only 15 to 20% of US soldiers in the Second
World War fired their rifles at the enemy. These men, trained to kill, armed with
sophisticated weapons that allowed them to kill at a distance (an "easier" task
than being within knife range), and in a situation that ensured that if they did
not kill, they had a very good chance of being killed, did not act. This low rate of
killing has been seen throughout history, and in many armies (Grossman, 1995;
Dyer, 1985; Holmes, 1985). The use of improved training techniques in modern
armies has improved this rate of firing, but there is still a lack of desire to kill
another human being (Grossman, 1995). There are those who enjoy killing,
some soldiers have relished the act of killing another person (Bourke, 1999). In
addition, there are far too many cases of soldiers and civilians engaging in acts
of senseless brutality against those they consider to be the enemy (Grossman,
1995; Jeffrey, 1997; Pauw, 1991, 1997; Fromm, 1973).
Prior to 1990, the majority of homicides in South Africa were committed with
knives or other cutting instruments. Firearms were the weapons of choice in
only White on White homicides. This pattern has changed since 1990 with
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firearms increasingly used across race groups, to the position in 2002 with just
under half of all homicides being performed with a firearm of some type.
The rise in firearm-homicides has coincided with a decline in the rate and total
number of homicides in the country. It could be argued that there is a
correlation between the two facts, and that an increase in firearm ownership and
use has reduced the levels of homicide. Lott and Mustard (1997), and Lott
(1998) argue that a better-armed society (Le. greater ownership of handguns)
provides a greater deterrent to criminals and a lower risk of victimisation; an
armed citizen is a safe citizen - able to provide self-protection, and thus increase
the risk to the criminal of harm. However, to apply their argument to South
Africa ignores the political and social changes that have occurred since 1990 that
have played key roles in reducing homicide rates. Lott and Mustard's work has
been further critiqued and criticised for flawed research and analysis (Webster,
1997; Zimring and Hawkins, 1997; Webster, Vernick, Ludwig and Lester, 1997).
An increase in firearm ownership increases the risk of violence and death, and
does not reduce it.
The work by Kellerman et al. (1993, 1995, 1998) and Cummings et al. (1997) in
their exhaustive studies of the relationship between firearm possession and
fatality rates in assaults in the USA have clearly shown that owning a gun
increases the risk of being a victim of homicide by a factor of Lip to 2.7
(Kellerman et al., 1993). This is due to several factors, including the weapon
being used upon the owner, the owner taking a more aggressive stance in a
confrontation, "standing ground" and fighting back, rather than escaping from
the situation. The study by Kellerman et al (1995) showed that owning a gun
does not provide protection; in only 1.5% of cases was a gun used successfully
to defend the homeowner, while 3% lost their weapons to their attackers.
Owning a gun makes people react differently to how they normally would in
threatening situations, increasing their willingness to engage in high-risk
behaViour, and thus increasing the risk of death (Kellerman, 2001).
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Further work by Miller, Azrael and Hemenway (2002) on the impact of firearms
on female suicide, homicide and unintentional deaths in the USA showed a clear
elevated rate of risk of death in those states with a higher level of firearm
ownership. The elevated rate of death was not explained by the levels of
poverty or urbanisation, and was driven by firearm violence, rather then non-
firearm violence. They conclude that although firearms do give some women
some benefit, in general firearms only increase the risk of violent death.
Wells and Horney (2002) found that guns increase the risk of lethality,
independent of the individual characteristics of the assailant. However, as with
the work of Kleck and McElrath (1991) it was found that there was less risk of
injury in an attack with a gun. This is due to the assailant missing their target.
Wells and Horney (2002) point out however, that the majority of these attacks
would not have occurred if another weapon such as a knife were used.
Hansmann (2000) has shown that in the case of robberies in South Africa the
armed victim has a lower chance of having possessions stolen than the unarmed
victim (34.1% to 65.6%), but has an elevated risk of injury (34.1% to 17%)
Oosthuysen (1996) argues that the large number of weapons in the hands of
South Africans poses a serious threat to the long-term peace and stability of the
country. He points to the high rate of firearm loss and theft. Between 1993 and
1995 an estimated 169 783 firearms were stolen or lost, many would enter the
illegal weapon market directly.
Minnaar (1999) paints a violent picture of an armed South Africa. With an
estimated 20% of households with a gun, and the cheap cost of purchasing an
illegal firearm (an AK47 assault rifle for R150) creates a dangerous environment.
Minnaar shows that weapons have entered the country from Mozambique and
Angola that were originally supplied by the South African government to the
rebel groups, as well as local government issue. The weapons issued to
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homeland leaders and police were not returned, and there was no disarmament
of the SDUs and SPUs; only a withdrawal of political and economic support,
leaving these groups highly armed, but with no political or social direction,
leaving them open to a move into crime. Further weapons have entered the
illegal market through loss from the SANDF. The results of this were a
significant increase in the use of firearms in robberies, homicides and other
crimes. Of the 879 police killed between 1994 and 1998, 86% were by firearms
(Minnaar, 1999).
This influx of weapons decreased in the late 1990s as the political, social and
policy changes have occurred in South Africa and its neighbours. The S.A.P.s.
has worked with the government of l"1ozambique to find and eliminate the
weapons left there from the war (Smit, 2002). Internally, the S.A.P.s. and the
state are actively trying to make South Africans less armed, and thus hopefully
reduce the homicide rates. The Firearm Control Act of 2002 has limited
ownership and the number of firearms and amount of ammunition that an
individual can own. This has been a very significant step, whether it will result in
a decrease in homicides is still to be seen.
Altbeker (2001) shows that South Africans are not responsible gun owners, with
lost and stolen guns moving qUickly into the criminal market adding further
danger to the society. The use of firearms has increased in non-homicide
crimes, particularly robberies. This change in the nature of crime can be seen in
the increase in the use of firearms in homicides. Prior to 1990 only Whites were
killed in any significant numbers by firearms, the majority of homicides for all
other South Africans being knives or other stabbing weapons. Since 1990,
firearms have become the weapon of choice. From being used in less than 5%
of all homicides in 1990, firearms were used in 49.3% of homicides by the year
2000. This is ironically in conjunction with a decline in the rate and total number
of homicides. However, the large number of firearms in the country, both legal
and illegal continues to pose a serious threat to the society.
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Gun ownership has strong supporters. The pro-gun lobby in South Africa is not
as prolific or as influential as the National Rifle Association in the USA, but is still
vocal. They repeat the arguments used in the USA, in that the restriction of the
number of legal weapons will not reduce the number used by criminals.
Moreover, that reducing the legal availability of guns will make the armed
criminal more dangerous.
It can be argued that the increase in use of firearms in robberies in South Africa
is due in part to the high level of gun ownership. A successful criminal will
ensure that they will get away with the crime and not be killed in the process. If
they think that the victim may be armed, then it is easier to kill them first. The
high rate of homicides in farm robberies points to this conclusion, as there is a
very high probability that the farmer will have access to a firearm, and thus
killing them before robbing them is a method to ensure that the criminal is able
to commit their act successfully. Due to increased fear of victimisation, South
Africans are arming themselves to be protected from this violence; and thus
continue the cycle. If they cannot be armed they will attempt to engage the
services of someone who is. The proliferation of the private security industry can
be seen in part as the use of the unarmed of the armed. The levels of crime in
the society will ensure that the public will want to be protected in some manner,
and if the state or other agency cannot do so, the public will do so themselves.
The state needs to continue to reduce the availability of firearms. This will
impact upon the rates of homicide, as the reduction in the number of lethal
weapons in circulation will reduce the lethality of assaults.
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ii. Medical Care
Homicide does not just involve the aggressor and victim. Others play key roles
in the determination of the act. Once the victim has been injured, the role of
medical care plays a key part in whether or not the result will classified as an
assault or a homicide. Not all assaults result in the death of the victim; the
number of serious assaults are many times the rates of homicide in all societies.
Access to swift and adequate medical care is a strong independent variable in
homicides (Doener, 1985, 1988; Gaicopasi et al., 1992). This factor is often
ignored or overlooked in studies of homicide, as it only plays a role post-event.
However, the ability and willingness of medical staff to treat victims of violence
can and does affect the rates of homicide and other forms of mortality. Injuries
that were life threatening fifty years ago can be treated with ease in a well-
equipped modern medical care facility. Skilled and reliable trauma care is vital in
the reduction of mortality from injury.
Researchers in the USA have studied the impact of medical care and the ability
to access it upon homicide rates (Doerner, 1983, 1988; Barlow and Barlow,
1988; Long-Onnen and Cheatwood, 1992; Harris et al., 2002). These works
have shown that while the rates of serious assault have increased in the USA
over the past fifty years, the lethality of those assaults has decreased, and thus
impacted the homicide rate as an independent factor. The improvement of
trauma medicine has had a direct effect upon the homicide rate. The
improvement and advancement in practices of medical and emergency
personnel, transportation of the injured, communication with medical aid have all
decreased the lethality of assaults in the USA (Hawkins, 1983; Norwood et al.,
1995; 0' Keefe et al., 1999; Harris et al., 2002). The need to get the injured
person to medical care is imperative in their survival, the longer the delay, the
greater the chance of death (Barlow and Barlow, 1988; Giacopassi et al., 1992).
The Giacopassi et al. (1992) research into the link between medical care and
lethality in Memphsis USA showed a reduction in lethality from 11.4% to 3.2%
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from 1935 to 1985. The improvement of medical care, speed and practice all
contribute to the reduction of mortality of victims.
The Apartheid hospitals were designed to provide the best care available for the
White population, the least care for the majority. This racial and economic
division has had to have an impact upon morbidity rates between the races. The
state of health care is still very unequal; the provinces showed marked
differences in numbers of doctors, hospital beds, and funding and critical care
facilities available. What is not known however is the impact of that divided care
upon the victims of assault. It can be postulated that the reduced access to
critical care for Blacks, Coloureds, and to a lesser extent Asians, have had a
major role in the levels of mortality of assault victims. Interviews with South
African trauma doctors in previously "Black" and "White" hospitals has shown a
marked difference in the levels of trauma care given to Black and White trauma
victims, and this will impact their survivability and thus the rate of homicides.4
Critical care has increased for the majority of South Africans, with an increase in
hospital funding, beds, and access to skilled medical personnel (Chetty, 1994).
Combined with this is an improvement in road networks in rural areas,
decreasing response times for ambulance crews and thus increased chances of
survivability for victims of assault. As the various independent factors of
transport, communication, and medical care improve, so the mortality rates for
assaults will decrease. This shift in a multiplicity of factors has to be maintained.
The increase in private hospitals shows the continued divide in health care, and a
continued social and psychological divide along more economic lines of access to
medical care. However, the increase in the cases of AIDS is threatening to
eradicate any advances achieved, as the pandemic absorbs a greater percentage
of available resources.
4 Interviews with Or M. Birch (Edendale hospital, KZN), Or R. Nattrass (Edendale Hospital and
MediCity, KZN), Or R. Liddell (Edendale Hospital, KZN)
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The AIDS epidemic adds further pressure upon the state's ability to provide
medical care for assault victims. The increasing number of cases of HIV and
AIDS related disease not only is killing a vast number of young adults, but also
impacting directly upon the economic stability and growth of the society. An
estimated 23% of the skilled labour force and 13% of the highly skilled labour
force is expected to be infected by 2005 (Mattes, 2003, p. 7). An estimated 23%
of workers in the public sector are expected to die from AIDS related disease by
2012 (Mattes, 2003, p. 7). The state has been unable to recruit and train
enough nurses to cope with the demand, (Ensor, 2001) and it can be expected
that very soon South Africa will follow the patterns in Zambia and Malawi where
deaths of doctors and nurses exceed the rate of replacement (Cheek, 2001, p.
12).
The increase in AIDS related medical cases have meant the shifting of resources
to these patients, taking money and resources away from other areas. As more
hospital beds are filled with AIDS cases, less are available for other patients.
There is only a limited amount of medical resources available for use. Trauma
care will be less important to a hospital that has a majority of AIDS patients; this
will mean a reduction in adequate care, and a subsequent increase in mortality
of the trauma victim, and an increase in the homicide rate.
The migration of medical staff to other countries is a further factor in the threat
to the medical system. The report reported that 60.9% of doctors who
graduated between 1985 and 1994 have emigrated. The reasons are numerous,
poor working conditions, high crime rates and higher salaries on offer in the
other countries. The remaining doctors have ever-increasing workloads placed
upon them, increasing the risk of their leaving the profession. The loss of skilled
staff will reduce the ability of hospitals to proVide adequate care. The loss of
staff is also an indicator of the immigration of South Africans, reflecting the lack
of faith they have in the future success of the nation.
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The economic burden will have a significant and direct effect upon the rates of
crime. An increase in the number of orphans in the society, without the
structure of family to provide support, comfort and control will increase the rates
of crime. The impact upon the family structure will be more serious than the
effects that the migrant labour system has had.
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iii. Alcohol
"Seven people from Eastern Pondoland were killed last week at a
peace ceremony after a fight over beer ended in a bloody battle
with spears and old hunting rifles, followed by a shoot out with
police."
Mail and Guardian Oct 13-19 2000, p. 12
The presence of alcohol in homicide victims is testimony to its role as an agent in
the creation of a high-risk situation. However the direct correlation between
alcohol use and homicide is still relatively little scientific research on the subject
(Auerhaun and Parker in Smith and Zahn, 1999). The problems are multiple; the
alcohol/violence link is often studied through the victims and aggressors of
violence. Their high rate of alcohol consumption does not however clearly
demonstrate the actual risk of homicide and violence amongst drinkers. The
isolation of alcohol as a causal factor ignores the wider social nexus in which the
drinking and violence occurs. Poverty, family stability, crime and race will all
affect the relationship between alcohol and violence. In bars and taverns the
risk of violence increases due to the high number of intoxicated young males
present, as well as overcrowding and permissive social environments, factors
often encouraged by the bar owners (Finney, 2004).
Isolating alcohol as a direct causal factor is highly problematic. In the case of
drunk driving, there is a direct causal relationship between alcohol consumption
and impaired ability to drive. Alcohol consumption on its own however does not
make all people violent, or victims of violence. However, the use of alcohol and
other drugs will increase the risk of violence or other crimes occurring.
The interpersonal nature of the majority of homicides shows that when alcohol is
consumed then people will engage in violence, and take that violence to a deadly
level. It acts as both an agent of disinhibition of violent behaviour, and helps to
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restrict the choices that the intoxicated person can make. The intoxicated
person will make decisions that are not rational, and will engage in more high-
risk behaviour. On its own alcohol does not cause violence, but like firearms and
poverty assist in the increase in risk. Adult South Africans consumed an
estimated 11.5 litres of pure alcohol in 2000. In comparison, citizens of the UK
and USA consumed 9.7 and 9 litres respectively, while the high homicide rate
countries of Brazil and Russia consumed 4.7 and 10.7 (Data from WHO Global
Alcohol Database). However, research has shown that half of South African
adults do not drink, while a third drinks to excess in binge type episodes (Parry,
2000). This would increase the alcohol consumption up to at least 20 litres of
alcohol per year, giving a clearer picture of the real problem of alcohol
consumption. Alcohol by itself will not cause violence, but it is involved in the
process. The gross amount does not tell the full picture. It is how the alcohol is
consumed and the social situation of its consumption that influences the effects
it causes upon behaviour.
There are strong links between the use of alcohol and interpersonal violence in
South Africa (Shaw and Louw, 1997). The role of alcohol is important in the
creation of high-risk situations, reducing social controls and increasing the risk of
violent behaviour. The large-scale illicit alcohol trade and the use of the Dop
system; paying deciduous fruit farm workers in part with alcohol, has in
particular created a large scale public health and crime problem. The Dop
system, although now illegal, continues in the Western and Northern Cape
amongst at least 20% of workers (London, 2000). This system demonstrates the
culture of alcohol in the society, where it became a commodity of payment,
entrenching alcohol use within the society. In the provinces where the Dop
system was prevalent, the Western and l\Iorthern Cape, high levels of alcoholism,
family violence and serious assault rates remain, in spite of dramatically
improved medical and social welfare conditions (Leggett, 2004). The interaction
of drinking and associated violence often leads to homicides, the majority being
described as "assaults that go too far" (Shaw and Louw, 1997, p. 8).
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Research analysis carried out by the National Injury Mortality Surveillance
System (Peden, 2000; Matzopoulos, Cassim and Seedatl 2003) of a sample of
homicides in 1999 and 2002 found that more than half of the homicide victims
had alcohol present in their systems. The average concentration was
0.lg/100ml in 1999 and 0.17/100ml in 2002. The legal limit for driving is 0.05
g/100ml, while a concentration of above 0.16 BAC will result in dysphoria and
nausea. The high level of alcohol in the victim can be related to the nature of
these homicides, that being non-planned assaUlts, with the aggressor being in a
similar state of drunkenness (Parry, 2000). Studies of trauma victims admitted
to hospitals in the Western Cape found that over 60% were alcohol related
injuries (Leggett, 2004). The impact of alcohol is evident; its consistent
presence in homicide victims points to its role in the act. Alcohol is found in
similar levels in transport fatalities (Matzopoulos et al.l 2003), and although
there continues to be a concerted campaign to reduce drunk driving and educate
the public to its dangers, there is not a similar campaign to address the role of
alcohol and violence.
The consumption of alcohol by itself is not sufficient to explain the rates of
assault or homicide. White South Africans are the most prevalent alcohol
consumers, with over 80% of adults drinking alcohol (Parry, 2000); however this
group does not have the highest levels of homicide nor of assault. It is the
pattern of drinking and the social situation in which the drinking occurs that
creates the danger. There is not a direct causal link, but instead alcohol acts in
combination with other factors to increase the risk of violence and homicides
occurring. The disinhibition caused by alcohol does not automatically result in
violence, if this were the case there would be far more homicides than present.
Alcohol is a contributing factor in the creation of a high-risk environment, a
factor that can in part be altered and controlled, but never eliminated.
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Alcohol consumption continues to present a serious and long-term threat to the
health of the society. Alcohol consumption on its own cannot be taken as a
factor or indicator of anomie. However, when present in communities that show
signs of anomie, or the social conditions for anomie, alcohol consumption can
then be seen as an indicator of community problems, and will function in
conjunction with other social factors such as weak family and social structures to
increase anomic conditions and the risk of homicide.
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iv. Policing
A nation's police force is meant to act as an agent of social control, a visible facet
of the criminal justice system. The police are meant to protect the citizens of the
society, and their presence to act as a form of inhibitor to criminal behaviour.
Their role in the control of violence, but also in the creation of violence is well-
documented (Smith and Zahn, 1998; Wolfgang, 1958; Reiner, 1997; Garland,
1985). Police forces can create order, as well as disorder. In South Africa the
police have a long history of upholding and enforcing a brutal system using
violence, threats and coercion, which only helped to increase the levels of
violence and homicide in the country. The S.A.P. was not engaged in crime
prevention, but political suppression.
If the police are unable or unwilling to prevent crime and violence from
occurring, crime and violence will increase. The acts of social control by the
police serve to punish and protect, but also to create increased levels of social
cohesion within a society. When those who commit crimes are not caught or
punished, the cohesive function of social control will weaken. For Durkheim one
of the functions of crime occurs when criminals are punished. It allows the
society to observe social control in practice and see the moral order upheld.
When this does not happen, the society and their greater collective conscious are
under threat from the crimes. The police and the other agents of the criminal
justice system have to perform to protect the beliefs of the society in which they
serve. If the society does not believe itself to be protected from crime, it will
seek out alternate methods to achieve this.
The police under the Union of South Africa, and subsequent Apartheid
governments used force to enforce racial divisions, to maintain the Apartheid
system and oppression, and to act as agents of violence. The South African
Police (S.A.P) was moulded into an oppressive force, highly militarised in nature,
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and oppressive in practice. (Cock and Nathan, 1989; Brogden and Shearing,
1993; Cawthra; Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1988)
For many the South African Police were the faces of the Apartheid system,
people to be feared and avoided, rather than relied upon to ensure safety and
security. The police themselves were involved in the assault and murder of
civilians and members of the ANC and PAC (Weitzer and Beattie, 1994; Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 1998; Minnaar A. et al., 1994; Pauw, 1991 and 1997;
Coleman, 1998). Specialised units such as the riot squad were created within
the S.A.P. to be used to crush political and social dissent. Units of the S.A.P. and
SADF were incorporated into specific assassination squads, trained and used to
kill leaders of the liberation movements (Pauw, 1991, 1997; O',Brien, 2001).
They helped to create a climate of fear within the country against the police.
They were a key element in the creation and maintenance of a state of violence
in the country, and thus did not create the levels of trust and reliance amongst
the majority of the population that a police service requires in order to perform
their duties. In order to be effective police have to have the trust of the people
that they serve. The S.A.P. did not have that trust.
This method of policing discouraged reliance upon the police to provide basic
levels of crime control. Low levels of crime reporting, and a decline in the levels
of success in solving crimes are all indications of the failures of the S.A.P. to
police the society (see Chapter 5 for prosecution rates for homicide). They were
agents of control, rather than of justice. The liberation movements actions in
creating alternative forms of policing point not only to the failure of the S.A.P.,
but also to the recognition of the need for some form of recognisable and
legitimate agent of social control. The creation of the Self Defence Units (SDUs)
and Self Protection Units (SPUs) by the ANC and Inkatha in the townships were
the result of this. They filled the gap, but also acted as more than a police force,
but also a militia to protect the community from attack from opposition political
groups. The SDUs and SPUs however acted as more than just a policing unit,
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but also as militias for the communities guarding against attack from opposition
forces, and as agents of social control and punishment within the community did.
The operation of these units within the townships would have further ensured
the decline in reliance upon the police, as well as been the agents of some of the
politically motivated homicides that occurred prior to 1994.
The S.A.P. acted as a police force and as a para-military agent of oppression. To
change the force into a representative and effective police force required time,
resources and effort. Not all of have been available. The establishment of a
democratic state in 1994 and the change of the South African Police to the South
African Police Service set new challenges for the agency. The government
sought to bring about change in the force to change it from an oppressive agent
into a police force that not only protected the people, but also was directed to
solving crimes. The S.A.P.S. has had to transform while in operation, and had to
deal with a massive loss of manpower, as many White officers resigned and
moved into the burgeoning private security industry. The transformation of the
S.A.P.S. has had to occur internally, with the racial, political and psychological
transformation of the force, as well as an external change in convincing the
public that the S.A.P.s. has changed into a legitimate agent of the state that will
protect the public.
The creation of Community Police Forums was created to assist in this
transformation. They, and community justice initiatives were established in
areas where community structures were severely damaged under Apartheid have
had mixed results. The community based policing forums it was hoped would be
able to create communities that were willing to support and encourage the
concepts and practices of restorative justice (Brogden and Shearing, 1993;
Geulke, 1995; Mbehle, 1998). The forums were often hijacked by local gangs, or
were controlled by one political group, and thus seen as biased. Their
judgements were violent and more retributive than restorative. The problems of
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changing a society from one of deep-seated oppression to an open democracy
were clearly exposed in these forums.
The police have also not significantly changed their operating procedures.
Between 1997 and 2000, 1548 people died as a result of police action while 626
died in police custody in South Africa (Bruce, 2000). Bruce (2001) estimates that
the police injured another 4332 people in that period. This compares to the 239
who died in police custody in the UK, and the 136 in Australia for the same
period (Home Office 2002; Collins, 2002). This level of violence cannot be
sustained if the police are to be seen as protectors of the public.
The police are high-risk targets for violence. They are killed in the course of
their duties and off duty with frightening regularity. Between 1994 and 2003,
1732 police officers have been killed, the majority off duty, and the majority by
firearms. This in comparison to the 50 police killed by suspects in Britain since
1980 (C.I.A.C., Home Office 2002).
The ability of the S.A.p.s. to solve crimes and act as effective agents of social
control is still limited by a lack of resources and skilled officers, as well as a
sustained perception that they are unable to compete with the crime in South
Africa (Louw and Schonteich, 2001). In particular the low numbers of skilled and
experienced detectives severely hampers their abilities to solve crime, and thus
continues the cycle of low prosecution rates for serious crimes. The continued
weaknesses of the S.A.P.s. are reflective of the greater criminal justice system,
and the public's attitude toward social control. For the public the S.A.P.S. have
been unsuccessful in their fight against crime (Shaw, 2002), this lack of faith in
the police's ability to fight crime is serious. If the public do not see the police as
able to fight crime, they will be more willing to use alternate methods, which are
clearly happening. The growth of the private security industry continues to
demonstrate the weaknesses of the S.A.P.s. and their inability to provide
adequate policing and safety. The private security industry threatens to reduce
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the effectiveness of the S.A.P.S. further, as those with the financial resources will
rely increasingly upon private options, reducing their support and need for the
S.A.P.s.
The S.A.P.s. has had to "transform under fire" (Shaw, 2002). They have
changed dramatically from the oppressive, militarised force as the S.A.P.;
however, they still have a long road ahead before they are able to reduce crime
levels in the country. They are fighting a difficult and often losing battle against
crime and the perceptions of the public of their performance. The S.A.P. was a
key agent in the creation of anomic communities in the past, if the S.A.P.S. are
unable to protect communities, the anomic responses will be used to protect
themselves. A lack of adequate and effective policing in a community will result
in the creation of alternative forms of social control. These will function to
protect the community from real and perceived threats and serve in the case of
South Africa as a symptom of anomic communities. As well as an impetus for
greater levels of anomie as the community becomes more reliant upon their own
social control based upon their own morality and less on the state and the
criminal justice system. The police in South Africa have to reduce crime and
violence. However, they cannot achieve this without the support and trust of the
public. The transformation and specialisation of the S.A.P.s. has assisted in this
process, but the continued high levels of crime in the country are constantly
eroding public perceptions of the S.A.P.S.'s abilities.
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v. Conclusion
In order to reduce homicide levels a multitude of factors have to be addressed.
The complex nature of homicide ensures that the addressing of a single issue will
not have a significant impact upon homicide rates; a more effective method is a
multi-task approach, dealing with both crime and social issues. The factors
detailed above are important in predicting how homicide will change in the
future, and how the state can influence these changes. It can be postulated that
the reduction in the rate and number of homicides since 1994 has been the
result of state efforts in the limitation of firearms, the restructuring of the police
and the improvement of medical services. Whether this trend will continue will
depend largely on the ability of the state to continue to provide safety and
security for the majority of the population. Just as the homicide rate
dramatically increased from 10 per 100 000 in 1970 to over 50 by 1982 (see
chapter 6 for more detailed statistics), it can do so again.
The divisive past is reflected in the present nature of violence in the country.
The politicised nature of policing and medical care increased the level of anomie
in the society, as well as increasing the risks of homicide. Individuals and
communities want to feel safe from external harm. If the state is unable to
perform this task through the police, the communities and individuals will do so
themselves by arming themselves, or the use of others who can protect them;
Le. private security or vigilantes. The shift in firearm use is a reflection of the
continued weakness of the police, the growth of Vigilante groups in the 1990s
and the continued expansion of private security is also a result of this failure in
the state's ability to provide safety and security for South Africans. The current
position of the nation is one of continued economic and racial divisions, with
anomic communities still separated from the core of the political state. The
anomic condition will continue as long as violence and crime threaten the social
fabric of the society.
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Each of the above factors plays an important and influential role in the causation
of homicide. Homicide is a multi-causal act, influenced by a multitude of factors,
societal, individual, pre and post the violent act. Each one can be directly and
indirectly influenced by the policies and actions of the state in order to reduce
the levels of homicide in South Africa. The ability and willingness of the state to
act is however another factor. The change in one factor might not reduce the
homicide rate, as other factors may well come into play to negate the effect.
These factors are also indicators of the level of social stability. In the case of
policing and medical care, it is demonstrated to what extent the state is willing
and able to protect its citizens from harm. The trust of the individual in the
ability of the state and its agents to protect them is shown in the changing rate
of firearm ownership and use, as well as the effectiveness of the police. Alcohol
consumption on its own is not an indicator of social rupture, but in combination
with the other factors plays a key role in the creation of a lethal environment.
The four factors discussed above are not the only factors that influence homicide
in South Africa. However, these factors are crucial in the determination of state
social policy. They are the ones that can be altered, improved and thus have an
impact upon the rates of homicide and violence in the country. They are also
key indicators for a shift in the social cohesion of the society. A more effective
police and medical service will have the effect of a reduction of the levels of
homicide. The continued restriction of firearm ownership will bring about
positive results, but only if the public believe that they can rely upon the police
or others to protect them from crime. Alcohol use will continue to create violent
environments, and increase the risk of homicide and less lethal violence. All
these factors have to be addressed if homicide is to be reduced. Dealing with






a. Accuracy and Validity
"Homicide victims are notoriously poor respondents to Census
Bureau interviewers."
(Benjamin Renshaw, Former Acting Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics;
quoted in Mosher et al., 2002, p. 135)
Statistics in any country reflect in part the nature of the social system and the
political biases and perceptions that stem from it. The statistics rarely reflect
with great accuracy the events on the ground, instead showing the biases and
effectiveness of the police and other state services. Slabbert (in Davis and
Slabbert, 1985) emphasises the need for caution with the relative nature of
crime statistics, particularly in the case of South Africa with its long history of
racially motivated and structured police services.
The accuracy of official statistics has been always considered suspect. As
Mosher et al (2002) shows if it is not just the problem of defining what is under
study, but also the relationship between the cause and effect of the crime. What
is counted is the result, the homicide, the arrest or the conViction; however, the
relationship between the police arrest records and the initial act are not always in
conjunction. When official data is studied, it is often the bias of the police and
recording officials that is being shown, and not the actual reality of crime in the
society.
Sutherland states, "the statistics of crime and criminals are known as the most
unreliable and difficult of all statistics." (Sutherland, 1947, p. 29). The initial
problem is that of the definition of the act as criminal or not, and the dividing
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line between the various acts. When does serious assault become grievous
bodily harm, or culpable homicide become murder? The accuracy of the
homicide statistics is always in question, but is the lesser of the many evils of
crime data due to their simplicity and universal consistency of definition.
Official data will always be at the mercy of political and social pressures. The
changes in crime rates due to changes in police practices, police performance
incentives, the linking of result to pay for police, as well as political needs to
"lower" crime rates will all have a direct effect upon the data. (Seidman and
Couzens, 1974, McCleary et al., 1982, Mosher at al., 2002, Black, 1970) Crime
"waves", "epidemics" or "drops" can be easily constructed with minor alteration
of the data and data collection. The efforts by the S.A.P.S. in 2000 to make the
police methodology more accurate by placing a moratorium on the release of
crime data for a 3-month period only led to derision on the part of the public and
press. The gap between the data showing declines in crime and the public's
experience of crime became clear. The efforts by the state to reduce fear by
altering the statistics of crime did not result in a decrease in their fear, or their
efforts to control their fear. 5
Statistics can be used to create a picture of one's own choosing. The numbers
that exist on the paper are a social creation and interpretation of a physical
event. The various state and private agents place a select meaning upon certain
activities and then gather that data, turning it into information about the
society's behaviour. Studying deviant acts is always a fraught process, and
attempting to make an accurate appraisal of violence in a society is even more
difficult.
5 The official decrease in crime has not resulted in a decrease in the growth of private security,
vigilante attacks or the public's fear of victimisation.
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b. Race and Statistics
From 1990 onwards, the South Africa Statistical Services and the South African
Police Services have limited any release of data based upon racial classification.
Race has been a part of the Apartheid system, a cornerstone of its identity and
polices. The "New South Africa" has been attempting to classify itself as a
"rainbow nation", one that is moving beyond its racially identified past.
Racial breakdown of data can be used to discriminate against groups, the data
can be used to create a false picture of risk and increase prejudice. The South
African government has taken a stand that the society has to move past its racial
past and the stopping of data collection based upon race is part of this process.
It is understandable that any research using race as a classification will come
into difficulties, as this work has done in gathering accurate homicide data. In
conducting the qualitative research, opposition was expressed in two schools
towards the use of racial classification of the subjects, and permission was
denied for the research to be conducted. Race exists as a social reality, and has
to be researched in that manner. The American Sociological Association has
emphasised this issue in a statement that reads in part:
"Refusing to acknowledge the fact of racial classification, feelings
and actions, and refusing to measure their consequences will not
eliminate racial inequalities. At best it will preserve the status quo."
(American Sociological Association, 2003, p. 4)
Race is a constant factor in South African life. The colour of a person's skin will
affect how they are viewed and treated. Race is still a determinant of health,
wealth and education in this country. Just as gender is a powerful social factor
in affecting how and why lives are lived. Racial categories are used in daily life,
ignoring them in official statistics will not change this. People will continue to
live in racially homogeneous communities, marry intra-racially and will have
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different life experiences and expectations due to the affect that race has upon
them, their education, health, employment and the manner and time of their
death.
The lack of racial classification of deaths will not alter the actuality of mortality
patterns. The work by the Medical Research Council on mortuary data supports
this argument; their data is presented along racial and gender lines, an
acknowledgement of the continued importance of race and gender as an
indicator of risk. Different races die at different rates, patterns and methods.
Blacks and Coloureds are more at risk from violent death than other races; by
compounding all the death data into a single category creates a false picture,
one that reduces apparent morbidity for the high-risk groups. If race is to be
ignored, then why not gender? Males die from violence at a far higher rate than
females, and in different ways. They face different risks, gender, as with race, is
a social determination, it is a social fact that affects how and where and when
we live and die. The South African Police Services has stopped compiling their
data according to race to show that they are not racist, the British Home Office
data on arrests is also not broken down according to race, but deaths in police
detention are, to show that police actions are non-racist. The same methodology
has been used by the Australian government since 1992 according to the
recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
(1991).
Ignoring race in South Africa will not eliminate racism, or improve the lives of the
majority. Race, gender and economic status will be significant factors in
determining risk of violent death, and have to be recorded. To ignore race will
not lessen the risk, only create a false picture of the reality of violence.
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c. Classi'fication of Homicides
Statistics SA (Stats SA) record homicides according to the following
classifications:
Code Cause of death
960 Fight, brawl, rape
961 Assault by corrosive or caustic substance, except poisoning
962 Assault by poisoning
963 Assault by hanging and strangulation
964 Assault by submersion
965 Assault by firearms and explosions
966 Assault by cutting and piercing instruments
967 Child battering and other maltreatment
968 Assault by other and unspecified means
969 Late effects of injury purposely inflicted
889 Violent death, unspecified as to whether accident, suicide or homicide
970-978 InjUry due to legal intervention and legal execution
980-989 Death by other causes
990-999 Death from acts of war









After 1994 the S.A.P.s. reported only "Murders".
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This differing classification system raises significant problems in the accurate
comparison of data and the accuracy of the available data. The data sets are
meant to be of the same homicide Victims, but due to the lack of directly
compatible data, this is not possible. The method of classification of homicide
prior to 1994 by the SAP demonstrates the political nature of much of the
violence, as this would have been classified as "public violence" or "faction
fighting", which are very broad, catch-all classifications. However, the post-1994
data is as difficult as only giving data for "murders" can thus exclude a high
number of homicides that are not classified as murders by the police, but in a
different context would be seen as such.
These differing methodologies have to be taken into account when comparisons
are conducted. The political use of homicide and crime data by the state can
result in the data being skewed or reclassified. Thus for this thesis the use of
death records from the Central Statistical Services is used for the more detailed
study and the S.A.P. and S.A.P.S. data used to provide a necessary validation.
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ii. Homicide Pre-1994
The data that is available on homicide pre-1994 comes from Statistics South
Africa Annual Reports of Causes of Death from the Department of Health and
annual Prosecution and Convictions of Crime from Home Affairs, the South
African Police, in their Annual Police Commissioner's Report, and from non-
government agencies that collected death and violence reports. The data is
different as each agency is counting for a different purpose. The S.A.P. were
investigating crimes, the Department of Health mortality, and the non-
government agencies political oppression. There is little agreement between the
agencies, even with the two main sources from the state, as shown below.
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Prior to 1994 the political and social construction of the country created problems
in the accurate gathering of vital statistics. The creation of the Homelands was
possibly the most crucial of these problems. The severe lack of information
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about the populations within these areas, coupled with a lack of willingness on
the part of the state and its agents to change the situation.
Prior to 1979, it was not required for Blacks to register deaths, a serious problem
for data collection. Botha and Bradshaw (1985), make this very clear in their
assessment of the "black hole" of Black death rates, showing a large gap in the
officially recorded death statistics for Black deaths. McGlashan (1985) makes a
similar point, stating that the discrepancy of recorded and actual deaths might be
as high as 40%.
This lack of data cannot however limit the analysis to deaths only after that date,
neither is it useful to only use data after 1994, or after 2001, or any date. In
order to understand the conditions of the present a historical analysis is vital. As
Kaplan argues: "The greater the disregard of history, the greater the delusions
regarding the future". (Kaplan 2001, p. 39)
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a. "Other Violence" Homicide by Assault or Accident
The accurate tabulation of cause of death is vital in any analysis of the state of
the society. The causes of non-natural death have to reflect accurately the
reality of the patterns of methods and numbers of violent death. Unfortunately,
for the South African data a serious problem of homicide classification arose with
the use of the classification of violent deaths as being caused not by assault but
by "other violence".
The classification of homicide falls into three main categories, within which are
various sub-categories according to the weapon (if any) used: homicide by
assault, by legal means and finally "other violence". This final category is a
variable one, including deaths that are unable to be classified as it is unknown as
to whether or not they are due to assault, accident or suicide (code 889), and
"injury due to accident" (code 980-989). The rates in these categories vary
considerable from 1968 to 1992. One would not expect a nation to become
more "accidental", but if this classification did demonstrate accurately the levels
of unusual death, it will show the nature of policing and the perceptions that the
state has towards homicides. A rise in the level of deaths by "other violence" will
show that they are not being investigated for whatever reason.
"Other acts of violence" is defined as follows:
"[It] include[s] unnatural deaths, deaths resulting from mine and
industrial accidents, railway accidents, air crashes and other cases
where circumstances were such that death of the people concerned
could not be imputed to any specific reason."
(Annual Report of the S.A.P., 1975, p. 8)
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The changing rates of "other violence" call into question the validity of the
classification. The increase in the deaths in this classification matches the
increase in political violence, and raises concerns about the validity of this
classification.












- - - - - "Other violence"
--Assault
The increased rate of death by "other violence" can significantly alter the
homicide rate, as if these forms of homicide are excluded from the total, then a
rather different picture of homicide emerges, as shown below.
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Homicide and "Other Violence": Rates per 100 000
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If we assume that the "unspecified" deaths are the result of a violent act, then
they should be included in the analysis. However, suicides have to be excluded,
as they should not be included in a study on homicide. The nature of the acts
are different, as well as the causes. However, it is impossible to determine from
the data what percentage of the "unspecified" deaths are suicides, so we are still
left with the original problem. To ignore the data will give a false picture of the
rates of violence in the society, but it can be argued that their inclusion will do
the same thing.
The classification of deaths changes as the system changes. Once more, this is
more a reflection of the nature of the state and its agencies, than the events on
the ground. One cannot assume that the change in classification means an
increase in accuracy; merely a different picture will emerge from the different
statistics. In later years, this problem re-emerges in the classification of
unnatural death that is not classified as homicide or suicide, but merely left as
"injUry", which are then complied into the classification of "other violence". A
rather nebulous term, which serves more as a catch-all for much of the violent
deaths. The problem remains of whether or not to include this data in the
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analysis. In the 1990 data, 41% of White unnatural deaths were in this
category; if one excludes suicides, then it is 76%. This means that the homicide
rate could be either 15.9 or 3.8 per 100 000 depending upon which figures are
used.
The level of non-classified deaths tells us much about the nature of the violence
and police response. To have such a high level of deaths that cannot be
classified can be seen as a weak police investigative system, and this has been
the case for South Africa.
The data presented will include the homicides from "other violence" - to exclude
them will give a false picture of the levels of violence in the country. A lack of
police investigation does not mean that the homicide rate declines. As the police
service improves its methods, then the statistics will become more accurate.
However, with the data from the past the information has to be understood in
the context of the wider society. To exclude these figures will give a false
impression of the levels of violence, but the rates produced have to be seen as
an inaccurate picture of the real levels due to the incomplete data available.
!l:..Political Homicide
The number of deaths as a direct result of political action will probably never be
known. Unfortunately, the nature of the armed struggle and the methods of
State oppression meant that violence was widespread and often unfocused. The
nature of the violence meant that much went officially unrecorded as political
acts.
The definition of what is a "political" and what is a "non-political" homicide is
problematic. It can be argued that political causes can be used to hide more
"normal" homicides, or that homicides that were of a political nature were not
classified as such to lessen their political nature. This is obvious in the various
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reports of political violence during the 1980s. During the period 1984 to 1986,
the number of "political deaths" were counted by two non-government agencies
and two government departments as follows:
Agency 1984 1985 1986
Indicator South Africa 149 922 1352
SA Institute of Race Relations 149 879 1296
SA Govt. Bureau of Information 0 407 397
Minister of Law and Order 0 398 586
(From Bennett and Quin, 1988)
Each had their own agenda and classified deaths as political or non-political
according to their own aims. For the state, it is obvious that counting low
numbers of political deaths suited their purposes, while for those who opposed
the state sought to highlight the political nature of the violence that was
occurring in the country.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998) cited a total of 9043 people
killed for political reasons during the period 1975 to 1994, with an estimated (but
unreported to the TRC) 15 000 more deaths due to political violence in the
period 1990 to 1994. Of the total number of homicides for the two periods
(1975 to 1994, and 1990 to 1994) the political killings comprise 3.7% and 22%
of total deaths for the period (T.R.e. vol. 3 1998). The TRC recognised that they
did not investigate all the violence that occurred, and thus gave the estimated
number of killings for the 1990 to 1994 period. Prior to this there would have
been many killings that would not have reached the TRC, and are thus lost to
analysis.
Further analysis by the Human Rights Committee of South Africa (Coleman M.,
1998) of political killings produce a different set of figures. They record a higher
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total number of political deaths, with a total of 21527 deaths from 1984 to 1994,
comprising 12.9% of all homicides for the period.
Total Homicides
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights Committee
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The impact of the political violence was far beyond the direct political victim.
The significant increase in all homicides has had to have been influenced by the
political killings.
The T.R.e. report gives some detail of the victims of political violence. A total of
83% were male, and 67% were in the 13 to 36 age range. Firearms were used
in 60% of cases. The political affiliations of the victims were unknown in 47% of
the cases, of the remainder 70% were members of the ANe. The majority of the
killings occurred in KwaZulu-Natal (53%), and members of the Inkatha Freedom
Party were sited the most as aggressors (T.R.e. vol. 3, 1988).
These patterns match those of more general homicides, with young males being
the majority of victims. The key difference is the higher rate of firearm use in
political homicides, during the period of 1968 to 1990 only 5% of all homicides
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recorded were by firearm. However by 1994 this had risen to 41.5%, a very
significant change in methods, and one that has to be linked to the use of
firearms in political homicides.
From 1994 to 2000, the homicide rate has declined by 19%, the same
percentage that political killings formed of the total homicides from 1990 to
1994. However, new forms of homicide emerged in the post-1994 society, with
an increase in taxi violence, vigilante killings and crime related deaths.
97
c. Homicide as a Percentage of Total Deaths
The accuracy of the death rates per 100 000 are dependent on several factors:
• The accuracy of the police reports.
• The accuracy of the national census.
• The classification process of the acts.
• The level of reporting of deaths, whether violent or non-violent.
Due to the nature of many of the deaths from violence, Le. politically motivated,
there were many reasons why reporting of the acts would be inaccurate - a lack
of faith in the police to solve the crime or catch the perpetrators; the
involvement of the police or other state agents in the killings themselves.
Killings by other political groups could also result in a low reporting rate. For a
homicide to be reported there has to be some level of motivation for the act to
be reported. If the homicide was committed by someone connected to the
police, or by the police themselves, the obvious result is that the cases will not
be reported. If people fear the aggressors, the cases will not be reported, or if
they have no faith or trust in the police to take the necessary action, the case
will not be reported. The classification system is closely tied into the broader
political structure of the society.
Combined with this is a lack of accuracy in the national census. This is
particularly true for those who are most at risk from violence, the poor and the
marginal in the society. A lack of the reporting of normal deaths is also a
problem. Thus the scale of the error is not known, however these tables can be
used in comparison with other data to get a clearer picture.
In order to compensate in some way for these errors, a slightly different system
will be used in this section to analyse the patterns of violent death. The scale at
which various groups are killed in relation to their total deaths will show the level
of violence within that group. It will compensate for the inaccuracy of the
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census data. However, it does not compensate for the inaccuracy of the data of
total homicides, and thus the data presented has to be viewed with the research
conducted on the total rates of homicide.
The method used for the following graphs was to analysis the percentage that
deaths by violence make up of the total deaths recorded. These are broken
down into age, gender and racial categories. After 1990, the Department of
Health no longer reported deaths according to racial categories, only gender and
age. Thus the data presented falls into several differing categories according to
the type of data available.
Homicide as a Percentage of Total Deaths: 1968·2000
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This graph shows the changing scale of homicides from a longitudinal
perspective. Broken down according to gender and year the graph clearly
illustrates both the high level of risk that males face from violent death and the
increasing percentage that violent death occupies in the mortality of the
population. A clear increase can be seen occurring in the mid-1970s. An event
that matches the increase in the violent struggle against the state, this is of
course most marked in the male population. The worrying trend is however the
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continuing rise in the graph. This can be attributed to several factors: the
decrease in other forms of mortality, the reclassification of the nature of death,
or more importantly the rise in the use of violence in the society. This graph in
itself however does not tell a fully detailed picture, but it does give a clear
overview of the shift in nature of the scale of homicide in the county.
For certain race and age groups the percentage of death by homicide is
particularly of concern. IVlales between 15 and 30 have experienced a very high
percentage of violent death.
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The changing percentage reflects the increase in homicides for the period. The
extreme levels of homicides for the 15 to 30 age groups are of particular
concern, a rate of over 50% is indicative of an extremely violent society.
For females a similar pattern, but at a much lower percentage is observed.
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For both male and female there are similar racial patterns, with Black and
Coloured death by homicide having the greatest percentage of total death. The
racial patterns are similar for males and females of each race group, indicating
similar risk patterns and changing levels of homicide.
The problem with analysing homicide as a percentage of total death after 1990 is
the increase in the rate of HIV and AIDS as a cause of death. AIDS related
deaths are the most frequent in the age groups most at risk from homicide and
other violence. (Statistics South Africa, 2002, Dorrington et al., 2001). The
Statistics South Africa report on a 12% sample of causes of death for 1997 to
2001 (2002) shows a very different picture for deaths by homicide.
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The significant difference in the patterns of data shows the problems of accurate
data collation. The report used the category of "unspecified unnatural causes"
which included death by "assault, hanging and drowning" (2002, 6), as well as
death by assault. Bradshaw (2000) and Bradshaw et al. (2002) argue that this
problem of classification is due to a lack of cause placed upon the death
certificate. This would occur when:
• the medical practitioner does not have access to the full medical record
for certification;
• the diagnostic tests have not been done prior to the death;
• the autopsy has not been done; or
• the Death Report form has been used and the death as been certified as
natural by a traditional leader or headman.
(Bradshaw et al. 2002, p. 13)
Until these issues are solved, death data will not be one hundred percent
accurate. However, no social research can ever be that accurate and the best
use has to be made of the data that is available. To not use the data would be
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as problematic as to use it without question. The research of homicide in South
Africa, as in any society has to recognise that the work will be conducted with
some degree of imbalance. It is this recognition that allows the research to be
reliable.
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d. Homicide and Race
The racial nature of South African society allows for some broad assumptions to
be made about the nature of intra-group violence. Homicide that occurs within
racial groups is more likely to be between people who know each other, than
interracial homicide. The changing nature of the racial profile of the aggressor
and victim shows a changing social structure and motives for homicide.
There are clear racial differences in the rates of homicide in South Africa, and
these can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century. White and
Asian population groups have had far less homicides in rates, as well as a
percentage of total death than those members of the Black and Coloured
communities.
For the accurate figures for all population groups in 1968, the rates of homicide
per 100 000 for the racial groups and along gender lines was as shown below:
Black Coloured White Asian
Male 21.4 44.2 4.8 11.2
Female 2.3 11 2.8 1.4
The differences in the rates are startlingly clear. The Coloured population, both
male and female having an extremely high rate of homicide, dwarfing the other
population groups. Unfortunately, due to the methodologies employed by the
Central Statistical Services the race of all the aggressors of Coloured victims
cannot be determined; the only data that can be used are the prosecutions and
convictions for the period.
In spite of this problem the death data demonstrates that homicide in South
Africa is influenced by race, race in South Africa is a key indicator of economic
and social opportunity. For higher rates not to be recorded within the Black and
105
Coloured communities would be an anomaly due to the nature of the social
system.
All the racial groups experienced an increase from the period around 1976. This
can be linked to the changing nature of violence within the country with the
increase in political destabilisation and associated violence.
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e. Male and Female Homicide
As with other research, there are consistent and important differences in the
homicide rates and patterns of male and female homicide.
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From 1968 to 2000 males were killed an average of 5.4 times more than
females. Males were more likely to be killed with a gun or other weapon (ratio
of 1.3-1, and 1.6-1). Females were killed without the use of weapons at a
greater ratio than males (0.7-1). This pattern is indicative of the nature of
violence in the society, with females being more likely to be killed by a man
using his fists, whereas male on male violence has a greater use of weapons, as
the use of these will give the aggressor a greater advantage over his victim. The
physical differences between males and females will lessen the need for a male
aggressor to make use of a weapon to successfully assault a female.
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The methodology of homicide reflects the different types of homicide that males
and females experienced, and gives an indication as to who was the aggressor.
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IVlale homicide has been dominated by assaults with cutting and piercing
weapons, such as knives. A significant number of homicides have been caused
by "legal intervention"; this would be state executions as well as police shooting
males.
The percentages of homicides that are unclassified and thus difficult to analyse
coincide with the increase in the number of homicides that occurred. This lack of
classification will be related to the increase in cases that the police and coroners
had to deal with, as well as giving an indication of the declining ability of the
criminal justice system to cope with these deaths.
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Female homicides share the high rate of assault with cutting and piercing
weapons, but also have a significant number of homicides by strangulation and
drowning. These homicides must be understood in the context of the "normal
female homicide", which will be caused by a male partner. The male is able to
use strangulation or drowning as a means of homicide due to the differences in
physical strength. The very low numbers of male homicide by strangulation or
drowning emphasises this key difference in male and female homicides.
The lack of significant numbers of female homicides due to legal intervention
demonstrates the differences in risk taking behaviour, with males more involved
not only in crime, but also under apartheid were executed more than females.
The homicides by "other violence" and "unspecified violence" create the same
problems that confront the analysis of male homicides.
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f. Age Groups
An individual will be a variable risk of being a victim of homicide dependent upon
their age. Age itself is not a cause of homicide, but an indicator of life style.
Under 15 years of age, the individual will not engage in behaviour that will
increase their risk of violent assault. However, between 15 and 30 years the
individual will be at greatest risk from violent victimisation, as well as be at high
risk for other non-natural causes of death, such as motor vehicle accidents and
since 1990 death from AIDS. This age group will be more likely to engage in
activities that will take them to areas of high risk, such as bars, and be more
likely to consume excess alcohol.
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Age group
The comparison above of the percentage of deaths caused by homicide in 1968
and 1996 demonstrates the increased risk of those between 15 and 35 years of
age. A more detailed examination of the high-risk age groups shows the nature
of the high level of homicides that occur in this limited age range.
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Homicide has played an increasing part of the deaths of males under 35 years.
The rise in the late 1970s can be explained by the increase in political violence,
and its subsequent effects upon the use of violence within the country. These
age groups die from homicide at a far greater level than males over 35, which
has to be linked to their lifestyle, increased risk taking and willingness to use
violence.
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For females, the pattern is similar, although the percentage of total deaths by
homicide is lower. The same age pattern is present, with those in the 20 to 30
age groups being most at risk from homicidal death.
For both males and females, the number of deaths from homicide is extreme,
and this trend has continued into the 1990s. However, this age group is also
most at risk from AIDS, and thus homicide has been reduced as a prime source
of death. This does not mean however that this group has reduced its level of
risk of homicidal death, only that it now faces a new source of death, that is also
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Blacks in South Africa die from homicide in the largest numbers, and have done
so since accurate records were kept. This data however is not as accurate as the
other racial groups due to the nature of the methodologies and policies of crime
data collection for most of the twentieth century. Black homicides that occurred
within the homelands during their existence were never recorded by either the
police or mortuaries in South Africa. They were meant to be collected by the
various homeland authorities, however this was never done to any form of
accuracy. The police, as has been exposed in the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission reports also never recorded many of the political homicides.
However, the data that is available does demonstrate the nature and rates of
Black homicide and clearly shows the nature of violence that this race group
have faced and still face.
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The extremely high rate of homicide for Black males and females is indicative of
the violence that has faced this society. The rapid increase in the 1970s
coincides with the change and increase in the political struggle. However, the
rate per 100 000 is problematic due to the lack of accurate census data. An
analysis of the homicide percent of total deaths shows a similar pattern, and with
similar significant levels of violence.
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The percentage of deaths from homicide has a less dramatic increase in the
1970s, and is of comparatively lower levels than would be expected of the rates
per 100 000. This points to high rates of death occurring within this population
group, and that homicide forms only part of the multiple causes of death.
The forms of homicide for Blacks show what type of weapon was used, if any, in
the homicide. The form of weapon gives some indication of the nature of the
violence, as well as changing patterns of behaviour.
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For both male and females the main weapon used was a cutting or piercing
weapon, followed by "other means", and finally firearms. Males had a high
percentage of death from weapons (above 60% from 1968 to 1977); females
had a lower rate for homicides by weapon, and a higher percentage for homicide
by other means. In relation to this homicide by strangulation was more
prominent for females than for males, while males suffered a higher homicide
rate from legal intervention.
For both genders the levels of undetermined homicide and homicide by "other
violence" increased in the late 1970s and dominates the causes of death by
1990. This trend is linked to the increase in homicides and the failure of the
criminal justice system to adequately cope with the rising homicide rates.
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Homicide in High Risk Age Groups
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Males and females in the 15 to 30 year age groups experienced a higher than
normal level of homicide. The percentage of deaths by homicide for Black males
between 15 and 25 was above 30% since 1968, and rose steadily throughout the
period reaching over 50% by 1988.
Female death by homicide was at a lower level than for males, but was still high,
at between 5 and 8% in 1968, and rising to over 15% by 1989.
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h. White Homicide
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White homicide reflects greatly the changing patterns of violence in the country,
the changing methods of homicides, as well as the increase in homicides
demonstrates the changing patterns and nature of violence and homicide in the
country.















The rates and patterns of homicide within the White race groups are in many
ways similar to those found in Europe and North America. The rates are on an
international level quite high, but within the context of South Africa they are low,
being maintained below 5 per 100 000 until 1977.
Method of Homicide
The method of homicide demonstrates to some degree the nature of the
homicide, as well as showing the changing nature of the society. Accurate
consistent information about weapon type is only available after 1968, and thus
has to be analysed from that date.
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From 1968 to 1977, the main forms of homicide were that of knife or other
stabbing instrument, firearm and other weapon. Females did have a significant
rate of homicide by hanging and strangulation (code 963) which points to
homicide by someone significantly stronger than them, Le. a male. After 1976,
this pattern changes in the increase in the homicide in the codes of "other
violence" and "death by injury undetermined". This change in homicide is not
limited to White victims, but is present in all racial groups. It is very pronounced
in the White race group however, and has to be analysed in the context of the
changing nature of the political struggle in the country at the time.
Male homicide increased significantly after 1977, particularly for those in the 15
to 29 year age groups. The men in this age frame were at an increased risk
from violence due to their involvement in the National Defence Force and the
police. This can be seen by the increase in the percentage of homicide deaths
from acts of war during the period 1979 to 1987, when these forms of homicide
accounted for between 8 and 9% of homicides. This figure may under-represent
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the actual figure of military deaths due to the clandestine nature of the war
being fought by the South African government in the region and inside the
country.
Both males and females have a high percentage of homicides from firearms,
decreasing in percentage only with the increase in "unspecified" and "other
violence" deaths. This is particularly the case for female homicides, where
firearm homicides formed an average of 29% of homicides prior to 1979.
Firearm homicides will be linked to the availability of the weapons, and the
decrease in the rate of firearm homicides is linked to the shift in the patterns of
homicides and their increase in number. Unfortunately, the high number of
homicides by "other violence" and "unspecified" do not give an indication as the
weapon used, and thus it is not possible to track any changes in weapon use.
Females were more likely to die from strangulation or hanging than males, this is
again a predominantly female form of homicide, and points to a male being the
aggressor.
They are also in the age group that is normally associated with increased risk
from violence; however, the massive increase in their homicide rates can only be
explained by the change in the security situation in the country. This shift in
homicide is also present in the other racial groups, but not at such an extreme
change.
The nature of the homicide classification however leaves gaps in the knowledge
of the types of homicide that occurred. The high number of homicides due to
"other violence" is problematic. The increase in this classification matches the
increase in political instability, and matches the increase in homicides of this type
in the other racial groups.
The categories of "other violence" and "undetermined" increase, while homicides
that can be specifically determined maintain a stable pattern. The homicide
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rates for males and females increases dramatically after 1977, with homicides
increasing to account for over 15% of total deaths for males in the 15 to 34 age
group, from a percentage of below 5% for the period prior to 1976.
For the codes of 965 (stabbing), 966 (firearms) and 968 (other weapon), the
numbers remain fairly consistent, but the rates of homicide increase significantly.
This shows a change in the type and method of homicide. These homicides have
to be placed within the political and social events in the country and the increase
in violence in the townships and the increase in inter-racial violence will explain
this shift and increase in homicides.
The shift in the political and social nature of the society in the 1970s had a direct
and immediate impact upon the White population. Their rate of increase in
homicide is far greater than any other group; this is particularly pronounced for
males. After 1978 the homicide rate has stabilised, but at a higher level of
around 20 per 100 000 for males and 10 for females.
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High risk Groups
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For both males and females in the 15-30 year age groups, they were at greater
risk from homicide than Whites outside that age bracket. Males were at greater
risk, with up to between 15 and 20% of deaths being as a result of homicide.
Female homicide made up between 10 and 15% of the total deaths.
White males had the largest increase in their homicide levels for the 15 to 30 age
groups. This increase in homicide from below 5% to over 17% clearly shows the
rapid change in the forms of violence that occurred during the late 1970s. Some
of these deaths will be as a direct result of the military and police campaigns, but
not all.
In spite of these increases, these death percentages are far lower than those
recorded for the other race groups, and match the lower homicide rates that
White males and females experience. The changing patterns of rates of
homicides, methods used and percentage of deaths by homicide are the clearest
and starkest images of the rapid change in the society in the late 1970s - A
change that is still being experienced.
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i. Asian Homicide
The number of homicides in the Asian community are comparatively small, this is
in part due to the low total numbers of Asians in South Africa, but is also
connected to the nature of their social structure.
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Bearing strong similarities to the White homicide rates, they do differ in certain
areas.
The rates as with White homicide remained low until the late 1970s, then
experienced the same sudden increase after 1977. Both male and female
homicides increased, with males having the greater increase from 10 per 100
000 in 1970 to 60 in 1982, females increasing from under 0.7 in 1970 to 8.8 in
1982. The patterns of change are consistent with the White population, and
thus have to be analysed in the greater societal structure, rather than a purely
intra-racial event.
Asian males were most at risk in the 20 to 30 age group, with homicide making
up between 30 and 50% of their total deaths after 1987. Prior to 1977, the
homicide rates had been relatively stable and low, remaining under 20 per 100
000 until 1978.
Asian females experienced very low homicide rates, remaining below 5 per 100
000 until the mid 1970s, then slowly rising to between 10 and 15 per 100 000 by
1990. The total number of Asian female homicide are low, and thus skew graphs
showing the manner of death, the annual number of homicides prior to 1978
remained below 12, and only increased above 50 per year in 1988.
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Types of Homicide
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Asian males were killed mainly by cutting or piercing instruments and by other
means. Firearm homicides constituted a small percentage of the total number of
homicides prior to 1990, never reaching above 8% of all homicides. A small
number were killed by strangulation or hanging. These strangulation victims
were not limited to any single age group. It must be noted that strangulation
does occur in all other race groups as a type of homicide for males, it is the
higher percentage of homicides by this manner in the Asian male population that
makes it significant.
Female homicides are low in number and thus make assessment of patterns
more complex. It is apparent however, that strangulation and other non-weapon
types of homicide have been dominant. Firearm homicide is infrequent.
For both males and females, the types of homicides are blurred by the increase
in deaths by "other violence" and "unspecified". Once more this creates
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Asian males under 30 experienced a significantly high percentage of homicides
as a percentage of their total deaths. The patterns fit into those of the other
race groups, as they increase from the 1970s. Females experienced much lower
percentages of homicide, and only experienced a small increase in their
percentage of homicide mortality.
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j. Coloured Homicide
Homicide within the Coloured community has been the most severe for all the
race groups. Both males and females have much greater risk of violent death
than any other community in South Africa.
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Coloured homicide rates have always been high relative to the other racial
groups. Prior to 1977 their homicide rates for both male and female were at
least twice that of any other group. They are the most at risk group from
violence and as the male homicide patterns show the young Coloured males are
at extreme risk from violent death.
Males
Coloured males between 15 and 30 have experienced very high levels of
homicide mortality since the 1960s. Homicide for this age group has made up
over 25% of all their recorded deaths since the early 1970s, and has continued
to rise with the 20 to 24 age group experiencing over 50% of all their deaths
coming from homicide.
Females
Coloured females have a lower homicide rate than their male counterparts, but
are far in excess of other female groups' homicide rates and percentages. The
Coloured female homicide rate per 100 000 has been above 10 since 1970, and
remained between 15 and 45 per 100 000 from 1974 until 1990 when records
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were racially combined. The homicide patterns as a percentage of total deaths
also show their high risk; however, this graph demonstrates the problems of
combining different sets of data. The mortality rate of Coloured females is high,
and homicide is only a maximum of 5.5% of total deaths.
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Types of Homicide
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The tables above show the differing types of weapons and methods used in
Coloured homicide.
Male Coloureds had a consistently high percentage of death by stabbing or
piercing instruments, with between 50 and 60% of all homicides being caused by
such weapons. This pattern remained constant during the period of 1968 to
1990. The use of firearms remained low, at fewer than 5%, while other means
of homicide also remained fairly static at between 27 and 27% of the total. A
small, but significant number of Coloured males were killed by legal intervention,
the largest percentages prior to 1980.
What is unusual is the relatively low number of homicides that have been
classified as being "unspecified" or as a result of "other violence". This pattern is
in contrast to the homicides in the other race groups, where homicides in these
classifications increased from the mid-1970s onwards, dominating homicides by
1990.
For Coloured females homicides methods are consistent through this period, with
the majority of homicides being caused by cutting and piercing instruments, as
well as by other means. Once more, there is a low percentage of homicides by
firearm, and a small but significant percentage of homicide by strangulation.
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High Risk Groups
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The high-risk age groups show a consistent pattern. There has been a steady
increase in death by homicide for those in the 15 to 30 age groups since the
early 1970s, reaching over 50% for males and 30% for females in the 20-24 year
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age group. However, prior to 1976, the percentage of deaths by homicide was
still significant at over 20% for males. The extremely high percentage of
homicides for the 15-30 age group reflects the extremely high-risk environment
that existed for Coloured male and females.
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The patterns of homicide from 1968 to 1990 show a significant change in
numbers, rates and methods after 1976. The political upheavals during this
period would have had both direct and indirect effects upon the use of violence
and homicide both in the political and non-political realms of the society. The
period prior to 1976 can be seen as one of stable levels of homicides, but after
that date the levels of homicide increased for all races, genders and in particular
those aged between 15 and 30 years of age.
The patterns of homicide alter to similar degrees across all race groups, with the
rate and number of homicides being a key difference. The patterns of weapon
use are significant in their racial difference. Firearms are only significant in
White homicides, while for the majority of Black and Coloured homicides
stabbing and other weapons are used. This will be linked to the availability of
the weapon, as well as the motive for the act. Homicides as a result of assaults
"gone too far" will reflect the weapon being carried by the aggressor. As
firearms become more available, so the rate of firearm deaths will increase.
Unfortunately, the lack of accurate data created by the use of the classification
systems of deaths by "other violence" and death "undetermined whether
homicide, suicide or accident" does limit the reliability and validity of the data.
However, even with this problem of data accuracy, the scale of the shift in
homicides can be clearly seen, and has to be recognised and understood in order
to deal with the patterns and rates of homicide after 1994.
It is clear that the political struggle against the Apartheid system had a
significant and direct impact upon the levels and rates of homicides in South
Africa. In order to understand the future trends for homicide the past has to be
understood and patterns analysed.
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iii. Homicide Post-1994
Homicide patterns after 1994 were both similar to and significantly different from
the homicide patterns prior to that date. The ending of politically inspired
homicide is the most significant, but new patterns emerged, in particular the
increase in homicides involving crime, the taxi industry, vigilante killings and the
apparent increase in the homicides of White farmers.
The gathering of homicide data altered with the creation of a centralised data
collection unit within the South African Police Force, the Crime Information
Analysis Centre (C.I.A.C.). This positive step was however hindered with the
withholding of the release of crime data in 2000 and 2003 by the state. The
basis of which was to ensure that the data that was released to the public was as
accurate as possible, and that "Releasing crime statistics too regularly posed a
threat of demoralising society" (Minister of Safety and Security Nquakula, quoted
in www.news24.com. 10/05/2002). These actions were roundly criticised as not
only dictatorial, but also short-sighted on behalf of the government, as for the
general public they were still suffering from the realities of crime, whether the
national crime figures were released or not. As well as the initiatives by the
S.A.P.s., various NGOs and research facilities gathered data on crime and
violence, in particular the Institute of Strategic Studies and the CSVR have
conducted consistent and ongoing research into crime and justice patterns and
methodologies in the country. Further work by the Medical Research Council on
mortuary data has provided detailed accounts of the number and manner of
deaths, while pressure groups such as Gun Free South Africa have increased
focus on specific areas of crime.
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This post-1994 data must be placed within a greater time period. When this is
done a clear picture emerges of possibly why the data was reduced to such a
degree.
The above graph illustrates that the 2003 C.I.A.C. crime report homicide rates do
fit into the pre-1994 data. However, the 2001 C.I.A.C. crime report rates also fit
into the prevailing homicide rates; it depends upon when the peak of the rates
occurred. The data of Stats SA lack the homicides for the Homelands, and the
post-1994 data should include all homicides throughout the nation. On this
basis, the pre-1994 homicide rates will underreport the national homicide rates,
while the post-1994 rates should reflect a more accurate picture, and thus be
greater than the pre-1994 rates. This is the case of the 2001 report, but not the
2003 report. Alternatively, the reduction in politically motivated crime should
have had a direct effect upon the homicide rates and a dramatic reduction
should be seen. For both sets of data, explanations can be used to support or
oppose their use. The problem remains in that which of the C.I.A.C. data should
be used.
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a. Alternative Homicide Data Sources
The National Non-Natural Mortality Surveillance System (NMSS) within the
Medical Research Council has conducted research into mortuary data in an effort
to understand and record accurately the nature and patterns of non-natural
death in South Africa. Their studies do not cover all mortuaries, and thus do not
include all deaths, but they have been able to provide an accurate cross section
of the nature of homicide that is separate from the C.I.A.C., and thus can be
used as an independent control for national homicide rates and patterns.
The reported patterns of non-natural death fit into the established patterns of
homicide.
Homicide, external causes by victim population group, 1999
Firearm Sharp Blunt Strangle Burn Other TOTAL
Asian 96 (65.3) 22 (15.0) 13 (8.8) 3 (2.0) 4 (2.7) 9 (6.1) 147
Black 2627 (51.7) 1652 589 56 (1.1) 38 (0.7) 122 5084
(32.5) (11.6) (2.4)
Coloured 500 (40.2) 544 (43.8) 123 (9.9) 9 (0.7) 2 (0.2) 65 (5.2) 1243
White 198 (60.9) 50 (15.4) 36 (11.1) 21 (6.5) 3 (0.9) 17 (5.2) 325
(Butchart et al., 2000)
The NIMSS data shows that homicide patterns have altered only in the methods
employed. Firearms were used in over 50% of all homicides, the highest levels
being amongst White and Asian homicides. Males were killed at 6.5 times the
rate as females and those in the 15 to 39 age groups were the most at risk from
homicide. These patterns fit into the pre-1994 patterns of homicide, as would be
expected. They found that 80% of those killed by sharp instruments had alcohol
in their systems, while only 40% of gun shot victims had. This element points to
the nature of the homicides, with knife injuries more likely to be caused by
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argument, rather than planned killing, which would be more likely to be carried
out with a firearm.
The racial patterns fit into the pre-1994 patterns, with Black and Coloured males
being most at risk, and the predominance of firearm homicides amongst White
victims.
In the MRC Initial Burden of Disease Estimates for South Africa 2000 (2003), a
study of all deaths in South Africa for year 2000, the homicide data is far in
excess of the C.I.A.C. data. The rvlRC has recorded 32485 homicides for that
year in contrast to the official C.I.A.C. figure of 15457, a difference of 52.4%.
This discrepancy is of concern to any study of the nature of violence in the
society. A true understanding of the threats posed to the stability of the society
are only hindered by inaccurate data.
Statistics South Africa Causes of Death in South Africa 1997-2001 report (2002)
raises further questions in their analysis of death data. The report is based upon
a sample of 12% of all deaths recorded. The report records death by assault
only constituted 0.8% of all deaths between 1997 and 2001. However, death by
"Unspecified unnatural causes" constitutes 11% of all the deaths for the period.
This contrasts with the other data sources of the MRC and the S.A.P.s., who
produce different percentages of homicidal deaths for the same period.
For the year 2000 the competing data on the numbers of homicides recorded are




Organisation Classification Male Female Total
C.I.A.C. 2001 Murder 21683 (3.9)
C.I.A.C. 2003 Murder 15457 (2.8)
Stats SA Death by Assault (1.7) (<0.5) (1.1)
Stats SA Death by Unspecified (12.6) (4.1) (8.6)
unnatural causes
MRC Homicide/violence 27134 (9.0) 5351 (2.1) 32485 (5.8)
This conflicting data is problematic, as there is a discrepancy of over 10 000
deaths between the S.A.p.s. and the MRC, while the Stats SA data can be read
as either being above or below both the S.A.P.s. and the MRC data.
Whatever the actual numbers of homicides, the reality is that death by violence
continues to be a serious threat to the population.
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b. Weapon Use
One of the most significant changes in post-1994 homicide is the increase in
firearm use. Prior to 1976 only Whites were killed in any significant numbers by
firearms, the vast majority of homicides were by cutting or piercing instruments.
Combining the data available from the NIMSS reports and that of Stats SA the
changing trends in weapon use since 1968 can be traced. The graphs below
show the type of weapon used in the percentage of homicides that a weapon
was recorded. Those homicides that were recorded by Stats SA as "other
violence" have been excluded.
Male Homicide: Percentage Cause of Death.
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Female Homicide: Percentage Cause of Death.
Stats SA (1968-1997) and NIMSS (1999-2001)
100%
90%
80% o Assault by hanging and
70% strangulation




o Assault by cutting and
I
piercing instruments




fo~ ~" ~t:;.. ~'\ 9:J~ 9:J~ 9:Jro 9:J0:> Rl'" Rl~ !0"
"Ql ,,0:> ,,0:> ,,0:> ,,~ ,,~ "Q) "Q) "Q) "Q) ",'5
Comparing the NIMSS and Stats SA data also shows racial patterns of homicide.
The key change is the increase in firearm use. The increase is not however
consistent across all race groups, with Black homicides showing the greatest
increase, and White homicide the least. This is linked to the high rates of
firearm homicide that Whites experienced prior to 1990. Coloureds have a low
increase, as a large percentage of their homicides as recorded by the NIMSS are
still with cutting and piercing instruments.
The following graphs show the type of homicide for both males and females
according to race group. The data from 1968 to 1990 is from Stats SA, for 1999
and 2001 from NIMSS. Homicides that were classified as "other violence" have
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After 1994, firearms became the predominant weapon used and after 1999 the
main type of homicide.
Number of Homicides with Firearms 1994 - 2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Homicides 26832 26637 25782 24588 24875 24210 22030
Homicide by Firearm 11134 11 056 11 394 11224 12298 12011 10854
Firearm Homicides as a
141.5% 44.2% 145.6% 149.4% kJ9.6%41.5% 149.3%
Percentage of the Total
(C.I.A.c. data, quoted by Gun Free South Africa)
To understand this change in detail, the changing patterns of homicide use are
instructive, as can be seen in the graph below.










The types of firearms used in these homicides correspond to the availability of
the weapons.
In 2000 there were 6724 (62%) homicides with handguns and 2603 (24%) by
rifle or shotguns, and 151 (1.4%) by high calibre gun (military assault rifle). This
pattern corresponds to the legal ownership of weapons. There are 4.54 million
firearms registered in South Africa, 61.2% are handguns, 28.5% rifles and
shotguns.6 Thus the pattern of firearm homicides matches the pattern of firearm
ownership. The number of illegal firearms is difficult to estimate as many
weapons have been smuggled into the country from neighbouring states, and
the number of reported thefts is assumed to be an undercount as many will not
report their firearm as lost or stolen. (Altbeker, 2001)
As has been argued earlier, firearms increase the risk of death; however
homicides are decreasing as firearm use increases. The increase in firearm use
is not however a cause for hope for a continued decline in homicides. Other
factors have played a role in the decrease, and the increasing use of firearms will
ensure that the risk of lethality is high. As Altbecker (2001) shows, there are a
high percentage of crimes with the sole intention of theft of a firearm, and these
will be used in committing crime and violence.
6 Firearm data obtained from Gun Free South Africa and C.I.A.C.
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c. Lethality and Homicide Rates
The hope for any society is the reduction of homicide and associated levels of
violence. However, a reduction in the homicide rate does not automatically
mean that the society is any less violent in nature. As has been stated there are
many factors that contribute to the "creation" of a homicide, and these factors
have to be taken into consideration when dealing with this area.
A homicide is an assault that has resulted in the death of an individual. The
number of homicides in a society is influenced by the willingness of its citizens to
engage in interpersonal violence, but also by the ability of others to save lives.









1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
The lethality of an act will determine if the outcome is a homicide or an assault.
The motive does not always determine the result, and what is important is the
changing rates of lethality of assaults. The level of lethality will show to some
extent the changing nature of external forces that influence the result of
assaults.
Working with data from the C.I.A.C. the levels of lethality can be determined.
Homicide makes up a small percentage of the total number of Assaults (Murder,
Attempted Murder and Grievous Bodily Harm).
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The levels of lethality are calculated by calculating the ratios of homicides to the
total number of recorded serious assaults, whether these result in a death or
not; i.e. murders or homicides, attempted murders and Assault with the intent to
cause Grievous Bodily Harm or GBH. A change in the lethality rate will
demonstrate either that assaults are increasing and homicides remain static, or
that homicides are decreasing relative to the number of assaults. In either case
a decrease in lethality is a positive outcome for any society. However, a
decrease in lethality does not mean that the levels of violence in a society are
decreasing; only that percentage of lethal outcomes for assaults is decreasing.
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As can be seen in the above chart, lethality in South Africa has decreased since
1994. However, the total number of assaults during that period has increased by
20%. The number of homicides has decreased not only in number, but also in
their percentage of total assaults, from 10.5% in 1994, to 6.7% in 2001. The
total number of assaults has increased from 1994 to 2001 by 20%, while
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homicides have decreased by 31%. In total figures this represents an increase
in 37,899 cases of murder, attempted murder or GBH from 1994 to 2001.
Violence has increased in South Africa since 1994. Even though the results of
that violence have been less lethal, the levels of reported violence demonstrate
that for South Africans their world is still violent and risk prone. The anomic
situation of the society will ensure that this violence will continue.
The patterns in homicide after 1994 have altered in three significant ways: the
end of political killings, an apparent reduction in rates and an increase in firearm
use.
The decrease in homicide rates and the end of political killings is linked, as there
has been a reduction in around 20% in homicides since 1994, and political
killings made up an estimated 20% of homicides during the period 1990 to 1994.
The increase in firearm use can be linked to the increase in availability of
firearms, both legally and illegally, as well as an apparent increase in firearm use
in crimes.
The high levels of homicide in South Africa will continue for the foreseeable
future. Even if the homicide rate continues to decline as at present it will be only
after 2020 that the rate will reach pre-1976 levels. A crucial factor in this is the
continued anomic condition of the South African society. People believe that
they are under serious threat from crime, that they cannot rely solely upon the
state, and that for many they have no real link to the state in any case.
Communities will continue to engage in activities that will increase their anomic
condition using privatised security, vigilante acts, and physically enclosing their
living and working space. The result of this is the enclosing of the social world,
an anomic belief for many that they are at risk, and that they have the right as
individuals and communities to protect and punish.
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iv. Prosecutions and Convictions for Murder and Culpable Homicide
1949-1996
The data on the prosecutions and convictions of crimes in South Africa gives
information on the aggressor, their race, gender and to a lesser extent their
marital status and education level. This data is useful in providing a deeper
insight into the nature of homicides in South Africa, as well as demonstrating the
level of effectiveness and bias of the Criminal Justice System.
a. Data structure
The prosecutions and convictions for murder and culpable homicide are recorded
by Statistics South Africa annually and are presented by the gender of the
offender as well as their race according to the crime committed. The race of the
victim is given to a limited extent. No information is given about the relationship
between the victim and aggressor, and this has to be assumed with a study of
the racial divisions of the data.
The classification system of crimes has changed with time, reflecting state
attitudes towards race. The one constant is the prominence of data for Whites,
whether they are victims or aggressors. The data for prosecutions was not
always published, and weapon use was only published after 1980. Although the
gender of the offender is given, the gender of their specific victim is not; again
assumptions have to be made linking this data with the more precise data in the
Annual Death reports.
The table below sets out the different classification methodologies used by
Statistics South Africa in their recording of murder cases from 1940 to 1996. The
first character represents the victim, the second the aggressor on trial, thus "W
by A" means a White person was killed by an Asian person, while N-W by W
means a non-White person (Le. a Black, Coloured or Asian murdered by a White
person).
153
Racial Classifications of Murder. Statistics SA
Pre-1962 1963 to 1979 1980 to 1987 1987 to 1995
infanticide infanticide infanticide Infanticide
WbyW WbyW Firearm WbyW Small Arms WbyW
WbyC Wby W by CIA W by CIA
WbyA 1\1- W W by B W by B
WbyB CIA by W CIA by W
CIA by W N-W by W B byW B byW
B byW N-W by N-W N-W by N-W
N-W by B N-W by Other WbyW Other WbyW
N-W by C N-W weapon W by CIA Firearms W by CIA
N-W by A WbyB W by B
CIA by W CIA by W
A = Asian B byW B byW
B = Black N-W by N-W N-W by N-W
C = Coloured High WbyW
W = White calibre W by CIA
N-W = Non-White, or W by B









For the crime of culpable homicide only the following racial information is given





This racial classification reflects the government's policies at the time, and in part
demonstrates the importance placed upon homicides that did not involve Whites.
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As has been shown, not all race groups experienced the same level of violence,
nor the same risks of committing violence. In particular the Asian community
experienced far less homicide than either the Black or the Coloured communities,
but in this data all three race groups are compressed together, thus clouding the
social realities. This severely hinders a detailed analysis of the realities of the
structure of the homicidal act, and limits the usefulness of the data. However,
as the alternative is using a case-by-case basis (a Herculean task with over 100
000 convictions for murder and culpable homicide since 1968), this data will be
used.
Even though this data is limited in nature, it does provide an insight into the
nature of the homicide process. The majority of "normal" homicides occur
between relatives and acquaintances (Wolfgang, 1958) and in South Africa the
divided nature of the society will predelict that inter-racial homicides should
occur more frequently than intra-racial homicides. Any change in the nature of
the racial composition of the victim and aggressor would point to a changing
nature of the society, with either a decrease in racial divisions in society, or a
change in the nature of the homicide process, with an increase in stranger
killings.
The changing rate of prosecutions and convictions for homicide exposes one of
the key problems facing the state in reducing violence. Since the mid 1970s,
when the rates of homicide increased, the levels of successful prosecution and
conviction has remained at a low level.
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Convictions for Murder and Culpable Homicides
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Prior to 1976 the number of convictions for murder and culpable homicide
exceed the recorded number of violent deaths. There will be a lag from the
recording of the death to the recording of the result of the criminal case, but this
should not produce more convictions than deaths, unless there have been many
cases of multiple murderers, an event that is rare and unlikely. This overlap
raises questions about the accuracy of the homicide data, in particular for deaths
of Black South Africans. The deaths may have been recorded in the
"Homelands", but prosecuted in South African courts, thus the anomaly. The
number of White homicides, a more accurate figure than the total population, is
also exceeded in one year by the number of convictions for murder and culpable
homicide. This however could be the result of the previous year's cases being
prosecuted in that year. It is obvious that the data for Black, Asian and Coloured
homicides is lower than the real figure; by how much is difficult to surmise.
The number of convictions for murder and culpable homicide has not kept pace
with the increase in homicide rates in the society. This trend has continued with
the 21 995 cases of criminal homicide reported to the S.A.P.S. in 2000, 10696
(48.6%) went to court, and 4007 (18%) resulted in a conviction. This low level
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of convictions shows much about the key failures of the South African Criminal
Justice System. The failure to convict those who commit homicide will negatively
affect the public's perception of the criminal justice system.
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b. Racial Bias
The judicial system under Apartheid was well known for its racial bias. The
results of this bias can be easily seen in the patterns of prosecution and
conviction for murders and culpable homicides.
Percentage Convictions of Prosecutions for Murder
and Culpable Homicide 1980-1995
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In this fifteen-year period that includes the increase in political violence and state
oppression, the racial bias in the courts can be clearly seen. The cases of Whites
killed by non-Whites have the highest percentage of conviction for murder with
an average of 77% for the period 1980 to 1995. The killing of non-Whites by
Whites and non-Whites have the lowest level of successful convictions with
averages of 53 and 54% respectively. Several factors could be at play here:
variable access to lawyers; racial bias in the police; racial bias in the courts;
differing levels of stranger murders (less likely to be solved). The racist bias of
many of the police and courts would have a significant influence, but also the
political nature of the homicides in the 1980s will have had a direct impact upon
achieving a low rate of prosecution and conviction of the perpetrators. There is
a clear bias in favour of the conviction of those who killed Whites. Prosecutions
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for the murder and culpable homicide of White victims resulted in a 71%
conviction rate, while the prosecution for non-White victims for the same
offences had only a 53.6% conviction rate.
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c. Marital Status of Aggressor
The marital status of a person will affect his chances of engaging in high-risk
activities. A high ratio of single males and females in a community has a positive
effect upon the levels of social disorganisation and crime (Sampson, 1987;
Sampson and Groves, 1989; Messner and Sampson, 1991). Single adults will be
more likely to engage in higher risk activities, such as going to bars, and more
likely to engage in crime. While the married individual will have greater
pressures to conform to societal norms and be less likely to go to high risk areas,
or engage in higher risk activities such as engaging in excessive drinking in
public places.
The following data for marital status and education is taken from all convictions
for class Cl crimes, "Crimes against the Life and Body of a Person". These
comprise of Assault, Assault with the intent to do Grievous Bodily Harm, Culpable
Homicide, Murder and Attempted Murder.
Male C1 Convictions and General Population over 15:














A similar pattern is seen with female convictions. Where the majority of those
prosecuted are unmarried and only a slightly higher number of married females
are prosecuted for homicide than males. This is significant as an indication of
societal stability.
Female C1 Convictions and General Population over 15:
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o General Population
• Convicted
The over-representation of unmarried males and females in the convicted
population and the under-representation of the married show the relationship
between marriage and the use of violence.
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d. Education levels
The education levels appear to have less effect upon the conviction rate for
violent acts. There is a not such an over-representation of any group, although
male and females who are either illiterate or have an elementary education levels
are more likely to be convicted of violent crimes, it is only within a 10%
difference to their composition in the general population over the age of 18.
Male C1 Convicted and General Population:
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It is however important to see that as education increases, so the number of
convictions decreases. There does appear to be a negative correlation, but due
to a lack of detailed data it is impossible to comprehensively conclude if this is
due to less violence occurring, or a lower chance of being convicted of these
crimes.
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e. White Homicides and Convictions
Data for Whites, both as victims and aggressors is the most complete in the
available statistics. However, as the graph below shows, after 1976 the vast
majority of murders and culpable homicides of Whites were unprosecuted, and
thus the data available, even for White involvement as aggressors in murders is
limited. It could be postulated that the gap in prosecutions is due to an increase
in stranger homicides, but this cannot be proven unless a more detailed analysis
of police dockets for the period is conducted.
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White homicide increased significantly in the mid-1970s, however the
prosecutions for homicide did not alter with the increased rates, instead they
maintained a consistent total, and as a rate per 100 000 of the population
decreased.
Blacks formed the majority of those convicted for the murder of Whites, with an
average of 53% of all convictions for the period. Coloured and Asians were
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convicted of an average of 14% of White murders, while Whites were convicted
of the remaining 33%. Convictions of culpable homicides of Whites for the same
period resulted in an average of 41% of White aggressors and 59% of non-White
aggressors.
White Murder Victim:
Race of Convicted Aggressor 1949-1995
.Black
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The pattern of convictions of Whites for murder shows a rather different pattern.
Of the murder convictions for Whites from 1949 to 1995, 62% were of White
victims, 6% of Coloured or Asian victims and 32% were Black victims.
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Convicted White Murderers:
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After 1980 data on weapon use in murder cases was recorded and the patterns
of firearm use match race closely. The weapon of choice for White aggressors is
the firearm, being used in 51% of murders committed by Whites after 1980.
49% of White victims were murdered with firearms. The use of firearms is dealt
with in detail below.
White homicide provides a microanalysis of the greater issues surrounding
homicide in South Africa. The pace of convictions has not kept up with the
number of homicides, as this trend continues so communities will be further
estranged from the police and courts, as they will perceive them as not being
able to protect them, nor punish the guilty.
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f. Non-White Convictions
Due to the nature of the data categorisation, any analysis of murders involving
Asians, Coloured and Blacks is highly constrained. As has been stated above,
murders and culpable homicides that do not involve Whites are generally
compacted into the "non-White" category. It is not possible to extract accurately
over the entire period the differing levels of convictions and victimisation of
Blacks, Coloured and Asians, thus limiting its usefulness.

























In the above graph the White and non-White aggressor convictions of non-
Whites are combined, as White convictions only ever comprise a maximum of
2% of the total number of convictions for non-White murder and culpable
homicide.
The number of convictions of non-Whites has only risen slightly since 1980, while
the number of homicides has risen exponentially.
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Prior to 1968 there was a racial breakdown of the offender, but the victim was
still either White, or non-White. The racial variance between Coloured, Asian
and Black groups in their level of convictions is clear from this data.
















The graph above shows convictions for murder as a rate per 100 000 according
to race. Blacks and Coloureds are convicted at a much greater rate than Whites
or Asians throughout this period, and it can be suggested that these patterns
continue after 1968. The total number of convictions for murder and culpable
homicide were 13202 and 22811 respectively, males comprising 92.8% of all








Blacks formed the vast majority of convictions, followed by Coloureds, then
Whites and Asians. These rates and pattern of convictions matches the patterns
of violent deaths closely according to race, with Black and Coloured males having
not only the greatest risk of violent death, but also of conviction of such deaths.
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h. Weapon Use in Murders
After 1980 the type of weapon used in murder cases was recorded. This data
gives an indication of the differing methods employed by aggressors in
homicides, and allows further analysis of weapon use in the data available for
homicides in general.
Convicted White Aggressors: Percentage Firearm Use











..-- N C")co co co







~j .~ J., V )








o::t Lt) <0 1"- co 0> 0 ..-- N C") o::t Lt) <0co co co co co co 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0>
0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0>..-- ..-- ..-- ..-- ..-- ..-- ..-- ..-- ..-- ..-- ..-- ..--
There is a clear racial difference in weapon use with Whites using firearms in
murders at the highest percentage. Whites are also killed with firearms at a
higher percentage than non-Whites. White aggressors used firearms in an
average of 51% of murders; an average of 58% of White victims and 42% of
non-White victims were killed with firearms.
This is in contrast to murder convictions of non-Whites. Convicted Non-Whites
used fewer firearms in committing murders, an average of 16% of all cases, but
this had risen to over 20% after 1994.
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Convicted Non-White Aggressors: Percentage Firearm Use and
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Of the White victims of non-White murder, an average of 45% of cases involved
firearms, while only 15% of non-White victims were killed with firearms.
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The racial patterns of weapon use are unfortunately limited by the melding of
race groups into the "non-White" catch-all, as well as the more significant low
rate of convictions for the numerous homicides that occur. A clear distinction
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can be observed however between Whites and non-Whites in their use of and
victimisation by firearms.
The number of convictions for murder with a firearm has increased steadily
and should do so as the number of homicides by firearm has risen exponentially.
There has been considerable concern since the late 1990s about the low level of
convictions and punishment of criminals in general and murders in particular
(Schonteich, 1999). However, this pattern is not a recent phenomenon. The
gap between homicides and convictions began to grow in the late 1970s and has
never recovered. The change has been from 62% of homicides resulting in a
conviction in 1968, to 19% in 1996 and less than 5% in 2003. In comparison,
the USA has had a drop in clearance rates for homicides from 93% in 1961, to
67% in 1991 (Regoeczi W.c., Kennedy L.W. and Silverman R.A., 2002). The
problem that faces South Africa is immense and deep-rooted. The failure to
successfully prosecute in the 1970s, '80s and '90s has continued, but now there
is increased pressure upon the state to solve this problem.
The continued low level of success in punishing those who commit homicides
weakens the power of the C,J.5. in particular and the society in general. This
adds pressure on communities that are either high risk, or believe that they are
high risk from violence to increasingly rely upon other forms of security and
punitive sanction. Durkheim clearly argued for the swift and consistent
punishment of crime. This is vital in the demonstration to the populace that the
state is capable of maintaining order, and that those who violate the moral order
will be controlled. This has not happened in South Africa since the mid 1970s,
and the increase in the alternative structures of control and punishment have to
be understood in the light of this long-term trend of insufficient control of those
who kill.
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Punishment of crime is vital, and the continuing failure of the state will continue
to push communities away from the state based Criminal Justice System and into
the realm of the private security and vigilante. The state does have the ability to
bring about a change, and in many areas is doing just that. However, it has to
be remembered that this problem is not recent, and that the homicide and crime
rate will take time to achieve an acceptable level.
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v. Conclusion
South Africa has a history of violence and high rates of homicide. The political
struggle from the 1970s had a great influence upon the increase in homicide
rates, but the continued high rates in the post-1994 period have shown that the
violence in South Africa cannot be reduced through political changes.
The patterns of homicide in South Africa match closely those found in the USA,
with higher rates for young males from lower socio-economic backgrounds. The
key difference is the rate at which homicides occur in South Africa. Homicides
are particularly high within the Coloured community, and the continued use of
knives as their weapon of choice means that any change in firearm laws will
have little effect upon this community. The decline in the rates of homicide since
1994 has to be understood in conjunction with the increase in the rates of non-
lethal assault. The latter's rise could be due in part to an increase in the
willingness of people to report such acts to the police, but must also be due to a
decrease in the lethality of assaults due to better access to medical care, or
some other post-act variable.
The rate of prosecution and conviction for homicides is of grave concern. The
continued failure to punish aggressors will encourage individuals and
communities to rely upon their own resources, whether this is the hiring of
private security, the use of vigilantes, or the arming oneself with a weapon.
These actions in turn will increase the risk of violence occurring, and thus impact
the rates of homicide.
The statistics however only show part of the nature of the act. The statistics
have to be enhanced through an understanding of what South Africans think
about using violence. Homicides do not occur in a vacuum, the perpetrators of
homicides are members of the wider society, and it is the wider society's
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attitudes that will influence the individual's behaviours. These attitudes will be
explored in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6
Attitudes towards Violence amongst 16-20 year olds.
i. Attitudes and Violence Prediction
Any action arises from a willingness to engage in that act, even if the actor sees
the action as deviant. The Willingness to engage in acts of violence
demonstrates the nature of the individual and the society in which they exist.
It has been shown that a positive attitude towards the use of violence is a
positive predictor of actual violent behaviour. (Funk, Elliott, Urman, Flores and
Moc, 1999; Kraus, 1988; Upmeyer, 1989; Jenkins and Bell, 1997) and this
research have shown links between pro-violence attitudes and actual use of
violence. However, this has to be taken one step further in the investigation of
those who do not engage in violent acts themselves, but encourage others to do
so. Their attitudes will be pro-violence, but bounded within the rationale of
someone else engaging in the act, and thus they are involved in the creation of
the violence, but not to blame for it. They will form part of the wider social
forces that will act upon the individual who will engage in the acts of violence.
If violence is to be reduced it has to be understood as a long-term process
involving a plethora of external pressures, societal structures, personal attitudes
and internalised motivations and opportunities.
The impact of life experiences deeply affects the individual's attitudes towards
the acceptance and involvement in violence. The levels of violence in South
Africa have been consistently high since 1976, and the violence is an ever-
present factor in day-to-day living for all South Africans. The actual impact of
violence is varied across race, gender and economic levels, but all South Africans
are affected either directly or indirectly by the violence. This will affect their
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attitudes towards the use of violence by the individual and others. The attitudes
that are formed will affect how they will respond to violence being used by the
state, agents of the Criminal Justice System and civilians. Support for the use of
violence does not mean that the individuals themselves will be willing to engage
in violence, but that they will support others doing so.
Teens are those who should be targeted in any campaign in reducing violence.
They are the ones who are or are about to enter the most high-risk categories
for violence, both as victim and aggressor. Creating an understanding of their
attitudes is vital in understanding any changes in the greater changes in societal
behaviour.
In investigating the attitudes towards the use of violence a secondary goal is
seen, that of predicting future violence. It is assumed in these forms of studies
that pro-violence attitudes will result in violent action. However, there is the
tendency for over prediction of violence in these forms of studies; Le. predicting
violent behaviour in people who will not actually become violent. There is a
powerful urge to over rather than under predict in this case. (Duckitt, 1988) In
the USA this was the case after the Columbine School shootings of 1999, with
seemingly minor acts taken by students seen as deadly threats. However, school
shootings in schools in the USA continue to occur, as they had occurred prior to
the Columbine incident. The fear generated by this over-prediction poses a
danger to the understanding of the actual risk of violence. Violence can never be
completely predicted, understood or in turn halted.
The experience of violence in South Africa is common. The high rate of
homicide, rape, armed robbery and other acts of violence pose not only a
significant threat to the long term stability of the society at large, but also create
a society in which violence is not a random event, but a daily occurrence, to be
experienced directly, or via the media.
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In the work in the USA it was shown that racial minorities, Le. African Americans,
had the highest levels of pro-violence attitudes. These pro-violence attitudes are
reflected in the racial bias in the rates of arrest and victimisation for violence,
with African Americans being over-represented in both areas. A pro-violent
attitude will be as a result of the social nature of the community in which the
individual lives, their own experiences and other members of the community's
experiences. The high rate of pro-violence attitudes has to be expected in
African American communities in the USA, as they experience a much greater
rate of violence, as well as social and economic deprivation. In the case of South
Africa, the most "at risk" group are Coloured males, followed by Black males.
White and Asian males are least at risk from violence. However, for the most at
risk groups their levels of violence were seen to be lower than expected. The
historical nature and structure of violence in South Africa is substantively
different to that in the USA.
The historical trends in violence show that for all South Africans violence
increased in the 1970s as the nature of political and social change increased.
However the experience of violence was markedly different for the race groups.
The nature of Apartheid ensured that White and Asian communities and
individuals experienced less political oppression, as well as the continuing
violence. Black South Africans were excluded and made into anomic
communities within the country and the Homelands. Since 1994, the political
changes have increased the political, social and economic power of the Black
community, while the crime situation has expanded beyond the township borders
and into the rest of the society.
For the White community this "democratisation" of crime and violence has
resulted in their increase in the use of private security.
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Attitudes cannot be directly observed, but they play a key role in the
determination of behaviour, and it is through detailed questionnaires that some
level of understanding of these attitudes can be arrived at (Mueller, 1986). The
self-report measure is a useful tool in this process; the use of anonymity and
ensuring that the subjects do not feel that they should lie or alter their responses
ensures a high level of validity (Mueller, 1986).
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ii. Violence in KwaZulu-Natal and the Midlands
KwaZulu-Natal experienced very high levels of political violence in the 1980s and
1990s, which did not end with the 1994 election (Taylor R., 2002). The conflict
between the political parties of the ANC and Inkatha for control of the province
was encouraged by the Apartheid state that provided weapons and training for
Inkatha members (Jeffrey, 1997; Aitchison J., 1993, 1998). The homicide rate in
1993 reached over 200 per 100 000 in the province (Thomson J. 1994, p. 47),
with 46% of all political violence in the country occurring in KwaZulu- Natal
(Human Rights Commission 1994, p. 17). The political violence of the past
continues however to impact the present, with the province and Midlands district
continuing to experience above average levels of violence.
The levels of violence in the policing district of the Midlands were higher than the
provincial average, as shown in the table below.
Total reported Murder, Attempted Murder and Culpable Homicide
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
KZN 19,151 18,374 16,891 15,820 16,417 16,354 15,075 14,554 15,963
IVldlnd 3,736 3,724 13,635 3,398 3,675 3,480 3,105 2,658 2,690
Total reported Grievous Bodily Harm and Common Assault
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
KZN 50,584 52,319 53,175 51,952 53,339 59,961 67,226 68,360 73,835
Mdlnd 9,172 9,491 9,632 9,555 9,566 11,167 13,039 12,180 13,007
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In the 1998 -2002 period the Midlands experienced the following crimes:
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Percentage Change
1998-2001
Murder 1461 1263 1182 1012 1044 -28.5
Attempted Murder 1,704 1,689 1,485 1,229 1,253 -26.5
Culpable Homicide 510 528 438 417 393 -23
Aggravated Robbery 3,217 3,239 3,262 2,925 3,574 11
Rape 1,587 1,655 1,708 1,610 1,640 3.3
G.B.H. 5,056 6,095 6,521 5,754 5,821 15
Common Assault 4,510 5,072 6,518 6,426 7,186 59
(Data from C.I.A.C.)
The rates per 100 000 are higher than the provincial and national average, as
seen below: (Data from C.I.A.C. and Stats SA)
Murder Rate per 100 000.
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The Midlands had the third highest level of violence for the province in 2002,
constituting 17% of all violent crime for the province. The Durban North and
Durban South police districts had the highest levels, and these three districts
combined account for 57% of all violent crime in KwaZulu-Natal.
The levels of lethal violence have decreased in the past five years; however, the
levels of non-lethal assault have increased at a greater rate. Overall the levels of
extreme violence (IYlurder, Attempted Murder and Culpable Homicide) have
declined, and at a greater rate than the provincial and national averages.
The violence prior to 1994 was largely contained within the Black communities,
and the intra-racial nature of the violence would have encouraged the White and
Asian population to perceive it as not directly affecting them. Due to their lower
risk of violence prior to 1994, and the more "equitable" risk post-1994, the White
and Asian communities would perceive violence to have increased, even though
the levels have declined. Fear of violence and crime is as important an
influencer of behaviour as crime itself.
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iii. Methodology
The survey was conducted upon 700 students in their final or second to final
year of high school (aged between 16 and 20 years) in 8 different schools all in
or near Pietermaritzburg (a mid-sized South African city in the province of
KwaZulu-Natal). Of those 700 initial participants, 180 were excluded due to
incompletion; the majority had not completed the second section of the
questionnaire, while others had not indicated their gender. The students were
informed of the confidentiality of the survey and required to only provide
information on their age, gender, ethnicity and parental occupation to ensure
anonymity and increase accuracy.
The survey was conducted in classrooms during normal school hours. Only the
researcher was present during the survey to ensure anonymity for the students.
The questionnaire was handed out, and the students were given up to 30
minutes to complete it and then the researcher collected it. At no time were the
questionnaires seen by members of staff, nor were students allowed to converse
during the research period.
The schools were situated within the greater Pietermaritzburg municipal area,
which falls within the Midlands policing district. One school had only Black
students, one only Asian and Coloureds, the remaining schools were multi-racial,
having a majority of Black students. One school was a female only private
school, the remaining were all co-ed government schools. The economic class of




The subjects were as follows:
Black White Coloured Asian Total I
Male 163 43 12 39 257
Female 122 100 3 38 263
Total 285 143 15 77 520
Percentage 54.8 27.5 2.8 14.8 100
KZN race percentage 81.7 6.6 1.4 9.4 100
The low number of Coloured students was problematic. They form only a small
minority in the province, and were too small a group to be useful statistically.
Some difficulty was experienced in conducting the survey; in particular resistance
was met in six schools that refused to allow the survey to be conducted. The
reasons given included: A refusal to let the students be categorised by ethnicity;
A student was stabbed by another during school the day prior to the survey
being conducted (The researcher also felt that the closeness of this incident
would severely prejudice the research.); The head teacher of the all female
school refused, stating that: "Our girls would never do that sort of thing." The
remaining two schools gave no reason for their refusal.
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iv. Questionnaire 1: Cultural and Reactive Violence Scale
Taking from the work of Funk, Elliott, Urman, Flores and Moc (1999), 0' Keefe
(1997) and Vleicer, Huckel and Hansen (1989) a set of questions was developed
to test attitudes towards cultural and reactive violence. (See appendix c for
complete survey sheet)
The tests developed in the USA do not completely cover the experiences or
attitudes that may be held by South African students, thus additional items were
added. The occurrence of armed community watch, vigilante activity and mob
and crowd attacks upon suspected criminals are all within the "knowledge" of
South Africans; to ignore these activities would reduce the accuracy of the
survey.
The initial scale consisted of 30 items divided into two sections both using a
Likert scale. (1= Agree strongly, 5= Disagree strongly; and 1= strongly support,
5= not support at all). A pre-test on 80 students produced a Cronburg's Alpha of
.723. The survey was subsequently reduced to 26 items; certain items that
reduced reliability were dropped. The final survey was divided into two sections,
the first asking the subjects to state their level of support for certain statements
regarding acts of individual, group and state violence (19 items), the second
section asking the subjects to state their level of support for certain actions of
violence committed by individuals, groups and the state (11 items).
The questions are divided into two areas: Reactive Violence and Culture of
Violence.
Reactive Violence items are those attitudes that will show the immediate
response to a threat. They include personal violent behaviour, the "reaction" to
a situation. These attitudes will be most likely to change according to the
situation and be most influenced by any form of educational training.
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Culture of Violence items are those attitudes that show the perception of the
society as a dangerous arena. These attitudes will be internalised to a greater
degree and more difficult to change or alter. Support for these items show that
the subject sees the world as a dangerous place and that measures have to be
taken to ensure their own safety. Violent behaviour will be endorsed as a means
of protection against threats of other violence. (Funk, Elliott, Urman, Flores and
Moc, 1999; Kraus, 1988; Perry, 1997; Straker, Mendelsohn, Moosa, and Tudin,
1996).
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1. It is necessary to carry a we~on to protect oneself. Reactive
2. Communities should be allowed to protect themselves from Cultural
crime however they want.
3. You should be tauqht how to fight to protect yourself Reactive
4. The police cannot reduce crime on their own (deleted) Cultural
5. It is okay to hit someone if they insult you or your family Reactive
6. Society today is more violent than 10 years aqo. (deleted) Cultural
7. You should do whatever you want to protect yourself Reactive
8. You have to protect yourself, because no one else is goinq to Reactive
9. I should have the right to kill someone who steals my Cultural
property
10. Traditional forms of justice and punishment would work Cultural
better in reducinq crime.
11. More punishment would reduce crime Cultural
12. The death penalty should be used to punish criminals Cultural
13. The public should be allowed to punish criminals Cultural
14. Those who use violence are respected Cultural
15. The government doesn't care about my community Cultural
16. My community is under great threat from violence Cultural
17. Communities should be allowed to keep out potential Cultural
criminals
18. I would like to carry a qun Reactive
19. I am worried about beinq a victim of violence (deleted) Cultural
1= strongly support 5= not support at all
20. Parent slaps child for lying to her Reactive
21. A community-watch patrol stops and searches someone they Cultural
suspect of beinq a thief
22. Girl slaps her boyfriend who is flirting with someone else Reactive
(deleted)
23. A man shoots someone who is trying to steal his car Reactive
24. Husband slaps his wife when she argues with him Reactive
25. A crowd of people chase, catch and beat up a suspected Reactive
pick-pocket
26. The police shoot and kill an escaping prisoner Reactive
27. A crowd of people chase, catch and beat to death a Reactive
suspected rapist
28. A community-watch patrol catch and beat up a thief Reactive
29. The police beat up a suspect to get information about a Reactive
crime
30. A man punches his girlfriend when she cheats on him Reactive
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v. Results
The 26-item survey had a Cronbach's Alpha of .7631, showing a strong level of
internal reliability. The mean and standard deviation (SD) for all results is shown
below:
1= Agree strongly 5= Disagree strongly Mean SD
1. It is necessary to carry a weapon to protect oneself. 3.25 1.48
2. Communities should be allowed to protect themselves from crime 2.89 1.6
however they want.
3. You should be tauqht how to fiqht to protect yourself 1.77 1.22
4. The police cannot reduce crime on their own (deleted) 1.79 1.32
5. It is okay to hit someone if they insult you or your family 3.53 1.59
6. Society today is more violent than 10 years ago. (deleted) 2.0 1.44
7. You should do whatever you want to protect yourself 2.47 1.46
8. You have to protect yourself because no one else is qoinq to 2.15 1.35
9. I should have the right to kill someone who steals my property 4.17 1.31
10. Traditional forms of justice and punishment would work better in 2.63 1.49
reducing crime.
11. More punishment would reduce crime 1.91 1.35
12. The death penalty should be used to punish criminals 2.41 1.64
13. The public should be allowed to punish criminals 3.32 1.55
14. Those who use violence are respected 3.99 1.45
15. The government doesn't care about my community 2.78 1.43
16. My community is under qreat threat from violence 3.0 1.47
17. Communities should be allowed to keep out potential criminals 2.28 1.38
18. I would like to carry a qun 3.58 1.62
19. I am worried about beinq a victim of violence (deleted) 2.17 1.51
1= stronqly support 5= not support at all
20. Parent slaps child for lying to her 3.71 1.49
21. A community-watch patrol stops and searches someone they suspect 2.42 1.49
of being a thief
22. Girl slaps her boyfriend who is flirting with someone else (deleted) 3.32 1.57
23. A man shoots someone who is tryinq to steal his car 2.72 1.54
24. Husband slaps his wife when she argues with him 4.58 1.09
25. A crowd of people chase catch and beat up a suspected pick-pocket 3.53 1.48
26. The police shoot and kill an escaping prisoner 2.96 1.56
27. A crowd of people chase, catch and beat to death an suspected 3.01 1.58
rapist
28. A community-watch patrol catch and beat UP a thief 2.74 1.53
29. The police beat up a suspect to qet information about a crime 3.62 1.45
30. A man punches his girlfriend when she cheats on him 4.53 2.4
These results can be further broken down into attitudes towards cultural and
responsive violence. The respondents demonstrated that there were significant
differences in their responses as shown below:
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Race Gender Cultural Mean Responsive Mean
Black Male 2.89 3.01
Female 3.07 3.42
Total 2.96 3.19
White Male 2,29 2.78
Female 2,99 3,57
Total 2.78 3.33
Asian Male 2.77 2.76
Female 3.03 3.36
Total 2.9 3.06
Coloured Male 2.45 3.08
Female 3.15 4.07
Total 2.59 3.28
Total Male 2.75 2.94
Female 3.03 3.48
Total 2,89 3.21
There are significant differences in the means of the two forms of responses. In
all cases males show a greater support for all types of violence, while support for
cultural forms of violence is higher than for responsive violence. This supports
the idea that violence is inherent and internalised by the teenagers,
However, means do not fully explore the nature of the responses. They can hide
patterns of responses, and in this research that has occurred. The number of
responses for "strongly support" and "strongly oppose" will tell more about the
true nature of the individual attitudes, rather than being hidden within the mean
data.
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When the responses of 1 and 2 (Agree strongly and Agree) are combined and
collated, then turned into a percentage of total responses then the results would
be as follows:
Total Black White Asian Coloured
Quest'n male female male female male female male female male female
Reactive 43.1 29.0 40.9 33.9 47.1 23.0 49.2 30.4 40.1 12.5
Culture 53.0 47.5 49.2 47.8 63.5 47.6 54.0 45.7 63.7 50.0
The gender and racial differences are significant. In particular, the higher
support for cultural violence than reactive violence. Males of all races give
greater support than females, although there is only a 1.5 difference between
Black males and females in their support for cultural violence.
The greatest support is by White and Coloured males for cultural violence, while
the lowest support is by White and Coloured females for reactive violence.
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Percentage of 1+2 (Strongly Agree + Agree)
Black White Asian Coloured
M F M F M F M F
1. It is necessary to carry a weapon 41.1 16.4 41.9 14 43.6 15.8 41.7 0
2. Communities protect themselves 48.5 37.7 67.4 31 38.5 36.8 50 33.3
3. You should be tauqht how to fiqht 77.9 78.7 72.1 75 76.9 86.8 83.3 100
4. Police cannot reduce crime on their own 79.1 86.1 72.1 69 76.9 68.4 91.7 100
5. OK to hit someone if they insult you 41.7 19.7 51.2 14 35.9 7.9 33.3 0
6. Society is more violent than 10 yr. aqo 57.1 69.7 88.4 77 82.1 76.3 91.7 100
7. Should do whatever to protect yourself 63.8 51.6 67.4 37 51.3 47.4 41.7 0
8. Have to protect vourself no one else is 65.6 75.4 76.7 43 59 57.9 58.3 33.3
9. The riqht to kill someone who steals 22.7 6.6 18.6 7 20.5 2.6 16.7 0
10. Traditional forms of justice work better 49.1 38.5 72.1 55 41 39.5 66.7 33.3
11. More punishment would reduce crime 69.3 70.5 93 75 79.5 81.6 100 66.7
12. The death penalty should be used 50.9 51.6 97.7 61 66.7 63.2 66.7 66.7
13. Public be allowed to punish criminals 35.6 31.1 44.2 18 48.7 28.9 33.3 0
14. Those who use violence are respected 26.4 17.2 20.9 3 15.4 15.8 66.7 0
15. Govt. doesn't care about my community 44.8 41.8 48.8 39 61.5 18.4 41.7 33.3
16. My community is under qreat threat 35 49.2 46.5 29 43.6 18.4 33.3 66.7
17. Communities to keep out criminals 62.6 46.7 86 59 71.8 63.2 91.7 66.7
18. I would like to carry a gun 44.8 17.2 30.2 9 48.7 5.3 50 0
19. I am worried about beinq a victim 58.9 69.7 53.5 78 56.4 86.8 66.7 66.7
20. Parent slaps child for Iyinq to her 24.5 19.7 20.9 18 30.8 36.8 8.3 0
21. A community-watch stops suspect 48.5 53.3 79.1 65 53.8 39.5 75 66.7
22. Girl slaps her boyfriend who is flirting 19 47.5 44.2 21 46.2 42.1 41.7 0
23. A man shoots car thief 62.6 43.4 65.1 13 61.5 36.8 66.7 0
24. Husband slaps his wife when she arques 5.5 4.9 0 0 69.2 0 0 0
25. Crowd beat up suspected pick-pocket 30.7 20.5 39.5 8 43.6 15.8 33.3 0
26. Police kill an escaping prisoner 38 35.2 74.4 35 56.4 36.8 50 33.3
27. Crowd beat to death a suspected rapist 38 38.5 51.2 33 51.3 42.1 41.7 0
28. Community-watch patrol beat up a thief 53.4 44.3 72.1 38 64.1 36.8 50 33.3
29. Police beat UP suspect to qet information 27 19.7 44.2 10 38.5 15.8 41.7 0
30. Man punches girlfriend when she cheats 20.2 9 2.3 0 10.3 2.6 0 0




Scores below 50% in italics, above 70% in Bold
Black White Asian Coloured
M F M F M F M F
1. It is necessary to carry a weapon 41.1 16.4 41.9 14 43.6 15.8 41.7 0
3 You should be taught how to fight 77.9 78.7 72.1 75 76.9 86.8 83.3 100
5. OK to hit someone if they insult you 41.7 19.7 51.2 14 35.9 7.9 33.3 0
7 Should do whatever to protect yourself 63.8 51.6 67.4 37 51.3 47.4 41.7 0
8 Have to protect yourself, no one else is 65.6 75.4 76.7 43 59 57.9 58.3 33.3
18 I would like to carry a gun 44.8 17.2 30.2 9 48.7 5.3 50 0
20 Parent slaps child for lying to her 24.5 19.7 20.9 18 30.8 36.8 8.3 0
22 Girl slaps her boyfriend who is flirting 19 47.5 44.2 21 46.2 42.1 41.7 0
23 A man shoots car thief 62.6 43.4 65.1 13 61.5 36.8 66.7 0
24 Husband slaps his wife when she argues 5.5 4.9 0 0 69.2 0 0 0
25 Crowd beat up suspected pick-pocket 30.7 20.5 39.5 8 43.6 15.8 33.3 0
26 Police kill an escaping prisoner 38 35.2 74.4 35 56.4 36.8 50 33.3
27 Crowd beat to death a suspected rapist 38 38.5 51.2 33 51.3 42.1 41.7 0
28 Community-watch patrol beat up a thief 53.4 44.3 72.1 38 64.1 36.8 50 33.3
29 Police beat up suspect to get information 27 19.7 44.2 10 38.5 15.8 41.7 0
30 Man punches girlfriend when she cheats 20.2 9 2.3 0 10.3 2.6 0 0
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Cultural Violence
Black White Asian Coloured
M F M F M F M F
2 Communities protect themselves 48.5 37.7 67.4 31 38.5 36.8 50 33.3
4 Police cannot reduce crime on their own 79.1 86.1 72.1 69 76.9 68.4 91.7 100
6 Society is more violent than 10 yr. ago 57.1 69.7 88.4 77 82.1 76.3 91.7 100
9 The right to kill someone who steals 22.7 6.6 18.6 7 20.5 2.6 16.7 0
10 Traditional forms of justice work better 49.1 38.5 72.1 55 41 39.5 66.7 33.3
11 More punishment would reduce crime 69.3 70.5 93 75 79.5 81.6 100 66.7
12 The death penalty should be used 50.9 51.6 97.7 61 66.7 63.2 66.7 66.7
13 Public be allowed to punish criminals 35.6 31.1 44.2 18 48.7 28.9 33.3 0
14 Those who use violence are respected 26.4 17.2 20.9 3 15.4 15.8 66.7 0
15 Govt. doesn't care about my community 44.8 41.8 48.8 39 61.5 18.4 41.7 33.3
16 My community is under great threat 35 49.2 46.5 29 43.6 18.4 33.3 66.7
17 Communities to keep out criminals 62.6 46.7 86 59 71.8 63.2 91.7 66.7
19 I am worried about being a victim 58.9 69.7 53.5 78 56.4 86.8 66.7 66.7
21 A community-watch stops suspect 48.5 53.3 79.1 65 53.8 39.5 75 66.7
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Analysis
Males are more supportive of the use of violence, and the carrying of weapons.
They also support at a higher degree the use of violence by others (police,
community patrols). Females do feel more threatened by violence, and offer less
support for its use. This can be explained as although they are less likely to be
victims of severe assault or homicide, they have a greater fear of victimisation.
Male responses are only low for direct violent acts such as a man hitting his wife
or girlfriend. The unusual response is that both males and females do not think
that those who use violence get respect, but are willing to support its use.
In regard to community based violence (Questions 2, 16, 17, 21, 25, 27, 28),
there is general support for its use, although this support diminishes as the level
of violence increases.
Weapon carrying (Questions 1 and 18) is not strongly supported, although males
score much higher than females. However, there is strong support for severe
punishment of criminals and the control of potential criminals.
There is stronger support for organised forms of policing than simple mob
punishment. Support for the "beating" of a thief increases when it is conducted
by a formalised group (community watch), rather than the informal crowd. This
is further reinforced by the support given to police killing an escaping prisoner.
There are some inconsistencies in the responses. In particular, the differences in
support for using violence to protect property - Questions 9 and 23 address this.
A maximum of 22.7% of males support the right to kill someone who steals;
while a maximum of 66.7% support someone shooting a car thief. The shooting
of someone might not result in his or her death, and thus the greater level of
support for this action. The person can believe that they did not intend to kill by
shooting, and thus the action is more acceptable.
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The questions on punishment are important in understanding how the subjects
conceive of the role of punishment in reducing crime, and who should be allowed
to engage in the punishment of offenders.
There is greater support for more punishment to reduce crime, but this support
does not translate into a consistent support for the death penalty. A majority of
respondents support the use of capital punishment by the state, but this support
has to be understood in the use of capital punishment as a political weapon in
the past with little to do with crime control. Thus there is a contradiction; strong
support for harsher punishment, but less support for the death penalty. There is
still a majority of respondents in support for the death penalty.
Punishment of criminals by the community is not strongly supported, in contrast
to formalised community organisations such as community watch, whose actions
are given more support. This is further reinforced by the strong support for
communities having the right to keep out "potential criminals", a possible result
of the rise in enclosed suburbs, and the belief that communities can keep out
criminals and keep out crime. This formalisation of who can punish is important.
There appears to be a belief that punishment and control have to be bound
within some form of authoritative structure, and not left merely to "the mob".
In general there is consistent strong support for harsh punishment across all
respondents, but this is couched within the belief that this control and
punishment has to operate within a formalised structure of policing or
community control. Thus, extreme violence is approved, as long as the people
who do it are wearing a uniform.
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The various questions relating to interpersonal violence (Questions 5, 20, 22, 24,
30) all have low levels of support. All the questions involve violence that would
occur between family and acquaintances, and it can be argued that the subjects
have a greater level of direct awareness of this form of violence. The low level
of support is reinforced by the opposition to giving respect to those who use
violence (Question 14). The high support given by Asian males to a husband
slapping his wife when she argues with him (69.2%) is a strange result in
comparison to the other group's responses to that question, which is generally
negative. It is further complicated when compared to the response to Question
30 (Man punches girlfriend when she cheats on him: 10.3%), which might well
be considered a greater cause for a violent response. It could be explained by
the position of women within the marriage, and that violence against the married
woman is seen as less deviant.
The fear of personal victimisation is high, particularly for females (Question 19).
This fear has to be seen in contrast to the responses to threats to their
community, and here there is a much lower support for the idea that their
community is under great threat from violence (Question 16). The fear of
females can be seen as a fear of direct violence from those around them, and
that the violence is not directed against their entire community, but specific
people, they amongst them.
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vi. Questionnaire 2: Violent Scenarios
This was designed to retest the subject's attitudes towards the use of violence.
Scenarios were briefly described and the subject had to mark which response
was in their opinion the most appropriate (see appendix c for complete
questionnaire). Three scenarios were used, a mother and child, boyfriend and
girlfriend and two male strangers. In each scenario, six (in the case of mother
and child) or seven (for the other two scenarios) were described of differing
behaviours that could illicit violent responses.
The students had to select a response they believed appropriate for each
scenario from the following:
No action Talk to them Verbally Physically Slap Punch or
threaten threaten kick
1 Child fiqhts another child
2 Child hits the parent first
3 Child calls the parent insultinq names
4 Child hits a smaller child
5 Child sexually qrabs another child
6 Child threatens to run away from home
7 Sally cheats on Tom
8 Sally hits Tom first
9 Sally flirts with someone else
10 Sally calls Tom insulting names
11 Sally threatens to leave Tom
12 Sally hits someone smaller and weaker than herself
.- -
13 Sally refuses to have sex with Tom
14 Ed hits Frank first in an arqument
15 Ed calls Frank insultinq names
16 Ed verbally threatens Frank
17 Ed fights another person
18 Ed insults Frank's family
19 Ed hits someone smaller and weaker
20 Ed flirts with Frank's qirlfriend
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The results were tabulated to show the percentage of responses that supported
the use of physical punishment of either "slap", "punch or kick". These
responses will demonstrate a positive attitude towards the use of violence.
Black White Asian Coloured
M F M F M F M F
1 Child fiqhts another child 3.1 1.6 2.3 4 2.6 2.6 16.7 0
2 Child hits the parent first 53.4 35.2 46.5 19 38.5 23.7 33.3 0
3 Child calls the parent 53.4 36.9 39.5 28 17.9 23.7 41.7 0
insultinq names
4 Child hits a smaller child 22.1 13.9 18.6 20 10.3 15.8 16.7 0
5 Child sexually grabs 31.3 35.2 34.9 16 41 26.3 75 0
another child
6 Child threatens to run 6.7 4.1 2.3 0 7.7 7.9 16.7 0
away from home
7 Sally ch_eats on Tom 21.5 2.5 0 0 2.6 2.6 8.3 0
8 Sally hits Tom first 31.9 13.1 4.7 3 12.8 0 16.7 0
9 Sally flirts with someone 19.6 11.5 0 0 2.6 0 8.3 0
else
10 Sally calls Tom insulting 25.2 19.7 0 0 12.8 2.6 25 0
names
11 Sally threatens to leave 1.2 2.5 0 0 5.1 0 8.3 0
Tom
12 Sally hits someone 6.1 9.8 0 2 5.1 10.5 33.3 0
smaller and weaker than
herself
13 Sally refuses to have sex 4.9 2.5 0 1 5.1 0 0 0
with Tom
14 Ed hits Frank first in an 55.8 24.6 62.8 4 28.2 21.1 66.7 0
arqument
15 Ed calls Frank insulting 39.9 13.9 23.3 1 12.8 7.9 33.3 0
names
16 Ed verbally threatens 22.7 7.4 11.6 1 15.4 2.6 41.7 0
Frank
17 Ed fiqhts another person 9.8 11.5 2.3 2 7.7 7.9 16.7 0
18 Ed insults Frank's family 49.1 27 46.5 8 35.9 15.8 58.3 0
19 Ed hits someone smaller 23.3 18 20.9 14 17.9 26.3 33.3 0
and weaker
20 Ed flirts with Frank's 43.6 36.9 44.2 13 51.3 39.5 58.3 0
Iqirlfriend
In general there was a low support for the use of physical violence. Violence
was most often supported in the mother-child scenario, with the mother using
violence when the child hit her, insulted her or sexually grabbed another child.
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In the boyfriend-girlfriend scenario there was a universal low support for the use
of violence.
In the male stranger scenario there was support for violence when the person
was physically attacked, verbally insulted, or when the person's girlfriend was
being flirted with. This final situation had high support from females as well as
males.
The difference between the three scenarios is significant in that there are
contradictions in the type of violence that is supported. The low level of support
for violence within the boyfriend-girlfriend scenario has to be understood within
the context of the subjects themselves. This type of violence is the form that
they are most likely to encounter, and within the schools directly dealt with.
Violence between males is supported in the cases of insult or threat or attack.
Nevertheless, even this support is not at an extremely high level, even for males.
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vi. Comparison of Questionnaires 1 and 2
The two sets of questions both seek to find out the respondent's attitudes
towards the use of violence. The difference in the responses is significant and
important to understand.
Overall respondents were willing to give far greater support for the use of
violence in the first Questionnaire. They showed very strong support for cultural
violence, the use of violence against criminals and suspected criminals by
individuals and official and quasi-official agencies. Interpersonal violence
between intimates was less supported.
In comparison, the responses for Questionnaire 2 were much less supportive of
the use of violence. However, in the scenario of male strangers violence was
supported by over 50% of males when the person was hit.
If the responses are taken as a whole, then the use of violence is supported.
However, this has to be contained within a stricter analysis of the type of
violence that is supported. The Cultural Violence, which is done by others, is
supported. It is always easier to support violence that is conducted by a third
party, than to do it yourself. The differences in responses between the
Questionnaires demonstrate this clearly.
Violence does not occur in a vacuum, but is influenced by the attitudes and
actions of the direct community and significant individuals. The higher levels of
support for violence by a third party, rather than violence by the individual are
understandable in that the use of a third party enables the individual to distance
themselves form the violence. What also has to be taken into account is the
structure of violence in the pre-1994 period, wherein the state and its agents
acted to protect the White communities, violence was something that generally
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occurred "outside" the White and Asian communities, and was thus not of their
concern.
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vii. Anomie and Attitudes
The responses from these questionnaires demonstrate significant differences in
attitudes between races and genders. The key results are the strong support for
the use of violence, in particular punishment conducted by the state or its
agents. This is most marked in the response of the White males. This result has
to be seen within the social context of the changing nature of the South African
society. The abolishment of the restrictions of Apartheid has resulted in an
apparent wave of crime. The massive increase in privatised security, and an
increase in insecurity point to increased fear of victimisation. The belief that the
present is more violent than the past (Question 6) also shows that social beliefs
of crime and violence do not match the reality of violence.
The differing attitudes demonstrate not only attitudes, but also experiences.
Whites are least at risk from violence, but they demonstrate a strong positive
regard for the use of violence. This violence is however, not of their own
actions, but the actions of others, third parties that demonstrate some form of
legitimacy, such as police or community patrols. They oppose violence that is
more random in nature, less controlled, such as by individuals or by a mob.
The results clearly show support for the thesis that people will support violence
when it is used by others, and are less supportive when they are required to
engage in that same violence.
This has important implications for the future of violence in South Africa. The
use of privatised security, community patrols and vigilante groups and the move
of the middle class into anomic guarded suburbs will not reduce the levels of
violence. These agencies serve to reduce the immediate fears of violence, but in
the long term will only serve to create a more unstable society, based upon the
use of others to engage in violence to act as "protectors". This will not reduce
crime, nor will it end the "normal" violence and homicides that occur in the
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home. An illusion of security with the moral justification to commit violence is all
that is created.
Violence will continue for as long as there is support for it to occur. This
research clearly shows that there is strong support for such action, and that the
communities that feel most anomic in the society will support the greater use of
violence to "protect" themselves from the perceived and real threats to their lives
and security.
In research conducted into attitudes towards violence in the USA, African
American males score the highest in support for the use of violence (Funk,
Elliott, Urman, Flores and Moc, 1999; Kraus, 1988; Upmeyer, 1989; Jenkins and
Bell, 1997). It is argued that this is the result of their estrangement from the
central society. This same argument can be placed upon the White males in this
study. The males interviewed were in racially mixed schools, from middle and
lower middle class backgrounds. They are the ones whose parents reaped the
benefits from the Apartheid State, and the sense of control that was brought
with it. Now they are ones who are not included in the state forms of regulation,
and thus are anomic and react to threats of crime in a more violent manner, but
couched within a community framework.
The formally excluded, the Blacks, Coloured and Asians now have a greater
ability to influence their socio-political environment. Thus, they will have a
greater sense of community control, and a lower sensation of anomie. It can be
argued that the Apartheid system created a social system based upon a lack of
regulation and integration, and this process, although ended, still influences how
individuals and communities perceive their role and place in the "New South
Africa".
Some of the results are positive. The lower rates of pro-violence attitudes
amongst Black students is important, as they are the second highest risk group
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for violence. Importantly, the lower levels of support for reactive violence are
encouraging, as this should translate into less immediate violence. The cultural
attitudes can be influenced by state polices, and the effectiveness of the Criminal
Justice System in providing adequate policing and justice to the public.
This research is limited, and should not be extrapolated to the entire society.
Only a small sample was used, and results will be different, in particular for
Coloured students who are most at risk from homicide.
All these attitudes can change, but the direction they change will depend to a
significant degree upon the effectiveness of the state to provide a safe
environment, as well as the communities in which the subjects rely upon the
state for social control.
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Chapter 7
Anomic Conditions of Communities
South Africa faces an anomic future, communities isolated and reliant upon their
own resources to provide protection and safety. The growth of vigilantes and
private security indicates increased reliance upon non-state forms of social
control. The belief of the White farming community that crimes committed
against them are political attacks illustrates their isolation from the greater
society. If the state does not address the perceived fears of these communities,
they will increasingly rely upon their own resources, often employing violence,
and not the Criminal Justice System to protect themselves.
Individuals and communities want to be safe from violence, and if they believe
that the state cannot or will not protect them, they will seek alternative systems
and forms of protection. As has been argued in previous chapters, the
willingness to support the use of violence by others is a key factor in the creation
and maintenance of violence in South Africa. The use of private security,
vigilantes and self-protection by communities that are anomic will increase the
chance of violence being used to control crime and threats to those communities.
Private security and vigilantes will not be concerned with the needs of the
greater society, only that of the individual or community that has hired or
encouraged them.
Communities that do not rely upon the Criminal Justice System will remain
anomic. As Durkheim argues, the state's punishment of the criminal serves to
reinforce the moral order, to re-establish it upon a level plane. The community is
able to see "justice done", and reinforce their own beliefs and solidarity. Public
protestation serves to bring the community together, to allow for increased
interpersonal communication, increased social bonding, and reinforcement of the
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normative order (Durkheim 1984, p. 102). Without the state delivering justice
communities will become trapped in a cycle of fear and isolation.
Within the anomic communities in South Africa, the state's role of providing
justice and social control is weak or non-existent. This is due to either the
community willingly excluding them, such as in the townships prior to 1994, and
in the gated communities of post-1994; and when the police have not effectively
established themselves within a community, such as in informal settlements. It
is in the latter that vigilante activities will occur, although the use of private
security and the use of gated communities can be understood as a similar
process. The use of vigilantes and private security are not only a symptom of
anomie, but act as a continued positive feedback to create more anomie. As
communities become used to relying upon their own resources for social control
and justice, they will become more estranged from the state criminal justice
system, and more anomic.
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i. Private Security
The actions of vigilante groups and the private security industry stem from the
same cause, that of the idea that the community in which they operate cannot
rely upon the S.A.P.S. to protect them from the threat or reality of crime.
Private Security firms have been able to fuel their growth from the large
numbers of experienced officers who left the S.A.p.s., as well as the increased
fear of crime and victimisation of those who are able to afford their services, and
an apparent increase in theft, car-jackings and assault. With 166 000 registered
security officers in 2000, and another estimated 50 000 in-house security
officers, the estimated 216 000 private security personnel far outnumber the 90
000 uniformed members of the S.A.P.s. (Schonteich, 2000).
Privatised security firms have increased in number and scale dramatically since
1994 (Schonteich, 2000; Altbecker and Rauch, 1999).
S.A.P.S. Budget and Turnover of Private Security
Industry (R Billions)
16 -r------------------








1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(Altbecker and Rauch, 1999)
1Il S.A.P.S.
• Private Security
Their annual turnover compares favourably with the annual S.A.P.s. budget, and
although the S.A.P.s. budget has increased by over 60% between 1994 and
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1999, the private security industry has increased its turnover by over 500%. The
S.A.P.s. has to serve the entire South African population of forty six million,
while private security serves a small fraction of that population.
The implications of this growth are the decrease of individual and community
reliance upon the S.A.P.S. This effectively "frees" the S.A.p.s. from having to
provide police for communities that can afford private security, and thus allows
them in theory to concentrate on other communities and areas. This is however
counterproductive in the long term, as the "privatised communities" lack of
reliance upon the state for policing will increase their anomic position. The
communities will become more isolated from the state criminal justice system,
and from the rest of the society. However, the S.A.P.s. cannot cope with the
levels of crime in South Africa at present, and private security offers a way past
short-term problems.
The S.A.P.s. has been left in a difficult situation in that the private security firms
are able to fill the policing gap that they cannot cover. However the continued
growth of this sector means that there will be a constant reduction in the
reliance that is placed upon the police, and that they will be excluded from their
formal role of policing in those areas that the private security firms operate and
control. The privatisation of certain functions of the S.A.P.S. can be reasonably
accommodated, but to increasingly rely upon a non-state system of policing will
continue to support the anomic state within the society.
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ii. Vigilantism
"Residents of an East Rand squatter camp each paid R22 this week to bail
a man accused of murder out of prison. Then they killed him. Johannes
Manamela left jail thinking relatives had paid his R4000 bail. Instead, he
walked into the hands of residents of the Winnie Mandela squatter camp
in Tembisa - who dragged him before a people's court and sentenced him
to die. He was stabbed and doused with petrol before a tire was placed
around his neck and set on fire.. Johannes Motaung, a recent victim of
crime in Tembisa, was one of those who paid IVlanamela's bail. "I donated
R22 when I heard what was going to happen to him. The idea of paying
bail for criminals and then killing them is liked by everyone. We want
them to know that we will get them in the end", he said."
(Sunday Times 4 July 1999)
"In February 2001, three youths were hacked to death when they tried to
break into a church building in Pimville to steal chairs. They were caught
after a member of the community raised an alarm."
(Sowetan 21 February 2001)
Linked to the growth of private security is the rise of vigilantes and vigilante
groups. These organised and spontaneous groups have arisen from the same
needs of the community that helped fuel the private security industry. Where
one community can afford the uniformed presence of security guards, the poorer
sectors rely in a similar fashion upon the vigilantes. Both serve to fill the gap of
policing.
Vigilante activity has occurred throughout South Africa, but has been in more
organised forms in the Western Cape with PAGAD, and in Limpopo Province and
Gauteng with Mapogo a Mathamaga. Both these groups have arisen from
relatively impoverished areas, and operate within communities that lack a strong
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connection to the political and economic arenas (Dixon B. and Johns L., 2001;
von Schnitzler A. et al., 2001; Harris, 2001; Nina, 1999). They form the
organised side of the vigilantism, and form a recognisable face of the much
larger presence of the spontaneous vigilante groups that form to attack specific
targets and then fade back into the community.
The roots of vigilantism can be traced back to the creation of Self Defence Units
(SDUs), Self Protection Units (SPUs) and "People's Courts". These operated
within a political framework, establishing an alternative system of justice and
social control mainly within the urban townships (Marks, 1995, Harris, 2001).
After 1994 the "People's Courts" were no longer needed, as the Criminal Justice
System was going to be reformed and made into a more representative and just
system. Unfortunately the levels of social disorder did not diminish, crime
continued, and the police and courts were not able to provide the level of
protection and control that was demanded. It was thus a logical step for
communities with a history of community-based systems of control to recreate
them, but as vigilante groups and kangaroo courts. Similar structures as pre-
1994, but now seen by the state as a threat and illegal.
The vigilante killings of criminals and suspected criminals act in a similar manner
to the role of the private security organisations, albeit in a more lethal manner.
They operate when the police are absent or unable to prevent crime from
occurring. The vigilante acts are in part the result of the anomic society, the
reliance upon the community and the estrangement from the society. They
represent the brutal face of anomie and the response to it.
There is a desire within communities for the state to provide them with sufficient
policing, vigilante acts occur in order to create a stable society; they are killing to
create social order. These actions are not designed to destabilise the state, as
the goals of the "People's Courts" were prior to 1994. The vigilantes are trying
210
to create safe communities, free from crime and threat. However, they do and
will continue to use homicide as a means of achieving this goal.
Efforts have been directed against the vigilantes, and to a much less extent
against the actions taken by the more economically advantaged in their actions
in physically closing roads to "keep out" crime. These will not succeed however,
as the increase in private security and vigilantism is a symptom of the anomic
state of the society, the fear of victimisation and the failure of the state to
successfully reduce risk.
Punishment of vigilantism will not end the behaviour, what is needed is a change
in how communities believe they are protected by the state. When they believe
that the state will protect them, vigilantism and privatised policing will lessen
their presence. However, this can only occur with a shift in the collective
consciousness of communities, and an increase in the success of the police,
courts and prisons.
Community policing in South Africa is seen as an alternative to both these
previous mechanisms (Brogden and Shearing, 1993; Mbhele, 1998). Community
Justice Forums hope to create a system and belief in restorative justice, as
opposed to the retributive acts of the vigilante. The ideal of restorative justice
cannot however operate in a policing vacuum, and an anomic society. Mbhele
(1998) shows how the forums in Umlazi, KwaZulu-l\Jatal, failed due to power
struggles between the police and the community, as well as within the
community itself. There was deep mistrust of the police by the community, as
well as an ANC and IFP conflict to control the forums, both within the community
and upper echelons of the police force. The community felt that the forums
served the needs of certain political groups - thus were biased. Once more
communities struggling over control of the institutions at the expense of the loss
of power for others. There were also cases of criminals trying to take over the
forums to control the community.
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Shearing's work in the Cape is trying to create a system of community based and
directed crime control and justice distribution (Personal communication, Toronto,
2001). This however will only feed into the already anomic society, and serve to
further move the communities away from the idea of the state as the centralised
system of crime control and justice. Communities will continue to tap into the
historical systems of "People's Courts" and the concept of the police only serving
the elite, whether it be racial, economic or political. This process will serve to
maintain the police as a secondary system to the community's primary reliance
upon non-state crime control systems.
The use of private security and vigilante acts means that the role of the state is
reduced to a secondary constituent in systems of social control, a rival in
competition for customers or a threat to their activities. Both vigilante activities
and the private security firms represent the result of an anomic society, one
where crime control is not the sole preserve of the state, but the responsibility of
the community. In addition, the community will use the means at their disposal
to increase social control and decrease the real or perceived threats that face
them, and in turn increasingly rely upon non-centralised systems of crime
control, weaken their links to the wider society, and increase their anomic
condition.
The anomic nature of these forms of homicide is very evident. The conditions
that have created these environments exist to influence the rest of the society,
and thus influence the increase in homicides, and the interpretation of such acts
within an anomic framework.
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iii. White Farmer Murders
White farming communities and their organisations such as AgriSA and the
Transvaal Farmers Union have seen the killing of White farmers as politically or
racially based attacks upon their communities (see www.rights2property.com for
more of their arguments). These organisations have called for the government
to view the killings of farmers as political acts, and to treat them as a group that
is being targeted for attack and violence (www.rights2property.com. Louw 2003,
Moolman 2003a). These attacks have appeared to have increased since 1994,
although there is no research prior to that date. The killings are often linked to
robberies of wages or more general robberies.
The work by Moolman (1999, 2003a, 2003b) places these homicides into a
broader socio-political perspective. He argues that these homicides are the
result of Nationalism; firstly in the form of Afrikaner Nationalism with the
creation of the apartheid system and its consequential oppression and alienation
of Black and White, and secondly African Nationalism and the related struggle
against modernity and the apparent loss of Black identity. He argues that the
aim of the attacks is to force the White farmers off their land. Robbery is
apparently not a motive as little is stolen, and the treatment of farm workers
does not influence the chance of attack.
However, Moolman's study of the 3544 farm and smallholding attacks from 1998
to 2001 shows that robbery is a key aim of many of these attacks. Firearms and
vehicles were stolen in 48% and 22% of cases respectively. A total of 541
homicides and 1755 injuries were reported with the number of homicides
declining by 15% during the period.
The most telling data that Moolman reports that contradicts the claims (including




Although the vast majority of the victims were White, 27.5% were non-White.
Attacks upon Whites have declined, while on non-Whites increased during the
period. As to the apparent motives for the attacks, Moolman reported that in
2361 cases (74.2%) robbery was the motive, while there were 283 (7.9%)
attacks of intimidation of farm labour and farmers, or of hatred, political revenge
or racism.
The farm attacks point more towards the shift in crime in the country, than to
any political act or goal. The attacks are better understood as part of crime
trends. Farmers are relatively easy targets, often isolated, easy to observe in
their habits and offering potentially lucrative rewards in terms of weapons,
vehicles and money (this is seen by the high number of elderly farmers who are
attacked). The risk to the attacker of being caught is small, and any risk of
being injured or killed by the farmer victim can be reduced by killing the victim
first. As crime targets are hardened with increased security, such as has
happened to banks and many suburbs, criminals will search out new targets.
Farmers can be seen as part of these new targets.
From the White farmers' perspective however, it is clear that they believe that
they are under direct attack and that the attacks are not purely robberies. AgriSA
vice-president L. Bosman stated: "It is not necessarily a political campaign, but
intimidation, racism and revenge play a role. Too many people are cruelly
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murdered without anything stolen" (Louw M., 2003). They perceive the attacks
as an attack upon them as a community, as a way of getting them off the land.
Even if the attacks are in the vast majority robberies, the perception is that the
"other" is attacking them. A response and interpretation based within an anomic
condition. The farmers are able to perceive themselves as a threatened
community, under direct attack to rid them of their lands. They do not believe
that the state has their interests at heart, and are anomic in their perceptions of
their involvement in the wider society. Their interpretation and reaction to the
killings are based within an anomic framework, and thus they have responded by
using their own form of protection with Commando groups.
The belief that a "community" is under attack from an outside threat is repeated
throughout the country. This is a result of the anornic condition of the society,
divided and fearful of external threat. The result is that of increased use of
violence or the threat of violence against those that are perceived to be
threatening the community's stability, security and socio-economic advancement.
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iv. Conclusion
The anomic conditions of South Africa have ensured that communities have
turned to their own resources for social control and protection when they
believed that the state cannot or will not protect them. The rise in private
security is a result of the White community believing that the state is not able or
willing to protect them as had occurred in the past. Within the townships, this
use of community serving agents of control had been established by political
groups as a way of providing "people's justice" and as opposition to the state.
The vigilante movement arose out of this community based activism, as they had
learnt that they could not rely upon the state to provide security for them.
These behaviours are all strong indicators of the continued anomic condition
within South Africa. The decline in township vigilantism in the late 1990s has
been a positive sign, and this combined with a greater degree of trust in the
police by Black South Africans is one factor that should reduce the levels of
violence. However, as one group is becoming less anomic, those who are hiring
private security and moving into gated communities are becoming more anomic.
This shift of the ability of the state to provide policing from one community to
another only provides short-term solutions, as in the long-term it is reproducing
a divided nation, one policed by the state, the other policed by themselves. This
is a repetition of the 1980s and 1990s with the Apartheid police ostensibly
protecting White communities, and the Black township communities creating
their own systems of policing and justice. If this path is followed, the society will
continue to remain anomic, divided and the historical anomic patterns of policing




The Future of Violence in South Africa.
"Violence and civil society cannot peacefully coexist. .. if violence
begins to plague the subjects of any civil society then that ensemble
of non-state institutions passes over into the category of an uncivil
society."
(Keane 1996, p. 71, italics in original)
Homicide will continue to pose one of the most serious threats to the long-term
stability and growth of South Africa. The country inherited a "murderous legacy"
(Thomson, 2004) from the Apartheid system, but the internalised nature of the
violence has meant that a change in the political structure has not brought about
a reduction in violence.
South Africa is anomic, the policies of Apartheid ensured the separation of race
and ethnic groups, a system that fostered and developed communities that were
separated from access to the state, while others enjoyed the economic, cultural
and social privileges and benefits of being the "correct" race group. After 1994,
this turned on its head, but the community centred perceptions did not alter.
South Africa has remained in an anornic condition, and only when this factor is
altered will crime and homicide be reduced.
A state of anomie does not however mean that homicide will occur; only that it is
more likely. In order for a homicide to transpire, someone has to be willing to
engage in an act of violence against another. Individual behaviour is a reflection
of the collective conscious and morality of the greater community or society in
which that person lives. There are of course exceptions to this, but as is clearly
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shown in homicide research there are communities that are more willing to use
violence than others (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967; Hawkins in Smith and Zahn,
1999, Phillips, 2002). Within these communities, not everyone engages in
violence; instead, they play the role of influencing how violence is perceived, and
thus encouraging or discouraging its use by others. Acceptance of high levels of
violence will result in the encouragement of its use, either by individuals, or by
third parties (Funk, Elliott, Urman, Flores and Moc, 1999; Kraus, 1988; Upmeyer,
1989; Jenkins and Bell, 1997).
For South Africa, the study of homicide is crucial in understanding the anomic
condition. The rates and patterns of homicides allow a historical understanding
of the present and a look into the future for stability and cohesion for the nation.
The study of homicide allows not only for an understanding of how the present
levels of violence arose and are maintained, but also where the state and the
society can act to reduce the levels of violence and the willingness of South
Africans to use violence. The decline in the rates of homicide since 1994 are
hopeful, but also hide a more worrying trend in the increase in non-lethal
assaults. South Africans it seems are not getting any less violent. The continued
pressures upon the state and society of economic and social disparity and
divisions, combined with the effect that AIDS is and will continue to have upon
the social framework, infrastructure and political economy could push South
Africa into an even more violent future.
South Africa has managed to create a viable society out of a destructive, violent
past. However, the rainbow nation is still divided, still violent and still scared.
The levels of violence will continue to impact upon the ability of the state, the
criminal justice system, communities and individuals to cope. If the state cannot
provide safety for its citizens, they will find it themselves, and will turn inwardly
to protect their own racial, economic and social communities. Homicide levels
can be reduced, but only through the willing partnership of state and public. The
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statistical evidence shows that South Africa has improved greatly since 1994, but
that homicide could easily halt any advances that have been achieved so far.
The anomic condition of South Africa has encouraged the internalisation of
violence and its acceptance as a normative method of social control, and
punishment in the society. Sub-cultural theories fail to fully explain the levels of
violence in South Africa. It may be that there are sub-cultures of extreme
violence in the society, but the rest of the population play a significant role in the
reinforcement of the violent behaviour by supporting its use, either by their own
personal encouragement, or the hiring and use of others who will engage in the
violence for them. These attitudes have to be understood in order for any
behavioural change to occur and the levels of violence to be reduced. If those
who are most at risk from being either victims or aggressors of violence; Le.
teenagers and young adults between 16 and 30 years, support the use of
violence by others, then violence will have a greater chance of occurring.
The increase in privatised security and social control as seen in vigilante acts and
the growth in private security after 1994 is not just a result of a changing police
service, but a shift in the attitudes of the public in the state's ability to protect
them. Although both vigilantism and private security are two economic sides of
the same private coin, vigilantism in South Africa is part of the process of
communities attempting to increase their inclusion into the greater society.
Private security has however been more involved with the separation of
communities from the rest of the society, and a result of a lack of faith in the
police and state to continue to protect those communities. Private security offers
the wealthy a social and psychological barrier to the rest of the society. It acts
as a negative feedback loop, with the reliance upon a private system of social
control the crime and violence situation is seen to have become worse.
Ironically, those race groups who are least at risk from homicide are the most
fearful of victimisation, and have a stronger belief that South Africa has become
more dangerous (Burton et al., 2004). The White and Asian communities are
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becoming more anomic, becoming more fearful of living in South Africa as the
society changes. The rise of gated communities in urban areas, that reflects a
worldwide trend, is creating a more divided society (Landman and Schonteich,
2002). This trend will create an increasingly divided and polarised urban
environment, and serve to increase the internalised separation of those with the
gated communities from the rest of South African society; they are isolated from
the society in a manner that the Apartheid architects hoped to achieve with Black
South Africans with the Group Areas Act. However, those who live there do not
rely upon the state, but purchase their social control. This is a significant long-
term problem that has to be addressed through policy measures restricting the
abilities of communities to cut themselves off from their physical and social
environments.
The anomic nature of South Africa places restraints upon the policing methods,
in particular community based policing. This policy can, and has, created
community based and community serving social control and community
protection units, that will act on behalf of the elite within the community. At this
stage in South Africa's transition a stronger centralised system of policing is
needed, moves towards decentralised and regional police will only serve to
reinforce the anomic attitudes and actions of communities as they will view the
police as "theirs" to be used to protect their interests and their goals, to the
detriment of any nationally directed goal.
The level of internalisation of violence as shown in the qualitative survey is
worrying, but understandable. The racial differences match that of the ISS 2003
national study, with White and Asian respondents being more fearful of crime
than Black and Coloured respondents are. What is however significant is the
high level at which pro-violence attitudes occur. This research exposes the
impact of violence in the society, and demonstrates how violence has become
part of South Africa's collective consciousness. Even though the majority of
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respondents are opposed to using violence themselves, they are supportive of its
use, in particular by agents of authority.
With regard to homicide statistics, the state must release timely and accurate
data. Withholding homicide and other crime data will not reduce any level of
fear amongst the public, who will base their perceptions about crime upon their
own experiences. Not releasing crime data does not mean that the crimes have
not occurred, only that the public will be less trusting of the state and police in
their abilities to fight crime. The classification of the data must be available on
gender, age and race classifications, as well as on a station level basis. In order
to reduce homicide it has to be known who is at greatest risk from being a victim
and an aggressor as well as which areas suffer the highest rates. Victimisation is
not equally spread across South Africa, but concentrated within certain age,
gender and ethnic groups. To hide this reality creates a barrier to effective
change within these high-risk groups. It is only with accurate data that any
social and policing policy can be implemented to increase safety and change
attitudes towards reducing violence. Homicide data must be seen as a necessary
reality, not a politicised football to be fought over by the state and interest
groups.
The rate of homicide can be reduced through the improvement of access to
adequate and timely medical care. Unfortunately, the state of South Africa's
health care is greatly threatened by AIDS and its economic and social impact
upon the health profession. As AIDS cases increasingly use up more health
resources, the homicide rate will increase as victims of violence will die due to
lack of medical care. This homicide problem is a public health problem and has
to be addressed as part of this wider framework.
The role of alcohol and firearms is a more difficult issue. Prior to 1996, the
majority of homicides were by knife or other stabbing weapon. The majority of
homicides within the Coloured community are still with knives. Homicides occur
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because someone wants to harm another person, firearms make the task easier.
The change in the firearm act will make firearms more difficult to own, and there
might be a reduction in the rate of firearm deaths, and a slight reduction in the
overall homicide rate. Unfortunately if a historical perspective is brought to bear,
then one can assume that South Africans will return to using knives to kill each
other. Greater faith in the S.A.P.s. ability to protect South Africans will reduce
the psychological need for a firearm, but the S.A.P.s. has yet to achieve the goal
of large-scale crime reduction. The ownership of weapons is once more an
indication of the anomic condition of the society, and the lack of connection with
the central state. The S.A.P.s. has to be moulded into a national force that
represents not just a local community, but a society.
Changing the police, restricting the ownership of firearms, improving medical
services will all affect the rates of homicide, but to ultimately change South
Africa what is needed is a change in the public's attitudes towards the use of
violence. It will not matter what the law says if individual South Africans
continue to support the use of violence to achieve their economic, social and
political goals. As George so aptly states:
"Laws cannot make men free. Only men can do that; and they can do
it only by freely choosing to do the morally right thing for the right
reason. Law can command outward conformity to moral rules, but
cannot compel the internal acts of reason and will which make an act
of external conformity to the requirements of morality a moral act."
(George R.P. 1993, p. 1)
The political and social gains achieved since 1994 could be lost unless the state
is willing to deal with the problem of redUcing violence in the society. The legacy
of Apartheid and the liberation struggle will continue to impact the society unless
anomie can be reduced, and this will only occur if communities are brought
within the control and protection of the state and the national criminal justice
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system. The dilution and disbursement of justice to a local level will only
increase anomie, and increase violence.
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Attitudes towards Violence Surveys
1. Attitudes Towards Violence Scale
2. Funk et al.'s Attitudes Towards Violence Scale
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1. Attitudes Survey
To be read to the subjects:
This survey is anonymous: Please do not place your name anywhere on these
sheets. No one will be able to find out your answers.
Please be as honest and accurate as you can, your answers will help in
understanding South African attitudes.
Thank you for your help in this survey.
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Age _
Race: Black White Asian Coloured
sex: Male Female
Parent's OCcupation: Father _ Mother
Do you agree with the following statements?
1 A I 5 0"= ~gree stronQIY = lsaaree strongly
1. It is necessary to carry a weapon to protect oneself. 1 2 3 4 5
2. Communities should be allowed to protect themselves from 1 2 3 4 5
crime however they want.
3. You should be tauqht how tofiqht to protect yourself 1 2 3 4 5
4. The police cannot reduce crime on their own 1 2 3 4 5
5. It is okay to hit someone if they insult YOU or your family 1 2 3 4 5
6. Society today is more violent than 10 years aqo. 1 2 3 4 5
7. You should do whatever you want to protect yourself 1 2 3 4 5
8. You have to protect yourself, because no one else is qoinq to 1 2 3 4 5
9. I should have the riqht to kill someone who steals my property 1 2 3 4 5
10. Traditional forms of justice and punishment would work better 1 2 3 4 5
in reducing crime.
11. More punishment would reduce crime 1 2 3 4 5
12. The death penalty should be used to punish criminals 1 2 3 4 5
13. The public should be allowed to punish criminals 1 2 3 4 5
14. Those who use violence are resoected 1 2 3 4 5
15. The qovernment doesn't care about my community 1 2 3 4 5
16. My community is under qreat threat from violence 1 2 3 4 5
17. Communities should be allowed to keep out potential criminals 1 2 3 4 5
18. I would like to carry a qun 1 2 3 4 5
19. I am worried about being a victim of violence 1 2 3 4 5
1= strongly support 5= not support at all
20. Parent slaps child for Iyinq to her 1 2 3 4 5
21. A community-watch patrol stops and searches someone they 1 2 3 4 5
suspect of beinq a thief
22. Girl slaps her boyfriend who is fJirtinq with someone else 1 2 3 4 5
23. A man shoots someone who is trvinq to steal his car 1 2 3 4 5
24. Husband slaps his wife when she arques with him 1 2 3 4 5
25. A crowd of people chase, catch and beat up a suspected pick- 1 2 3 4 5
pocket
26. The police shoot and kill an escapinq prisoner 1 2 3 4 5
27. A crowd of people chase, catch and beat to death a suspected 1 2 3 4 5
rapist
28. A community-watch patrol catch and beat UP a thief 1 2 3 4 5
29. The police beat up a suspect to qet information about a crime 1 2 3 4 5
30. A man punches his qirlfriend when she cheats on him 1 2 3 4 5--
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What action do you think would be correct in the following situations?
?flhe child dd chil8her dWhat should ~ ~~ - ... ~ _.._...........
1. Child fights another child No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
2. Child hits the parent first No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
3. Child calls the parent insulting names No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
4. Child hits a smaller child No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
S. Child sexually grabs another child No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
6. Child threatens to run away from home No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
What should Tom do to his girlfriend Sally
hen she does the follnwinn?
7. Sally cheats on Tom No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
8. Sally hits Tom first No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
9. Sally flirts with someone else No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
10 Sally calls Tom insulting names No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
11 Sally threatens to leave Tom No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
12 Sally hits someone smaller & weaker than No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
herself action them threaten threaten
13 Sally refuses to have sex with Tom No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
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What should Frank do to Ed when Ed does
the follnwinn?
14 Ed hits Frank first in an argument No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
15 Ed calls Frank insulting names No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
16 Ed verbally threatens Frank No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
17 Ed fights another person No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
18 Ed insults Frank's family No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
19 Ed hits someone smaller & weaker No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
20 Ed flirts with Frank's girlfriend No Talk to Verbally Physically Slap Punch or kick
action them threaten threaten
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2. Funk, et al.'s Attitudes towards Violence Scale
Jeanne B Funk, Robert Elliott, Michelle L. Urman, Geysa T. Flores, Rose M. Mock.
The attitudes towards violence scale: A measure for adolescents
Journal ofInterpersonal Violence, Beverly Hills, Nov 1999, Volume: 14 Issue: 11.
1. I could see myself committing a violent crime in 5 years
2. I could see myself joining a gang
3. It's okay to use violence to get what you want
4. I try to stay away from places where violence is likely (reverse scored)
5. People who use violence get respect
6. Lots of people are out to get you
7. Carrying a gun or knife would help me feel safe
8. If a person hits you, you should hit back
9. It's okay to beat up a person for badmouthing me or my family
10. It's okay to carry a gun or knife if you live in a rough neighbourhood
11. It's okay to do whatever it takes to protect myself
12. It's good to have a gun
13. Parents should tell their children to use violence if necessary
14. If someone tries to start a fight with you, you should walk away (reverse
scored)
15. Someday 111 be a victim of violence (dropped)
16. I'm afraid of getting hurt by violence (reverse scored)
17. It's too dangerous for kids my age to carry guns (dropped)
a) Factor 1 = culture of violence: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
b) Factor 2 = reactive violence: 8-14
c) Loading on both factors: 7
d) Loading on neither: 15, 16, 17
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